











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
I:\final\Thesis_Abstract.doc Use this side only 
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
 
 ABSTRACT OF THESIS  
 
Regulation 3.1.14 of the Postgraduate Assessment Regulations for Research Degrees refers These regulations are 
available via: http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/academic-services/policies-




Tianshu Zhou  
 
Address :  














China's Legal Reform of Corporate Governance: from Theoretical 
Research to Practical Solutions 
 
 





Summary:  There are two tasks of this dissertation. Firstly, it will make a contribution from a theoretical 
perspective. Some Western scholars conclude that rules and institutions transplanted from Western jurisdictions 
have not worked well in the Chinese legal system so far. This is because the level of consistency between the 
transplanted rules or institutions and the local context is still at a low level. However, this dissertation takes a 
different position. By solving a series of unanswered questions, it will make a theoretical contribution to the 
scholarship on comparative corporate governance in the context of the transitional economy. By and large, it 
will answer the question: "why can China, as representative of a transitional economy, not escape from the faith 
of legal transplant in its legal reform of corporate governance". Secondly, this dissertation will make a 
contribution from a practical perspective. Many Chinese lawyers and Western scholars complain that Chinese 
company law is suffering deeply from the problem of ambiguity. Indeed, it is poorly and inconsistently drafted. 
There is, nevertheless, no systematic study on how to solve this problem in a pragmatic manner. In light of the 
proposed theoretical research, this dissertation will provide an important response on this issue. It rebuilds the 
director's fiduciary duties and shareholder's fiduciary duties by inserting some workable legal rules from the UK 
into the existing legal regime in China. 
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Chapter I. Introduction
1.1. The Current Debate on Comparative Corporate Governance: Formal
Convergence versus Functional Convergence
In this era of globalization, the comparative investigation of corporate governance
across jurisdictions is a leading topic for corporate lawyers. There are at least two
major driving forces, which encourage corporate law scholars to place increasing
emphasis on this topic. The first is an inevitable practical need. Economic
globalization leads to the decompression of trade barriers. In this highly competitive
global market, competition is not only between products, but also between corporate
systems.1 In order to gain an advantaged position in the global market, corporate
lawyers take on the responsibility of finding the most efficient corporate model for
their own jurisdiction.2 The second driving force is largely, but not entirely, caused by
the first. Scholars encounter an important theoretical issue in the process of discerning
an economically efficient corporate governance model, namely how corporate
governance can be transformed into the most efficient model. On one hand, from a
Darwinist perspective, in a fully competitive global market, it seems that corporate
governance systems in different jurisdictions driven by economic and efficiency
considerations will be convergent to a similar pattern. One popular view is to regard
the US corporate governance system, which is oriented around shareholder value, as a
paradigm for other jurisdictions.3 On the other hand, this cross-border view of the
1 See R. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function' (2001) 49
American Journal of Comparative Law 330, also see A. Pinto, 'Globalization and the Study of
Comparative Corporate Governance' (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 477
2 See R. Gilson (n 2) 330-331, and also see C. Xi, 'In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model:
Board Reforms and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China' 2006 (22) Connecticut Journal
of International Law 1
3 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law
Journal 439, and L. Cunningham, 'Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of
Global Corporate Governance' (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 1133, and also see A. Chandler, Scale
and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990) for a
summary of the arguments surrounding "Darwinian evolution of company law toward the US
shareholder value model", see B. Cheffins, 'Law Economics and the UK's System of Corporate
Governance: Lessons from History' (2001) 90 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 71, 76 87 89, R.
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corporate governance gives rise to an important methodological issue, namely what
drives the development of the legal regime of corporate governance. Many
comparative corporate lawyers take a suspicious view of the cross-referencing of rules
and institutions among different corporate governance systems. They argue that there
is no single blueprint for success. Law is not only fostered as a result of economic
force, but political and cultural context.4 Therefore, the pressure of global
competition will not lead the different corporate governance systems to transform into
a single model. Instead, different corporate governance systems, under such force,
will become more divergent in many aspects. In order to achieve an equal level of
efficiency, the uniqueness of different systems needs to be consistently strengthened
and developed in accordance with the local politico-cultural context and pre-existing
legal infrastructure.5
Having drawn this rough picture of the theoretical debate on comparative
corporate governance, it should be noted that the debate on legal borrowing is a
long-standing core issue of the jurisprudence of comparative law. Moreover, a
considerable number of landmark studies have developed their comparative corporate
governance arguments on the basis of various theories of comparative law. Therefore,
investigating how corporate governance can be transformed into a success model is
Kraakman, J. Armour, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda and E. Rock,
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn,Oxford University
Press 2009) 5-14 This group of scholars argue the essential elements of company law are converging
across major jurisdictions.
4 W. Bratton & J. McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of Firm: The Case
Against Global Cross Reference' (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 214, D. Branson,
'The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in Corporate Governance' (2001) 34 Cornell
International Law Journal 321, S. Jacoby, 'Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospect
for Convergence' (2000) 22 Comparative Labour law and Policy Journal 5, for political determinants of
corporate governance, see M. Roe, 'Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate
Control' (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 539, cultural determinants of corporate governance, see A.
Licht, 'Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform' (2004) 20
Berkeley Journal of International Law 103, and A. Licht, 'The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A
Theory of Values and Cognitive Style' (2004) 29 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 649
5 L. Bebchuk & M. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance'
1999 (52) Stanford Law Review 127, Braendle, C. Udo and J. Noll, 'On the Convergence of National
Corporate Governance Systems' (August 2005). Available at SSRN:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=506522> accessed 20th July 2011, M. Roe, 'Some
Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and United States' (1993) 102 Yale Law Journal
1928, and also see R. Gilson, 'Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions
Matter?' (1996) 74 Washington University Law Quarterly 327
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not only a response to increasingly intensive global competition, but also tests the
current comparative law theories. A brief introduction to the fundamental comparative
law theories is essential to an accurate understanding of the debates surrounding
comparative corporate governance.
The "legal transplant" theory was originally developed by Watson based on his
study of Roman law. It refers to the "moving of a rule or a system of law from one
country to another, or from one people to another".6 By legal transplant theory,
Watson tries to prove a series of propositions including that "law is autonomous",
"legal transplant is socially easy"7 and even that "the idea of a close relationship
between law and society is a fallacy".8 Watson believes that the legal traditions and
the beliefs amongst legal professions, as compared with social, political and economic
demands, are much more important factors in influencing law-making.9 Consequently,
divergence between law and social demands become inevitable.10 Although, this
terminology is widely used to refer to the "legal borrowing and reception"
phenomenon in comparative law discipline, the theoretical implications attached to
the terminology are significantly different. Many users of this terminology are not
convinced by Watson's theory. One of the most pre-eminent of these user groups are
the contextualists. They challenge Watson's hypothesis by arguing that law is deeply
embedded in context and that any kind of law reform is pursuant to the demands of
external forces. They assert that overall, law is not autonomous, but a mirror of
society. For example, in Otto Kahn-Freund's landmark literature, he says that "any
attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its original country entails a
risk of rejection...its use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law but also of
its social and above all the political, contexts."11 Friedman, another leading supporter
for the context theory, once said: "I assume that if massive changes had taken place in
6 A. Watson, Legal Transplant: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, Athens: University of
Georgia Press 1993) 21
7 ibid 95
8 ibid 108
9 A. Watson, 'Society's Choice and Legal Change' (1980-1981) 9 Hofstra Law Review 1473
10 ibid 1480
11 Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 27
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Japanese society-and they certainly did-the legal system would have been absolutely
forced to change."12 In addition to the contextualists' scepticism, the culturalist
counter-argument is even stronger. They generally argue that "legal transplants" are
impossible. For example, Legrand states that "In any meaning-ful sense of the term,
'legal transplants,' therefore, cannot happen."13 Bearing such general disputes in mind,
the debates on comparative corporate governance can be investigated in detail.
Many lawyers have found significant evidence that a considerable level of
cross-jurisdictional convergence in company law has already been achieved. More
precisely, the rules and standards of company law in different jurisdictions have come
to be increasingly similar. For example, in 2001 Hansmann and Kraakman published
an important piece of work, which declared that company law in different
jurisdictions would converge to the US style shareholder-oriented model. This
conclusion was based on an assumption that the forces of logic, competition, interest
group pressures, imitation, and compatibility tend to lead different jurisdictions to
choose similar solutions to some universal problems (e.g. agency cost).14 Moreover,
Siems's observations on shareholder law in six jurisdictions (including China) find
that "convergence through congruence" is happening in the field of shareholder law.15
Indeed, as the socio-economic conditions in different jurisdictions become
increasingly similar, the law itself will also be transformed into a similar pattern. By
contrast, there is an uncertain perspective on the global convergence of corporate
governance. Hill's research on legal transplant in Russian company law concluded
that the "Russian privatization experiments are remarkably similar those taught by
Montesquieu, who warned about the dangers of attempting to graft one legal system
12 L. Friedman, 'Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplant', In D. Nelken and J. Feest (eds.),
Adapting Legal Cultures, (Hart Publishing 2001) 95
13 P. Legrand, 'What "Legal Transplants"?', In D. Nelken and J. Feest (eds.), Adapting Legal Cultures
(Hart Publishing 2001) 57
14 H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, (n 3) 439-486
15 M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law ( 1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 250-290
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onto another."16 Kanda and Milhaupt's study of transplanting director's duties from
the US to Japan reached a similar conclusion that "transplanting law is 'socially easy'
is open to question" and "the success or failure of the legal transplant…was
determined largely by the degree to which the transplant fit the prevailing legal and
non-legal infrastructure of which it was a part."17 Additionally, Bebchuk and Roe
employ the path-dependence theory18 to explain why institutional differences among
corporate governance regimes across different jurisdictions will persist. They argue
that in jurisdictions where the protection of minority shareholders is weak, controlling
shareholders could generally make extra profits by engaging in rent-seeking activities
(e.g. self-dealing). This is because they aim to block any fundamental change which
would potentially affect their interests adversely, and they generally hold the power to
avoid such unpopular reforms. For example, the controlling shareholder can block the
reform of ownership structure by refusing to sell shares to the general public.
Furthermore even if reform is inevitable, functional convergence would be the first
response to such reform because making a fundamental change to an existing
institution is economically inefficient (e.g. sunk cost,19 network of externality20).21
The effects of "path-dependence" would lead corporate governance regimes in
different jurisdictions to retain their different forms.
As this theoretical review has shown, legal transplant theories in the context of
16 J. Hill, 'Comparative Governance and Russia-Coming Full Circle', In G. Doeker-Mach & K. Ziegert
(eds.), Law and Legal Culture in Comparative Perspective (Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgard 2004) 405
17 H. Kanda & C. Milhaupt, 'Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in
Japanese Corporate Law' (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 887, 900
18 For the concept of path-dependence, see generally M. Siems, (n 15) 293-296
19 Sunk cost means the cost cannot be recovered. For details, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(7th edn. Aspen Publishers 2008) 7 and it is also defined as "the sunk cost effect is manifested in a
greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.
Evidence that the psychological justification for this behavior is predicated on the desire not to appear
wasteful is presented." see Hal R. Arkes & C. Blumer, 'The Psychology of Sunk Cost' (1985) 35
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 124
20 The concept of “positive” network consumption externalities was firstly recognized in the context of
telecommunications networks. There the value of a network to a subscriber increases with the number
of its adopters. see R. Kaufmann, J. McAndrews and Y. Wang, 'Opening the 'Black Box' of Network
Externalities in Network Adoption' (2000) 11 Information Systems Research 61, and it is defined as
"markets in which the value that consumers place on a good increases as others buy the good." see M.
Lemley & D. McGowan, 'Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects' (1998) 86 California Law
Review 562
21 L. Bebchuk & M. Roe, (n 5) 127-170
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comparative company law evolve into the debates of formal convergence versus
functional convergence. The proponents of the formal convergence model argue that
telecommunications revolution, the ease of international jet travel, and pressure
from law makers, stock exchanges, pension funds, and others, combine to
motivate and enable those who control larger corporations to become conversant
with corporate governance structure and practice.22
On the other hand, supporters of functional convergence place more emphasis on
the barriers which could deter the formal convergences, for example, cultural
constraints, differences of ownership structure and political-economic barriers.
Accordingly, the combined forces of globalization will lead different corporate
governance regimes to become more divergent rather than convergent. Jurisdictions
have to achieve global best practice by implementing different legal rules.23 Having
mapped this core debate, the following part will focus on how China's legal reform of
corporate governance might be used to test these comparative corporate governance
theories.
1.2 China's Legal Reform of Corporate Governance and Comparative
Corporate Governance Theories
1.2.1 The Significance of China as a Test for Comparative Corporate
Governance Theories
China is an extraordinarily interesting transition economy for testing comparative
corporate governance theories in at least three respects. Firstly, China is the second
largest economic entity in the world, behind the US and ahead Japan. It is a rising
economic superpower predicted to have the world's largest economy by the middle of
22 D. Branson (n 4) 324
23 L. Bebchuk & M. Roe, (n 5) 127-170
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this century.24 China's membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
meant that in the last decade it has made substantial progress in building a sound
commercial environment by forming a functional legal system. In 2010, China ranked
27th out of 133 countries on the 2010 World Economic Forum's Global Competitive
Index,25 22nd out of 57 countries on the 2010 World Economic Forum's Financial
Development Index,26 18th out of 58 countries on the Institute for Management
Development's World Competitiveness Index 2010.27 Furthermore, according to the
Fortune 500 index, Chinese enterprises occupied 54 positions in the top 500
companies in the world.28 Moreover, the Financial Times' latest report shows that
three Chinese State-owned companies are nominated as the top 10 most valuable
companies in the world.29 For the first time, PetroChina, has overtaken Exxon Mobil
as the world's most valuable company.30 In 2007, half of the six largest companies in
the world (by market capitalization) were Chinese. The market capitalization of
Chinese companies (listed both in China and abroad) totalled over double China's
GDP.31 The dramatic boost to China's national economy as well as the fast expansion
of its large corporate groups makes China an interesting example for testing
24 D. Wessel and M. Walker, 'Good News for the Globe; Nobel Winners in Economics Are Upbeat
About the Future As China and India Surge' (2004) September 3rdWall Street Journal (Eastern Edition)
a latest report by The Economist made a similar prediction, it says "According to our latest projections,
China's economy will have become bigger than America's: we think it might happen by 2027." in 'Jim
O'Neill looks at the global economy of 2036' (Nov. 22nd, 2010) Economist, The World in 2011
25 Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 issued by World Economic Forum is available at
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf> accessed 20th July
2011
26 See The Financial Development Report 2010, at
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FinancialDevelopmentReport_2010.pdf> accessed 20th July
2011
27 For the index, see <http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf>
accessed 20th July 2011
28 See Chinese companies on Fortune 500 index at
<http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/c/2010-09/29/content_42290.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
29 See FT Global 500 at <http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010> accessed 20th July 2011
30 See FT Global 500 at <http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010>
31 G.S. Swan, 'The Political Economy of the Rule of Law in China' (2009) 5:2 Hastings Business Law
Journal 309, 331
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comparative corporate governance theories.32
Secondly, compared to its rapid economic development, China's political reform
has been much slower. Unlike other transition economies which have ideologically
transitioned from socialism to liberal democracy, China retains its socialist ideology
with a one-party system. As one commentator indicates,
China's Communist Party is legally untouchable. The 73-million strong Party
dominates politics, and much business activity. It is deeply entrenched in the
separate governmental administration. It stands above the law, with its own courts
and disciplinary processes. 33
This political regime which is dominated by one party is even occasionally labelled
"totalitarian" or "dictatorial". Furthermore, the Chinese government has consistently
demonstrated that political goals that facilitate communitarian Communist principles
take primacy over the legal protection of individuals. This ideology clashes intensely
with individual shareholder protection, which is the main aim of the modern corporate
governance regimes of most developed jurisdictions. It is therefore interesting to
observe how socialist ideology interacts with rules that have been transplanted from
Western jurisdictions.
Thirdly, from a legal perspective, China is still undergoing an unusual process of
legal reform. Following the Cultural Revolution, legal reform in China aimed to create
a more business and investment friendly legal environment to help spur economic
32 For why these economic factors make China such an interesting test case for the application of these
comparative theories, see the discussion in chapter IV. The major target for China's company law
reform is to support consistently economic development. However, some scholars argue that China's
economic development is not supported by the "rule of law" system. For this point, see 4.2.2.1 below at
111 and D. Clarke, P. Murrell and S. Whiting 'The Role of Law in China's Economic Development',
(January 27th, 2006). GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 187. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=878672>, accessed 20th July 2011. D. Kenneth, 'China as a Test Case: Is the
Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?' (October 2006). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin
Working Paper No. 275. Available at <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=880125> accessed 20th July
2011
33 G. Swan (n 31) 314
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growth and reduce poverty.34 China's legal reform of commercial law, which is found
on instrumentalism, causes an unusual phenomenon. Indeed, it is apparent that,
compared to Western jurisdictions, modern Chinese commercial law, especially
company law, is fundamentally divorced from China's legal tradition and even its
traditional culture. As some lawyers have argued; for the whole of the twentieth
century, the development of Chinese law and legal science was a process of learning
from, making use of, absorbing and digesting foreign experiences.35 Following this
trend, Chinese commercial lawyers and judges tend to take westernised approaches,
deliberately keeping a distance from the Chinese legal tradition. Given these conditions,
investigating why there is a significant divergence between existing Chinese law and
China's legal tradition is important.
1.2.2. Mapping out the Two Major Scholarships
As one of the major transitional economies, China is widely considered to be an
important laboratory to test the formal convergence/functional convergence debate.
Broadly speaking, there are two major trajectories for current scholarship regarding the
relationship between China's legal reform of corporate governance and these
convergence theories. One is principally descriptive, whilst the other is normative in
nature. One school of scholarship (School A), mainly focuses on what actually happens
in China's reform. More precisely, it lays greater weight on addressing what kind of
positive laws are introduced into the Chinese legal system during the reform process. In
addition, it seeks to discern the dynamic forces, which drive policy-makers to adopt
certain rules or institutions. Finally, this group of researches deeply appreciates the
complexity of China's reform. As a result, they generally conclude that China's legal
reform of corporate governance manifests a hybrid pattern, which is usually a
combination of Western experience and local knowledge. The following part will draw a
34 R. Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest (Oxford University
Press 2008) 36, 43
35 J. Cheng, 'The Transformation of Chinese Law: From Formal to Substantial' (2007) 37 Hong Kong
Law Journal 689
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more vivid picture of the School A by providing some examples.
Siems uses the recent development of the Chinese corporate governance regime as
evidence of the convergence of shareholder law between jurisdictions.36 He finds that
Chinese policy-makers have transplanted a large number of rules and institutions from
Anglo-American jurisdictions into Chinese company law and securities law regimes.
This reform implies the increasing congruence of economic infrastructure between
China and Western jurisdictions. However, Siems also recognises that the legal rules
adopted by the Chinese legal system are approximate rather than identical to their
original forms. In general, there are still many differences in detail and actual
enforcement between Chinese and Anglo-American systems.37 Xi's recent research on
China's "board reform" illustrates that China's reform strategy demonstrates a partial
rather than complete formal convergence with the Anglo-American corporate
governance mode.38 For example, although the institutions of independent director and
board sub-committees under the board of directors have already been introduced into
the Chinese legal system, the two-tier board structure, which is a civil law mechanism,
is not abolished.39 Like Siems, Xi also provides an important insight into the dynamic
force for this partial formal convergence toward Anglo-American system. He indicates
that the pressure exerted by different interest groups may be the main force that leads
policy-makers to adopt this partial convergence mode.40 Finally, Howson's observation
on the doctrine of director's fiduciary duties shares a similar view to those of Siems and
Xi. Howson elaborates on the process by which the doctrine of director's fiduciary
duties is evolving, namely, through an interaction between functional convergence and
formal convergence in Chinese judicial practice. Howson finds that before the director's
36 M. Siems (n 15) 396
37 ibid 396




fiduciary duties were formally introduced into the China's Company Law 2005,41 the
courts had already used several different legal mechanisms to achieve a functional
equivalence to the doctrine of fiduciary duties. This reveals an interesting phenomenon
in that there is a pre-formal functional convergence. In addition to their original
contribution, Howson's findings also further support Siems and Xi's arguments by
demonstrating that the doctrine of directors' duties in Chinese law is influenced by both
the Anglo-American and the Civil law legal systems.42
By contrast, the other school of scholarship (School B) generally goes beyond
analysing what is actually happening in China's legal reform of corporate governance,
evaluating China's reform from a normative perspective. In order to achieve this,
commentators have used a number of case studies to assess whether transplanted rules
or institutions have worked in China. Generally, this scholarship evaluates the
performance of transplanted rules by two standards. Firstly, it assesses the transplanted
rule or institution by examining whether it works as the legislator expected it to work in
judicial practice. Secondly, they ask whether the transplanted rules in the Chinese
context are as efficient as their original forms in the Western jurisdictions. In accordance
with these two standards, School B concludes that Western rules and institutions have
not worked well in the Chinese legal system so far. This is because the level of
consistency between the transplanted rules or institutions and the local context is still at
a low level. Some commentators provide their own solutions to China's legal reform.
Although these solutions vary in detail, they generally suggest that policy-makers
should enact rules with stronger Chinese characteristics so as to meet local needs.
41 China first passed a Company Law in 1993. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa
[Company Law of the People's Republic of China], adopted by Fifth Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress, December 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994
[hereinafter Company Law 1993]. The Company Law 1993 was substantially amended in 2005. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the People's Republic of China], was
amended by National Congress of Communist Party of China on Oct. 27, 2005, effective January 1,
2006 [hereinafter Company Law 2005].
42 See N. Howson, 'Article 148 of China's 2005 Company Law: Precocious Convergence in the
Chinese Court' in B.S. Wang (eds.), Shi Jian Zhong De Gongsi Fa [Company Law in Practice]
(Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chuban She 2008) [China Social Science Academic Press 2008] 186. For
another example of Scholarship A, see S. Shim 'Corporate Governance Reform in China' (2005) 57
Company Lawyer 8
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Examples of School B scholarship are readily found in the current academic
market. For example, Clarke uses the law relating to independent directors to view legal
transplants in Chinese company law. He finds that the institution of an independent
director does not work as expected in the Chinese regime, because it conflicts with the
Chinese context at both macro and micro levels. At a micro level, the transplanted
institution is not well tied into any system of incentives. The market participants are not
motivated to comply with it. At a macro level, excessive State control also constrains
the independent director's performance.43 Similarly, research by Yang, Li and Lau on
China's recent legal reform of corporate governance indicates that many transplanted
rules are not compatible with China's political and cultural realities.44 They point out
that transplanting Western rules into the Chinese legal system is merely "window
dressing", designed to appease foreign investors and lenders.45 Another study by Miles
and He reveals a similar phenomenon. They find that after being transplanted into the
Chinese legal system, Anglo-American shareholder protection rules become far less
efficient. They argue that this is because a number of local constraints, particularly the
weak Chinese court system, curb the function of the transplanted rules.46
In addition to pointing out the conflicts between Western legal rules and the
Chinese context, these authors provide some suggestions on China's legal reform of
corporate governance. Clarke's answer is to "consider China's particular conditions, and
develop a system of corporate governance with Chinese characters."47 This argument
43 D. Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 Delaware Journal
of Corporate Law 125
44 A. Young, G. Li & A. Lau, 'Corporate Governance in China: the Role of the State and Ideology in
Shaping Reforms' 2007 (28) Company Lawyer 204
45 ibid
46 See L. Miles & M. He, 'Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minorities Shareholders in Listed
Companies in China: Challenge for the Future' (2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law
Review 275 A similar point, see C.X. Shi, 'International Corporate Governance Development: The Path
for China' (2005) 71 Australian Journal of Asian Law 60 and also see J.Z. Yang, 'Comparative
Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate Governance' (2005) 16 International Company
and Commercial Law Review 8. The author argues that "the legal rules transplanted from the United
Kingdom and the United States do not fit the existing legal infrastructure and political economic
system in China. Many cases were interfered with by the government because state control remains at
the centre of both business operations and regulation enforcement."
47 D. Clarke (n 43) 217
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does not appear to completely deny the formal convergence model.48 Rather it appears
to suggest that policy-makers should invest a greater effort into equipping the
transplanted legal rules with more local characteristics. By contrast, Yang et al take a
stronger approach. They say that the "Chinese government should do more to raise the
awareness of ethnic issues…reviving Confucius's teaching has a clear advantage apart
from the cultural considerations."49 According to their argument, the formal
convergence model is unreliable and reform should be oriented by a group of ethical
standards rather than legal rules and institutions.
1.2.3 China's Legal Reform of Corporate Governance: Unanswered
Questions
Having provided the above review, it is necessary to recap what we should
already know from the existing scholarship. The important insights offered by the
above schools of scholarship may act as a point of departure from which to find areas
of China's legal reform of corporate governance which remain unanalysed in terms of
comparative corporate governance theories. This raises the question of what kind of
contribution of such areas can make to the current debate on comparative corporate
governance. Firstly, according to School A, if we define formal convergence broadly,
the Chinese legal reform of corporate governance can be categorised as formal
convergence.50 These reforms are based on "transplant" rather than "copy". In fact,
most Western rules or institutions are transformed in a hybrid form: the Vice President
of China's Supreme Court, Xi Xiaoming states that "the Company Law 2005 is a
mixture of the Western experience and local resource".51 This is re-affirmed by
Peerenboom's recent study, which concludes that "most [Chinese] reforms will
involve a mixture of foreign and domestic inputs that interact in complicated ways, as
48 For the definition of formal convergence model, see 4.1.1 below 72-74
49 A. Young, G. Li & A. Lau (n 44) 211
50 For the definition of formal convergence model and functional convergence model, see 4.1.1 below
at 72-74
51 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Gongsifa Sifajieshi Yi Er de Lijie yu Shiyong [Understanding and
Applying the Supreme Court's Interpretation I & II on the Company Law 2005], (Renmin Faguan
Chubanshe 2008) [The People's Court Press 2008] 10
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well as attempts to deduce what will work from both in China and aboard."52
School B finds that placing an overwhelming emphasis on the transplanted
Western rules and institutions may cause serious problems in the legal reform of
corporate governance. Commentators have already provided substantial evidence to
show the inconsistency between the Western rules and local contexts. This usually
results from the profound differences between the social and cultural fabric of two
different jurisdictions. Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of the legal
rules, it is right for legislators to attach more importance to local political and
economic realities.
By and large, the scholarship of Schools A and B are insightful and credible.
They use large quantities of evidence to support their arguments. However, there are
still neglected dimensions of China's legal reform of corporate governance in terms of
convergence theories. Firstly, as J.H. Farrar states, "it is currently fashionable to talk
about the history of corporate governance in term of path dependence...corporate
structures, it is said, depend in part on the structures a country had in earlier times, in
particular with which the economy started."53 However, both of these Schools tend to
focus only on the company law regime developed since the 1990s, and analyse this
regime by looking at it in the ideological, cultural and political context of
contemporary China (from 1949 to present). This research approach may produce
misleading results. Indeed, history cannot be ignored in understanding the developing
path taken by China's legal reform of corporate governance, as the present is
influenced by that history. In order to gain a more accurate picture of China's
development of corporate governance, it is necessary to examine the historical path of
China's corporate governance regime from its starting point. Additionally, both
Schools A and B fail to offer a satisfactory answer to the question of whether the
formal convergence model has any advantages. The omission of this perspective is
52 R. Peerenboom (n 34) 217
53 J. Farrar, 'A Brief Thematic History of Corporate Governance' (1999) 11 Bond Law Review 259,
259
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particularly curious. School B focuses on one-side of the coin--the weaknesses of the
formal convergence model, but ignores its benefits. By contrast, the explanations of
School A are quite limited. The argument is for the purpose of "convenience" and
"efficiency", Western legal rules are selectively transplanted into the Chinese legal
system.54 However, as the formal convergence model's advantages are not the
principal concern of these studies, their answers do not undertake a comprehensive
analysis. As a consequence, it is still unclear whether the convenient or efficient
consideration is the only reason for transplanting Western legal rules into the Chinese
legal system. Thirdly, where the advantages of the formal convergence model are not
well exploited, the argument that policy-makers should adopt the functional
convergence model by, for example, reforming the corporate governance system in
accordance with Confucius's teachings, is also open to question. Such commentators
assume that the functional convergence model would be a better choice only because
the model which selectively transplants Western legal rules causes problems. They fail
to provide any affirmative reasoning which evidences the competitive advantages of
the model they support. The weakness of the formal convergence model cannot
automatically prove the advantages of other models, because the possibility that the
functional convergence model might have even worse performance in practice cannot
be denied.
In light of the above analysis, two specific questions deserve further study in order
to complete the scholarship on China's legal reform of corporate governance from a
comparative perspective. Firstly, what are the technical advantages (if any) of
transplanting Western legal rules into the Chinese legal system? Secondly, is the
functional convergence model a more effective model, as some lawyers support? In
addition to completing the scholarship on China's legal reform of corporate governance,
the research on these two questions leads to the investigation of a series of further
questions. Those questions have a great theoretical significance to general theories of
comparative corporate governance. They are:
54 R. Peerenboom (n 34) 217
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(1) Whether the "agency-cost controlling strategies"55 provided by the company
law system are still important to China's unique regulatory environment?
(2) If the Western transplanted rules do not work well in China's context, why do
Chinese legislators consistently borrow legal rules or institutions from Western
jurisdictions for China's legal system? Is the decision irrational?
(3) In Western jurisdictions, lawyers and judges generally treasure their domestic
legal traditions. Why then do Chinese commercial lawyers and judges, tend to take
significant amounts of experience from Western jurisdictions, whilst deliberately
keeping a distance from China's own cultural and legal tradition?
By solving these puzzles, this dissertation will make a theoretical contribution to the
scholarship on comparative corporate governance in the context of the transitional
economy. By and large, it will answer the question: "why can China, as representative
of a transitional economy, not escape from the fate of legal transplant in its legal
reform of corporate governance".
As mentioned above, one of the major driving forces for the theoretical
exploration of comparative corporate governance is the practical demands of finding
an efficient corporate governance model under the intensity of globalization. After
addressing the above theoretical issues, this dissertation will make a contribution from
a practical perspective. The theoretical research is expected to provide some important
methodological insights for fulfilling a practical task, namely improving the
legislative quality of "agency-controlling strategies". Many Chinese lawyers and
Western scholars complain that Chinese company law is suffering deeply from the
55 Agency-cost controlling strategies mean the formal or informal legal devices which can control the
agency-cost between director and shareholder or the agency-cost between minority shareholder and
majority shareholder. For this concept, see R. Kraakman and others (n 2) 37-44
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problem of ambiguity.56 Indeed, it is poorly and inconsistently drafted. There is,
nevertheless, no systematic study on how to solve this problem in a pragmatic manner.
In light of the proposed theoretical research, this dissertation will provide an
important response on this issue. It rebuilds the director's fiduciary duties and the
legal limitations on shareholder's voting power by inserting some workable legal rules
from the UK into the existing legal regime in China.
1.3 Organization of this Dissertation and Chapter Synopses
The structure of this dissertation follows a "problem-solution" model. The first
part (chapter II) maps out the problems of China's corporate governance regime. The
second part (Chapters III & IV) sets up a theoretical framework of solving these
problems, whilst providing some important theoretical insights into scholarship on
China's legal reform of corporate governance. The third part (Chapter V), following
on the theoretical study, provides some workable proposals for improving the
"agency-cost controlling strategies" of the company law system.
China is usually labelled as being a transition economy with a number of unique
characteristics. Therefore, in addition to illustrating the general background of China's
corporate governance regime, chapter II, will compare China's corporate governance
problems with those of Western jurisdictions.
Following this, chapter III will solve the first puzzle indicated above. It asks
whether the company law system should play a dominant part in regulating corporate
governance problems in a transition jurisdiction. This research is undertaken against a
background of three arguments that cast doubt upon the suitability of the company
law regime. Firstly, in order to solve corporate governance problems, some scholars
56 K.Y. Zou, 'Towards the Rule of Law: An Overview of China's Legal Reform' In G.W. Wang and J.
Wong (eds.), China: Two Decades of Reform and Change, (Singapore University Press, Singapore,
1999) 178, also see A. Young, G. Li & A. Lau (n 44) 204, and for more details of this point, see the
discussion of chapter III (3.2) at 58 below and the discussion of Chapter V in general.
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argue that the legal institution should be replaced by traditional Chinese ethnic
standards, which is more suitable for China's cultural context.57 Secondly,
administrative regulation has already played a key role in regulating corporate
governance in China. Finally, legal enforcement mechanisms in China are weak.
Chapter IV contributes some important theoretical insights. It begins with an
in-depth analysis of two representative case studies. By investigating these two cases,
it unveils the answers to the two questions ignored by the existing scholarship.
Following that, it will shed some light on what determines these answers under the
theoretical framework of path-dependence. Firstly, it puts the insights from the case
studies into a political-cultural context. It locates the cultural and ideological
determinants, which reject a total westernization of China's company law regime.
Secondly, it further unpacks those insights through a perspective founded on
"efficient-driven path-dependence".58 By locating the starting point of China's
company law regime and investigating it from a historical perspective, this chapter
explains why the Western experience is essential to China's legal reform of corporate
governance. Exploiting these determinants will ultimately lead to a more ambitious
theoretical analysis. It solves two curious puzzles of China's legal reform of corporate
governance, including why Chinese legislators adopt a reforming approach
underpinned by legal transplant and why the Chinese traditional legal culture plays
little role in China's modern company law.
In Chapter V, the focus will shift from generating theoretical implications to
searching for practical solutions. Following the comparative method, it enhances the
workability of the company law system by inserting a bundle of legal rules or
standards into current regime. It makes a series of suggestions regarding the reform of
director's duties and the legal limitations on shareholder's voting power in China's
company law system. Chapter VI finally concludes with some thoughts on the
57 See A. Young, G. Li & A. Lau (n 44)
58 For the concept of "efficient-driven path-dependence" see 4.2.2. 2.2 below 122-123
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scholarship of China's legal reform of corporate governance and the general theories
of comparative corporate governance.
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Chapter II. The Major Problems surrounding China's Corporate
Governance Regime and The Legal Implications of the
Problems
2.1. Introduction
Before discussing core research questions, this part introduces the major
problems surrounding corporate governance in China. Indeed, mapping these
problems is the first step to solving them. Moreover, it sheds some light on the crucial
question of whether the problems of China's corporate governance regime are unique.
More precisely, although most public companies retain several "Chinese
characteristics", such as "strong state-shareholder", "over-concentrated ownership
structure" and "powerful insider control", it is still unclear whether these
characteristics cause major problems for China's corporate governance regime in
nature, are distinctive from that of developed jurisdictions. If China's problems are
idiosyncratic in nature, the law in developed jurisdictions would provide little
valuable guidance on how to deal with China's problems. In short, the nature of the
problem determines whether solutions can be found in comparative research. The next
fundamental question is where the weaknesses of the legal regime that regulates these
corporate governance problems are. The answer to this question will indicate what
needs to be further improved in the current regulatory regime if a better corporate
governance regime is to be formed.
This part firstly defines corporate governance. It then introduces the
development of China's corporate governance regime. After that, it identifies the
major problems of corporate governance regime in China's public companies. The
following section will assess the legal implications of these problems.
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2.2 Defining Corporate Governance
Traditionally, corporate governance has been concerned with one subject. It is
about the "divergence of interest between the ownership and the management". This
concept was first recognised by Berle and Means in 1932 when they stated,
the owners were distinguished primarily by the fact that they were in a position
both to manage an enterprise or delegate its management and to receive any
profits or benefits which may accrue. The managers on the other hand were
distinguished primarily by the fact that they operated an enterprise, presumably in
the interest of the owners.1
Nonetheless, the interests of management could run directly counter to the interests of
owners. The major function of corporate governance is to guarantee that directors act
in the best interests of owners. Traditionally, in the UK, the corporate governance
regime has essentially been about how to manage a company's business in the best
interests of shareholders. The assets of a company should be used efficiently for this
purpose only.2
By the 1970s to 1990s, on an ideological level, development of theories like
"industrial democracy" and "stakeholder society" exerted a great impact on the
definition of corporate governance3. Additionally the theory of "firm-specified human
capital" fundamentally reformed the theoretical structure of corporate governance in
an economic sense.4 This movement forced corporate governance to shift from the
1 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation & Private Property (Transaction Publishers 2002)
112-113
2 For this point, see B. Cheffins, 'Corporate Governance Reform: Britain as an Exporter' in David
Hume Institute in Corporate Governance and Reform of Company Law, Hume Papers on Public Policy:
Volume 8 No.1 (Edinburgh University Press 2000) 10
3 B. Pettet, Company Law (2nd edn, Person Education Limited 2005) 58
4 See O. Williamson, 'Transaction Cost Economics', In R. Schmalensee and R. Willing, (eds.),
Handbook of Industrial Organization (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Pub 1989) 135, and see C. Chang
& Y.J. Wang, 'A Framework for Understanding Differences in Labor Turnover and Human Capital
Investment' (1995) 28 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 91
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shareholder-oriented model to the stakeholder-oriented model. The stakeholder model
which requires corporate governance to promote the interests of stakeholders has
become a widely accepted international standard.5 Following this trend, corporate
governance is oriented by the "enlightened shareholder value" in the UK. Here, the
director is not only responsible to the shareholders, but also to the stakeholders and
even to the community as a whole.
During 1980s to 1990s, a series of scandals triggered a widespread rethinking of
the corporate governance regime in the UK. These re-assessments of corporate
governance were fruitful. A series of reports concerning the regulation of corporate
governance were published in this period, of which the Cadbury Report is arguably
most influential. According to the Cadbury Report, corporate governance is "the
system by which companies are directed and controlled".6 Compared to the
traditional definition, it defines corporate governance from a functional perspective. It
stresses that internal corporate powers should be properly allocated to different
corporate organs. Arguably, this definition is the best-known definition in the
academic world.
By contrast, there is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance
in China's legal system. Generally speaking, the "system theory" is widely accepted in
China's academic world. For example, one of the top Chinese corporate lawyers, T.S
Shi defines corporate governance as "a system distributing the managing and
supervising powers to different corporate organs".7 Similarly, a Western scholar
points out that the "Corporate governance (gongsi zhili) is a concept whose time
seems definitely to have come in China. Chinese definitions of corporate governance
in the abstract tend to cover the system regulating relationships among all parties with
interests in a business organization, usually spelling out shareholders as a particularly
5OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (April 2004) available at
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf> accessed 20th July 2011
6 Cadbury Report (the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance), available at
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=132> accessed 20th July 2011
7 T. Shi, Shang Fa [Commercial Law] (Falv Chuban She 2003) [Law Publisher 2003] 233
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important group".8 The academic argument in this line has deeply influenced the
legislation. In the Company Law 2005, the term "corporate governance" is replaced
with "corporate organization and structure".9 This indicates that corporate governance
is deemed to be an institution which regulates internal corporate arrangements and
power distributions.
Similarly to the Western jurisdictions, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has
been incorporated into the Company Law 2005. Article 5 says that "a company should
accept the supervisions by government and the general public and assume social
responsibilities". Additionally, according to the Corporate Governance Guideline for
Listed Corporations 2002 (Corporate Governance Guideline), a director must take
the interests of creditors, employees, customers, suppliers and the local community
into consideration.10 However, these legal principles are without detailed and intricate
interpretations. Therefore, Articles on CSR and stakeholder protection in China are
more likely to be a slogan rather than an enforceable legal principle.11
We can view this issue from a different perspective. As MacNeil argues, the
dominant value in China's corporate governance is "shareholder primacy" rather than
"pluralism". Since the State is the major shareholder of most super-size corporations,
the "shareholder primacy" approach is more likely to be consistent with the task of
protecting State interests and property12. Most Chinese scholars accept that the core
problems of China's corporate governance regime still concern basic issues, such as
8 D. Clarke, 'Corporate governance in China: An Overview' (2003) 14 China Economic Review 496,
496
9 Company Law 2005 Chapter 4
Available at: <http://www.cpasz.com/xzfg/gongsifa2005.htm>
10 Corporate Governance Guideline, Article 43 & Chapter 6 for a general introduction of Corporate
Governance Guideline, see L. Lau, 'China: CSRC's Corporate Governance Guideline for Listed
Companies' (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 125, 125-128
11 In 2007, the Shen Zhen Stock Exchange issued a guidance of implementing CSR for all public
companies which listed in Shen Zhen. However, it merely provided a few permissive provisions and
the enforceability of these provisions are doubtful. and also see L.W. Lin 'Corporate Social
Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change' 2010 (28) Berkeley Journal of
International Law 64
12 I. MacNeil, 'Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: the Case of Chinese Listed
Companies' (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289, 335
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building a practical corporate governance framework, restricting insider control,
enhancing the protection of minority shareholders, and implementing sophisticated
disclosure rules. After all, protecting stakeholders' interests is not the central issue for
China's legal reform of corporate governance in the near future. Thus, it is not
surprising that a Western lawyer concludes that "the definition [definition of corporate
governance in China] seems to revolve around such components as transparency,
accountability, management, board function and shareholder's rights and director's
duties and responsibilities"13. All these components are in the sphere of the narrow
definition.
In accordance with the above analysis, in this paper, "corporate governance" will
be defined in a relatively narrow sense. This is not only because CSR is still an
unclear concept in the Chinese context, but also because the major problems of
Chinese corporate governance are still within the sphere of "shareholder primacy".
Therefore, this dissertation adopts the Cadbury Report's definition-- the system by
which companies are directed and controlled.
2.3. The Major problems of China's Corporate Governance
2.3.1. A Brief Historical Introduction
The historical development of China's corporate governance is important for
understanding the current problems. In the planned economic period (1949-1979),
after the civil war, the government's major task was to reinforce the dictatorship of the
socialist regime. During the early days of Peoples Republic of China (PRC), China
was economically backward following constant wars and the nationalist party had
taken nearly all the top Chinese scientists and scholars to Taiwan.14 Under these
13 S. Shim, 'Corporate Governance Reform in China' (2005) 26(12) Company Lawyer 367
14 Y. Hua, Zoujin Taiwan [Approaching Tai Wan], Chapter 14 Rencai Jingji Fazhan De Zhongyao
Yinsu [Human Resource and Economic Development], (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 2003)
[China's Social Science Press] 209
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circumstances, Chairman Mao had a visionary analysis of the economic status of
China. He pointed out the weaknesses of "bureaucratic capitalism". According to his
theory, mid and small sized private enterprises did not have the ability to use
resources efficiently.15 By contrast, a centrally planned economy and State-ownership
could enhance economic efficiency by pooling available resources together.16 Article
6 of the 1950 Interim Regulation Concerning Private Enterprises, says that
for the purpose of overcoming economic anarchy, adjusting the relationship
between production and marketing, and developing toward a planned economy, if
necessary, the government may make production and marketing plans in relation
to certain important products, which should be complied with by both
state-owned and private enterprises.17
This provision could be regarded as the starting point for transforming private
enterprises into State-owned or collectively-owned enterprises. Following this, in
1956, a more fundamental movement was initialled by the government to nationalise
all sorts of private enterprises. From 1949 to 1956, the government nationalised nearly
2800 private firms and 2400 financial institutes. In the same period, it also established
156 super-size State-owned enterprises (SOEs)18. State ownership was assumed to be
the only safe mode by which to stabilise the socialist dictatorship.
15 J.N. Li, 'Mao Zedong Fangqi Xin Minzhu Shehui De Zhuyao Yuanyin' [The Fundamental Reasons
for Mao Zedong to Abolish the New Democracy Sociality in China], (2005) 07 Beijing Dianzi Keji
Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute] 62, 70 also see Z.D.
Mao, Mao Zedong Xuanji [An Anthology of His Writings] (Renmin Chubanshe 1977 Diwujuan)
[People's Publisher 1977 volume 5] 177
16 According to Marxism, the highly concentrated state-ownership and highly socialized production
will ultimately replace capitalist system in which the development of productivity force will be
damaged, see generally K. Marx, Capital Volume One: A Critique of Political Economy (Dover
Publications, 2011)
17 Y.W. Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese Perspective (Kluwer Law International
2003) 92 and Guanyu Siyou Qiye de Rougan Guiding 1950 [1950 Interim Regulation Concerning
Private Enterprises] article 3
18 C.Q. Ge, 'Zhongying Guanyu Gongyouhua de Bijiao Yanjiu' [The Comparison of Nationalization in
China and the UK] (1998) 3 Nankai Jingji Pinglun [NanKai University Economic Studies] 72
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In respect of these newly developed SOEs, the government adopted a method of
uniform ownership, but hierarchical control. Under such a regime, most super-size
SOEs were directly controlled by central government. All medium and small size
SOEs were owned by the central government on behalf of Chinese people as a whole,
but controlled by local governments.19 In addition, the appointments and dismissals
of corporate managers were also controlled by the government.20 In order to protect
the rights of the labour force and prove the superiority of socialism, market
competition was rejected. Everyone received almost the same salary regardless of
productivity. Managers of SOEs were not assessed on the basis of the SOEs' market
performance, but by their ability to satisfy the plan set by government agencies.21
They would keep their jobs, even if they did not adequately fulfil their duties. This is
the so-called "iron rice bowl". During this period, the government did not develop
SOEs by building economic institutions or legislative frameworks. The stability of
politics was the main target of economic structural reform. According to this policy,
the corporate governance model was based on a strict socialist administrative decree
rather than law and regulations.22 In short, from 1957 to 1965, China's SOE
underwent dramatic upheavals, promoted by a number of movements.23 During the
subsequent "Ten Year Cultural Revolution" (from 1968-1978), the development of
SOEs stagnated.
Nonetheless, after 1978, the Chinese government officially replaced the "planned
economy" with the "socialist market economy". Indeed, there was a series of vigorous
reforms of SOEs in 1980s. The government's Decisions on Economic Structural
19 Y.W. Wei (n 17) 95
20 C. Shipani & J.H. Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China Then and Now' (2002) 2002 Columbia
Business Law Review 1, 5
21 ibid 8, Y.H. Wei (n 17) 94, and also see
Y.H. Wei, 'Corporation and Privatization: A Chinese Perspective' (2001-2002) 22 Northwestern Journal
of International Law & Business 219, 222
22 J. Farrar, 'Developing Corporate Governance in Greater China' (2002) 25 (2) University of New
South Wales Law Journal 466, and also see J. H Farrar, 'Developing Appreciate Corporate Governance
in China' (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 92
23 C. Xi, 'Transforming Chinese Enterprise: Ideology, Efficiency and Instrumentalism in the Process of
Reform' In J. Gillespie & P. Nicholson [eds.], Asian Socialism A Legal Change (Australian National
University Press 2005) 91,93
27
Reform issued in 1984 formally declared that the "ownership and management in the
SOEs should be appropriately separated". Additionally, a "contract responsibility
system" was employed to tackle inefficiency problems within enterprises. Under this
system, the manager of an enterprise signed a contract with the supervisory authorities
to guarantee that the enterprise under his or her management would achieve a certain
productivity target. However, it seems that these reforms, which remained superficial,
failed to provide meaningful autonomy or incentives for enterprise efficiency.24
A more fundamental shift from an ideology-orientation to an
efficiency-orientation in reforming SOEs was initiated in the 1990s. In 1992, Mr
Deng Xiaoping, then leader of the Party, declared that some "capitalist methods" can
be used to build socialism.25 This declaration paved the way for deeper reform of
SOEs from an ideological perspective. According to this declaration, in order to build
a "modern enterprise system", mid to large sized SOEs were gradually incorporated.
Some practical methods were implemented to support this reform. For example, the
first company code of the PRC, the Company Law 1993,26 was enacted in this
context. The key development manifested in the Company Law 1993 was its
categorisation of enterprise in accordance with its liabilities rather than its identity.
Before 1993 Company Law, companies were categorised in accordance with the
attributes of its owner. For example, the state-owned company and foreign-investor
owned company were governed by different laws.27 By contrast, the 1993 company
law has universal application to all companies incorporated under it.28 Generally,
companies were enabled to have an independent property right of a legal person.
Modern corporate organs, including the shareholder meeting, the board of directors
24 ibid 94
25 See Decisions of the CPC Central Committee on Some issues Concerning the Establishment of a
Socialist Market Economy System, adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Fourteenth
National Congress on 14th November 1993, see C. Xi (n 23) 108
26 The Company Law of People's Republic of China 1993, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa
1993, adopted by Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress,
29th December 1993
27 See 4.2.2.2.1 below at 129
28 See C. Xi (n 23) 100 also see M. Nikkel, 'Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: Questions
of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law' (1995) 80 Minnesota Law Review 524
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and the board of supervisors were all introduced into China's corporate governance
regime in accordance with this law. In addition to introducing a modern corporate
structure, the government persuaded managers of SOEs to abandon out of date
managerial methods and learn modern scientific methods of management.29 The
incorporation of SOEs, coupled with the introduction of an appropriate separation
between ownership and management delivered a strong signal that the government
had taken a substantial step to shift its role from setting out direct productivity plans
for SOEs to providing them with indirect planning by authorizing a higher-level of
autonomy to managers. In addition to this legislation, the Shenzhen and Shanghai
stock markets were established in 1990. Although private companies could be
authorised by the market regulator to list in the markets, the major function of the
stock markets was to raise funds for SOEs and to facilitate their structural reform.30
From this historical introduction, it seems that the most significant achievement of
SOE reform in the post-planned economic period is the government's move to loosen
the grip of state ownership over management.
However, the fundamentals of the economic infrastructure remained unaltered.
As the Constitution states, "the basis of the economic system is socialist public
ownership of the means of production".31 In order to retain the dominant position of
State-ownership, the shares of Chinese listed corporations were divided into three
tiers; namely, State shares, legal person shares and "A shares".32 Before the
shareholding unification reform, State shares and legal person shares were not
transferable to the general public.
It is not surprising that this "modern" corporate structure, which is transplanted
from neo-classical economic systems, comes into conflict with the socialist orthodoxy
29 Y.H. Wei (n 17) 110
30 I. MacNeil (n 12) 339
31 Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2004): Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xianfa Xiuzhengan 2004 article 7 amended by 2nd Meeting of the Standing committee of
tenth National People's Congress on 14th March, 2004 (hereinafter Constitution).
32 For details of the three ties of shares see 4.1.2.2.1 below at 76
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underpinned by State ownership. The mismatch between the form (management
structure) of the enterprise and its substance (ownership structure) causes several
complicated problems, including issues surrounding the "absent owner", "insider
control" and the problem of majority shareholder tunnelling. In addition to that, the
intrinsic socialist suspicion of the power of law led to a long-term legal nihilism in the
planned-economy period. Indeed, a strong administrative regulatory approach
negatively affected the independence and efficiency of the judicial system. The
following sections will unpack these issues in further detail.
2.3.2 Mapping the Major Problems of China's Corporate Governance
Regime
2.3.2. 1. Vertical Agency Cost: "Owner Absence" and "Insider Control"
On the Chinese stock markets, listed companies can be divided into two groups
in terms of their identity. One group is State-owned listed companies. The other is
private listed companies which have no State background. This part focuses on the
former group. In 2009, there were 1600 listed companies on China's stock markets.
Nearly 900 of these are controlled by the State. These companies occupy nearly 85
per cent of the total share value of all listed companies.33 Listed SOEs are still the
major forces on the Chinese stock markets and their problems are therefore important
and representative.
As previously mentioned the government deems the separation of ownership and
management to be a solution to problems rather than seeing them as an origin of
uncontrolled problems. As Xi points out,
33 'Guo Zi Wei Dui Shangshi Gongsi Zuo de Buchong Guiding' [A Survey on Listed Companies by
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council] at
<http://www.chinasoe.com.cn/gqxgc/2009-11-27/404535.shtml> accessed 20th July 2011
30
By corporatizing SOEs, the Chinese leadership intended to separate government
administration from enterprise management, release the state from its unlimited
responsibility for SOEs, raise funds to diversify SOE risks, and, consequently,
improve enterprise efficiency.34
Indeed, separating State-ownership from management is an important step, which
enables SOEs to plan their productivity in accordance with market demand rather than
a State mandate. Through the separation of ownership and management, bureaucratic
interference from the State, experienced under the old system, was replaced by the
share-voting power. This change worked to limit the State's power within a certain
scope by making it subject to a series of rules of company law. Furthermore, this
separation also creates a common ground for cooperation between State-shareholder
and private shareholders, as both pursue the same interests; namely, distributable
profits.35 The system also enables managers with high levels of expertise and
motivated by well-designed incentive schemes, to boost enterprise efficiency in a
fully regulated market. However, it is easy for policy-makers to forget that the modern
corporate structure cannot bring these benefits on its own. It needs the appropriate
institutional support. Such structures trigger serious problems, when forced to manage
concentrated State-ownership. Equally they cannot be efficient without an effective
legal regime and market regulations. The following part will discuss the types of
problem that the "modern" corporate structure causes in the Chinese context.
The separation between ownership and management of companies triggers
conflict of interest problems. In economic terms, this is usually called the
"agency-problem" or the "principal-agent problem". Some scholars argue that one of
the major functions of company law is to regulate the "agency-problem."36 When
corporate governance is narrowly defined two agency problems typically arise. The
34 C. Xi (n 23) 95
35 D. Clarke, (n 8) 499
36 R. Kraakman, J. Armour, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. B. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K J. Hopt, H. Kanda
and E.B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn,
Oxford University Press 2009) 35
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first is the "vertical agency problem" between corporate owners and managers. This
problem arises where a manager, whilst being an agent, nevertheless pursues his or
her own interest at the expense of the principal's interests. The second agency problem
is the "horizontal agency problem". This is between majority and minority
shareholders. Here, majority shareholders may improperly use their overwhelming
voting power to depress minority shareholders’ interests by squeezing them out
without fair compensation or tunnelling the company's assets to a special purpose
entity.37 Fortunately, although these two types of agency issues can coexist, they are
usually mutually exclusive. Some studies indicate that the "agency cost" (i.e. the
agency problem) between shareholders and executives is not a key issue in
jurisdictions dominated by concentrated ownership38. Majority shareholders hold the
residual right to claim corporate property and the voting right to control the
fundamental business decisions of the corporation. Therefore, they have both the
incentive and ability to supervise the directors' performance.39 By contrast, in
jurisdictions with dispersed ownership not much focus may be placed on the agency
cost between majority shareholder and minority shareholder, as fewer powerful
block-holders exist in this type of market.40
37 ibid 307-309 also see M. Roe, 'The Institutions of Corporate Governance', In C. Menard & M.
Shirley (eds.), Handbook for New Institutional Economics (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 95
38 There is taxonomy between US and UK's widely-held shareholder system and European continental
controlling shareholder system in the comparative corporate governance debate. In European
continental jurisdictions, e.g. Germany, the ownership structure in most of public companies is
concentrated. Therefore, the vertical agency cost is not a major problem in this jurisdiction. By contrast,
in the UK and US where the ownership structure in most public companies is dispersed, the horizontal
agency problem is hardly to be the major issue in these jurisdictions. See B. Cheffins, 'Minority
Shareholder and Corporate Governance' (2000) 21(2) Company Lawyer 41 and also see B. Cheffins,
'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto', (1999) 10 Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law 5, for a critical view toward the taxonomy between
widely-held system and controlling shareholder system, see R. Gilson, 'Controlling Shareholders and
Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy' (2005-2006) 119 Harvard Law
Review 1641
39 See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes A. Shleifer & R. Vishny 'Corporate Ownership around the
World' (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 475, M. Aoki, 'Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate
Governance in Transition Economies' In Masabiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim (eds.), Corporate
Governance in Transition economy, Insider Control and the Role of Bank (EDI Development Studies
1996) 5, and Y.H. Wei (n 17) 24
40 ibid
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Nonetheless, the mismatch between the form and substance of China's SOE
breaks this equilibrium in China. Although ownership in most Chinese companies is
concentrated, both types of agency problem are equally serious. In the course of
Chinese economic reform and in seeking the autonomous management of SOEs, the
government tends to delegate independent decision-making power to the executives of
SOEs.41 However, it has not developed an efficient system to supervise the conduct
of those SOE managers.42 The control of SOEs is hierarchical in China. It can be
divided into several tiers. These include the central governmental leadership, local
State organs and central ministries who all supervise the State-owned parent
companies. In accordance with Article 6 of the Chinese Constitution43 and Article 12
of the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned
Assets of Enterprises, central and local government must establish governmental
agencies to control and supervise State-owned corporations on behalf of the Chinese
people as a whole. Consequently, the State-owned Asset Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) was established in 2003. Its main function is to
control and govern 152 centrally-controlled SOEs. It is entitled to appoint and dismiss
directors and executives, assess directors' performance, assign supervisors to sit on
supervisory boards in the super-size SOEs, and guide and facilitate the reform and
restructure of SOEs. By contrast, listed SOEs are usually supervised and controlled by
their parent companies rather than State agencies. In order to form a listed company, a
promoter, usually a large SOE has to contribute its essential operating assets (factories,
workshops, or production lines) to the listed company. A listed company is a legally
separate enterprise from its State-owned parent company, though; in reality it usually
41 According to the Article 7 &10 of Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of
State-Owned Assets of the Enterprises, the business decision should be independent from the
administrative influence and clear separation between ownership and control should be established. It
means in principle the governmental agencies will adopt a "hand-off" approach on the daily business of
the state-owned corporations, and all state-owned corporations should make the "management decision
by their own and take full responsibility for their profits and losses". e.g. C. Shipani & J.H. Liu (n 20)
28
42 D.L. Xu, G.J. Zhao & G.H. Li 'Guoyou Gongsi Zhili Moshi De Yanjiu' [The Study on the Corporate
Governance Mode for State-owned enterprise] 2007 (4) Jingji Pinglun [The Study of Economy] 93 also
see J.Z. Yang 'Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate Governance' (2005)
16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 8
43 Constitution of the People's Republic of China 2004
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maintains a strong relationship with its parent company. Consequently, it is common
for directors or managers in the listed company to also hold positions in the parent
company.44
The main reason behind the weak supervision of SOEs is the "absent owner
problem". The State can only realise its shareholder's power through governmental
agencies. These government agencies are ultimately organised by individuals.
Nonetheless, the officials appointed to supervise the management of an SOE, unlike
shareholders, do not enjoy residual rights or other interests directly linked to the
performance of a SOE.45 Moreover, they neither bear any economic risk of a
corporate collapse nor benefit from the profits made by the SOE. They therefore lack
strong incentives to supervise director and executive performance.46 Additionally,
even where officials are loyal to the State's interests, they are still in a difficult
position. Such officials are generally appointed by local government, whilst serving
the central government-owned enterprise. However, local government interests can
occasionally conflict with those of the central government. Indeed, SOEs are usually
major tax-contributors for local government revenue. For the sake of regional
protectionism, the local government may require officials to loosen their supervision
on SOEs.47
State-owned parent companies encounter similar incentive problems. As majority
shareholder, the parent company has a residual claim to the profits made by a listed
company. However, State-owned parent companies, like State-agencies, are organised
by individuals. The persons who are appointed to check and supervise listed SOEs do
not have property rights in those companies. Rather, they are simply government
44 J.Q. Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China: From the Protection of Minority Shareholders
Perspective', (2006) 2 Corporate Governance Law Review 311, 316
45 For this point see D. Clarke (n 8) 500
46 Y.H. Wei (n 17) 24 and D. Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance'
(2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 125, 147
47 C. Xi, 'Case Note: Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi co v ZHONG
Weida and Others Hei Longjiang High Court' (2006) 1:2 Journal of Comparative Law 492, 496 and
also 4.2.2. 1 below Zijing Mining case at 116
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officials who earn a salary based on the governmental hierarchy, that is, around three
times that of an unskilled worker.48 Wary of social unrest, the State does not want to
pay SOE managers and also the supervisory officials in a manner that would make
them too far detached from lower level workers.49 Arguably, promoting a listed SOE's
market performance could be beneficial to an officials' political fortune. However,
even this incentive is suspicious. As mentioned above, a listed SOE that takes over its
essential assets from its parent company is usually equipped with the best production
line and the best trained employees. More importantly, the parent company has to bear
all sorts of burdens (e.g. debts, redundant personnel etc.) that occurred before its
separation from a listed subsidiary. These advantages guarantee listed SOE's strong
productivity. Additionally, a massive number of preference policies are granted to
listed SOEs by central and local government. Some large SOEs are even allowed to
monopolise markets like telecommunications, oil and airlines. Finally, companies
with State-backgrounds are much more successful in applying for loans from banks,
compared to private companies.50 Consequently, a listed SOE's market performance
is easily maintained at a high level, even without close supervision. In other words,
even if the managers make substantial profits through related party transactions or
lack due diligence in their daily management, these negative effects may be not strong
enough to ruin the overall performance of the listed SOE. In such conditions, there is
little reason for the officials in the parent company to contribute significantly to
secure a result that they can otherwise gain with little effort.
48 L.H. Tang & J.Y. Wang 'Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China's Listed
State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy' (2007) 7 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 143, 179
49 O. Rui, M. Firth & P. Fung, 'Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation in China' (September
2002). Available at SSRN: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=337841> 8 accessed
20th July 2011
50 Y. Kang, L. Shi, E. Brown, 'Chinese Corporate Governance: History and Institutional Framework'
Report in Centre of Corporate Ethnics and Governance (Rand Corporation 2008) 1, 32 The authors
argue that 'China's immature capital market is characterized by the Chinese bands' preferential
treatment of state-owned enterprise.'
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Gugler's research51 on the relationship between corporate governance and a
company's economic performance, highlights that compared to other models,52
dispersed voting power under a concentrated ownership structure is the most
disadvantageous. Gugler points out that this corporate structure shapes a pattern of
"Strong Managers and Weak Owner", which provides little means for shareholder
intervention. China's situation falls into the worst model in Gugler's study. This is
because the absence of the ultimate owner (weak owner) directly leads to the insider
control (strong management), which results in the situation where a firm falls under
the de facto or de jure control of insiders without any external checks and balances.53
In recent years, many cases have revealed that "owner absence" leads to ethically
questionable activities amongst executives in listed SOEs. The China Aviation Oil
Singapore (CAOS) scandal is a typical example. CAOS is a listed SOE in Singapore
whose chief executive officer, Chen Jiulin, carried out speculative oil derivative
trading from 2003, eventually causing the company to lose US$550 million. From a
legal perspective, speculative oil derivative trading is strictly prohibited by relevant
regulations.54 At an institutional level, CAOS had appointed Ernst & Young as
consultants to draft Risk Management and Financial Management Manuals for its
guidance. In practice, high-end risk management software, namely Kiodex Risk
Workbench, was used by CAOS to assist in business decision-making.55 In
accordance with the risk management regime of CAOS, any transaction, causing a
loss exceeding US$200,000 should be appraised by the risk-management committee.
Unfortunately, however, this rule was not obeyed by insiders. Indeed, even after Chen
Jiulin had been engaging in oil derivative trading for nearly a year, by which time the
51 K. Gugler, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance (Oxford University Press 2001) 4
52 The other modes are 1. Dispersed Voting Power under Dispersed Ownership
2. Concentrated voting power under Dispersed Ownership 3. Concentrated Voting Power under
Concentrated Ownership, ibid 4
53 K. Lee & D. Hahn 'From Insider Control Collusion to Insider Control in China's SOEs' (2004) 40 (2)
Issues and Studies 1, 3
54 See Qihuo Guanli Zhanxing Ban Fa [Interim Measures for the Control of Futures] Article 4
55 Q. Shao, 'Toushi Zhonghangyou Shijian: Chuanquan Buqing Daozhi Neiwei Fengxian Jiankong
Quanshi' [The Scandal of CAOS: Absence of Supervision] available at
<http://gov.finance.sina.com.cn/zsyz/2005-03-09/55247.html> accessed 20th July 2011
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company had suffered loss of 380 million USD, the risk management committee was
not aware of the illegal business activity and substantial losses. As Mallin concluded,
"the Chinese SOEs even including those operating aboard, CEO may be all-powerful
and able to take decisions that are not in the best interests of the company and its
shareholders and limited disclosure may exacerbate the situation."56
It might be argued that the issue of "insider control" is exaggerated by this
extreme case. However, similar cases are readily found.57 Statistical research supports
that the issue of "insider control" is widespread in China's public companies. A survey
by the National Bureau of Statistics found that from 2002 to 2005, nearly 100 billion
RMB had been misappropriated or misused for illegal purposes in 1290 SOEs.
Approximately 70 per cent of these companies were suspected of being involved in
forging financial reports.58 In light of this, it can be concluded that although
ownership is concentrated in most Chinese listed SOEs, the issue of vertical agency is
severe amongst such companies as a result of "owner absence". Consequently, as
State ownership of most Chinese listed companies is unlikely to be substituted for
privatization in the short term, enhancing shareholder protection against executives by
introducing a series of workable legal rules seem to be essential.
2.3.2.2. Horizontal Agency Cost between Majority and Minority
Another major concern regarding corporate governance in China is the fact that
the board of directors is controlled by a dominant shareholder, who may take
advantage of this control to undermine minority shareholders' interests by self-dealing
56 C. Mallin, Corporate Governance (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 5
57 For example, the scandal of China National Cotton Reserve Corporation (CNCRC) is a similar case.
In this case, the CNCRC participated the cotton speculative trading. Finally it suffered a loss nearly 100
million USD. The relevant report also indicates that, the proposal of cotton speculative trading did not
undergo a formal decision-making process before it was initialed. It was only decided by a few
executives in CNCRC. See a series of detailed reports about this scandal, available at
<http://finance.news.tom.com/1327/2005114-145131.html> accessed 20th July 2011
58 Q. Shao (n 55)
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or manipulating the share price.59 Indeed, there has long been a serious issue with
controlling shareholders engaging in "tunnelling activities". A number of cases in
China have shown that the manipulation of a few insiders can trigger thousands of
individual investors to suffer a loss of their investments. Reported cases show that
shareholder "tunnelling activities" can be divided into three major types. Firstly,
block-holders60 can force listed companies to provide them with corporate loans or
guarantees.61 Secondly, block-holders can exploit a listed company's assets through
insider-trading.62 Thirdly, block-holders can appropriate a listed company's assets
directly.63 According to a study of 173 listed companies in China, samples in which
block-holders had illegally appropriated company assets constituted 37 per cent of all
samples. Most appropriations were engaged in through the above activities.64
For listed SOEs, their interdependence with their controlling shareholders gives
rise to "stealing" activities on wide range of fronts. Officials who control the parent
SOE may move the listed SOE's assets to the specify propose entity owned by his or
her related party (e.g. friends or relatives). However, more commonly cases relating to
"tunnelling activities" do not involve appropriating a listed company's asset for
59 D. Clarke (n 46) 148
60 Block-holder means controlling shareholder with overwhelming controlling power on a company
61 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo [Shanghai Stock Exchange],'Guanyu Dui Shanghai Lengguang
Shiye Gufen Youxian Gongsi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao [Notice on Public Criticism on Shanghai
Lengguang Shiye plc] (11th 6 1999); available at <http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/> accessed
20th July 2011 Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo [Shenzhen Stock Exchange], 'Guanyu dui Beijing
Zhongguancun Keji Fazhan (Konggu) Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yuyi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao'
[Notice on Public Criticism on Beijing Zhongguancun Keji Fazhan plc] (28th 9 2001) available at:
<http://www.szse.cn/> accessed 20th July 2011 also see G.H. Jiang, C.M. Lee & H. Yue, 'Tunneling in
China: The Surprisingly Pervasive Use of Corporate Loan to Extract Funds from Chinese Listed
Companies' Johnson School Research Paper Series 31-06
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=861445> accessed 20th July 2011
62 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo, [ Shanghai Stock Exchange] 'Guanyu Dui Hubei Xingfu Shiye
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Hubei Xingfu
Shiye plc] (23rd 2 2001) available at <http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/> accessed 20th July 2011
63 Zhongguo Zhengjianhui [CSRC] 'Guanyu dui Hubei Meierya Gufen Youxian Gongsi Ji Yougian
Renyuan Yuyi Gongkai Piping de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Hubei Meierya Gufen
Youxian plc] (12th 9 2001) available at <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub> accessed 20th July 2011
Zhongguo Zhengjianhui [CSRC] 'Guanyu dui Ningxia He Minzu Huagong Gufen Youxian Gongsi Ji
Yougian Renyuan Yuyi Gongkai Piping de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Ningxia He Minzu
Huagong plc] (31st 10 2001) <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub> accessed 20th July 2011
64 H. Zhang & Z.D. Wu, 'Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Zijin Zhanyong de Xianzhuan Ji Tezheng Yanjiu'
[The Characteristics of Appropriation of Public Companies' assets in China] (2003) 5 Shangshi Gongsi
[Journal of Public Companies] 17, 24
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personal benefit. As already highlighted, parent SOEs contribute their best-equipped
facilities to subsidiaries in order to list them. However, maximizing profits is not the
only demand made of an SOE by the government. The government usually expects
SOEs bring multiple benefits—for example stabilizing society by providing full
employment, or providing strategic control of a particular industry where this cannot
be achieved through regulation.65 A parent SOE cannot fulfil all these tasks by itself.
It may therefore sometimes need to strengthen other entities of the group by
distributing the profits of its listed subsidiary between these entities. As some scholars
point out, "many SOEs are debt-ridden enterprises 'repackaged' for listing and
continue to be controlled by their parent companies who, having successfully seen to
their IPO, look towards them as cash cows for ready milking."66
For private listed companies, the horizontal agency problem is less complicated.
Some leading Chinese entrepreneurs have been shown to have a strong interest in
expanding their business empire by owning several listed companies and a number of
other business entities. However, such a super-size business network does not always
bring benefits and can, in fact, sometimes be a troublesome burden. According to
statistics, within the last three years, the market regulator investigated nearly 40
corporate groups, relating to more than 200 listed companies. Most cases investigated
involved illegal loans between members of a corporate group or undisclosed related
party-transactions.67 The main reason for these corporate scandals is that corporate
groups are overloaded with a large number of business entities. Some corporate group
owners have overestimated their capacity and recklessly become involved in several
different business sectors. Business failure in one sector may easily trigger pressure
from lenders or local government, which has granted preference policy (e.g. a licence
which authorises a corporate group to use a certain kind of natural resource during a
certain period). Related party transactions, illegal guarantees and other types of
65 D. Clarke (n 46) 150
66 L.H. Tang & J.Y. Wang (n 48) 151
67 R. Cai, 'You Shangshi Gongsi Zaoxi Yundong Yinfa De Sikao' [Some Thoughts Concerning Listed
Company's Profit Making System] (2005) 2 Shenyang Nongye Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Shenyang
Agricultural University] 98, 105
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financial manipulations are effective ways to conceal temporarily the effects of
business failure, though they do not help to overcome such failure permanently. In
fact, such manipulations usually worsen the problems and causes huge losses to most
members of the group. This phenomenon seriously threatens minority shareholder
interests and even their confidence in the stock markets.
Having provided a brief history of corporate governance issues, the above
sections have clarified the major problems of China's corporate governance regime;
namely, the vertical agency problem and horizontal agency problem. Both problems
are severe and widespread. These problems are not only the result of ideological
influence or concentrated ownership structures, but also because agency cost control
strategies are poorly designed. The following part will analyse the relationship
between these major problems and the law.
2.4. Weak Agency Cost Control Strategies
2.4.1 Administrative Regulation
Administrative authorities and regulations play an important role in regulating
China's public companies. Notably, even until 1988, no formal legislation had been
enacted to govern SOEs. The functions of the formal legislation, for example,
protection of creditors and accountability of managers, were managed through the
State administrative procedure.68 This culture of strong administrative regulation has
been inherited by the current regulatory regime.
Unlike the UK's Financial Services Authority,69 which is a QUANGO, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is a wholly government controlled
68 Clarke (n 8) 496
69 In June 2010, the UK Coalition Government announced proposals to abolish the FSA and reform the
UK financial services regulatory regime. The Treasury has now published a formal consultation paper
with further details of the proposed new regulatory structure, due to be in place by 2012, see Herbert
Smith, Corporate E-bulletin issue. No. 2010/24
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administrative authority. In accordance with the Securities Law 2005,70 the CSRC's
powers are divided into three parts: (1) formulating regulation; (2) investigation and
supervision; and (3) legal enforcement.71 Its powers range from proactive to reactive
and it plays an important role in promoting compliance with regulations in the stock
markets. Firstly, the CSRC contributes considerably to increasing legal certainty
surrounding the corporate governance regime. It does so by enacting
quasi-legislations, including regulations and guidelines,72 to implement the principles
of the Company Law 2005 and Securities Law 2005. In general, these regulations and
guidelines are legally binding and all listed companies must comply with them.
Secondly, the CSRC actively performs its supervisory and legal enforcement powers.
From a proactive perspective, the CSRC is entitled to verify the Articles of
Association for companies seeking to gain listed position in mainland China.73 The
CSRC has responsibility for ensuring that all the companies gaining access to the
stock markets, meet the required corporate governance standards. From a reactive
perspective, the CSRC has investigated more than 1000 illegal activities engaged in
by market participants within the last ten years.74 It has issued sanctions against 581
companies and approximately 1200 individuals.75 Between 1999 and 2003, the CSRC
investigated misconduct amongst 12 per cent of all listed companies and brought
70 China first passed a Securities Law in 1998. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa
[Securities Law of the People's Republic of China], adopted by Ninth Session of the Standing
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, December 29th, 1998, effective July 1st, 1999
(hereinafter Securities Law 1999). The Securities Law of People's Public of China 2005, Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquanfa 2005 by 18th Meeting of the Standing committee of tenth National
People's Congress 27 October, 2005 effective 1st January 2006 (hereinafter Securities Law 2005).
71 Securities Law 2005 Article 179
72 Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze 2002 [Corporate Governance Guideline 2002] issued by
the CSRC on 7th January 2002, Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhong Gudong Quanyi Baohu De
Rougan Guiding [Minority Shareholder Protection Provisions 2004] issued by the CSRC on 8th
December 2004, Guanyu Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu De Zhidao Yijian [Independent
Director Guideline 2001] issued by the CSRC on 16th August 2001, Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng
Zhiyin 2006 [Guidelines on Article of Association for Listed Companies 2006] issued by the CSRC on
16th March 2006
73 Securities Law 2005 Article 12
74 'Zhengjian Hui Zhifa Xiaolv Tigao' [Promoting of CSRC's Enforcing Efficiency] 12th Feb 2007,
Fazhi Ribao [Daily Law] electronic version available at
<http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2007-02/12/content_7793281.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
75 ibid
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enforcement action against those companies76. Its enforcement seems to work well in
most cases. Clarke points out that the sanction of a CSRC's reprimand or filing
rejection remains powerful, as the executives of most listed companies are
government bureaucrats, who are sensitive to anything that might blot their record or
affect their chances of promotion.77 Moreover, the CSRC's investigation and
enforcement procedures can also give rise to a criminal liability.78
Nonetheless, the above figures may not precisely reflect the position on the
ground. According to Pistor's survey, CSRC's sanctions are often benign. In 2003,
only 22 per cent of all enforcement actions resulted in fines.79 Some reported cases
also reveal that CSRC's sanctions exist merely on paper, which means they have not
been enforced. For example, in the case of Yi An Technology, the CSRC issued a fine
of 880 million RMB against the wrongdoers. However, because of the CSRC's slow
reaction to the misconduct, the moment for proper investigation and enforcement was
missed and the wrongdoers could not be located.80
Some research shows that regulatory compliance among market participants is
often prompted under the CSRC's administrative supervision. However, corporate
governance practice in listed companies is not substantially improved by complying
with CSRC's regulations. Instead of implementing CSRC standards into practice,
market participants passively accept these standards and then try to achieve them at
76 C.X. Shi 'Protecting Investors of China Through Multiple Regulatory Mechanism and Effective
Enforcement' (2007) 24 (2) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 451, 485
77 D. Clarke (n 46) 198
78 In practice, CSRC will deliver the relevant materials which could be the evidences of criminal
offence to the public security, e.g. see Report of Gu ChuJun and KE LONG's case, available at
<http://stock.jrj.com.cn/news/2006-07-16/000001551926.html> accessed 20th July 2011
79 C.G. Xu & K. Pistor, 'Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China'
(2005) 7 (1) American Law and Economics Review 184
80 A case report available at <http://www.southcn.com/finance/zhengquan/tb/200203260140.htm>
accessed 20th July 2011
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minimum cost.81 For example, according to CSRC regulations, all listed companies
must have independent directors on their board. However, many surveys indicate that
most independent directors play a far more passive role than the CSRC expects. For
example, Li's recent research points out that more than 90 per cent of independent
directors assess corporate performance on the basis of the materials circulated by
listed corporations voluntarily. Only a small percentage communicates with the
company's customers, suppliers, employees and other executives on a regular basis.
Moreover, Li's research reveals that a striking 75 per cent of independent directors
never use or prepare to use their power to recommend that the board hold
extraordinary general meetings or appoint independent auditing firms to investigate
the financial situation of the company. Nearly 90 per cent of them acknowledge that
they will never recommend the board to dismiss an auditing firm already appointed by
the corporation.82 Therefore, implementing CSRC's corporate governance standards
is merely a window-dressing exercise for most listed companies. The effectiveness of
the CSRC's administrative enforcement has also been brought into question because
of resource constraints. The number of listed companies in China is increasing
dramatically and the CSRC with a relatively small group of staff may not have
adequate human resource to supervise the conduct of all the listed companies
regularly.83
81 'Dui Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili De Pingjia' [Assessing Chinese Corporate Governance, An interview of
Li Weian] 11th, May 2007, Tian Jing Daily, Li is a Professor of NanKai University (China), and also the
director of Corporate Governance Research Center, NanKai University. This conclusion is based on an
empirical research on 1249 Chinese listed companies. A detailed report is available at 8th May 2007
Zhongguo Zhengquan Zazhi [China Securities Journal]
82 L.M. Li, 'Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Bianyuanhua Wenti Yanjiu' [Independent
Director, Only a Decoration?] In B.S. Wang (eds.), Zhuan Xing Shiqi Gongsi Fa De Xiandai Hua
[Modernizing Company Law in Transition Context] (China Social Science Press 2003) 131
83 W. Hutchens 'Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal
System' (2003) 24:3 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 638 The recent
survey shows that nearly 2000 companies listed in Chinese stock markets. In contrast, CSRC has 1812
employees whose average age is 35, and more than 40 per cent of them hold a master degree or higher.
Information available at <http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2006-11/28/content_455561.htm> accessed 20th
July 2011
43
Finally, as S.G. Tu, the vice-president of the CSRC, recently said, the
"Government will intervene in the development of stock markets, if necessary."84 The
CSRC is widely suspected to be a governmental body, which may facilitate State
intervention. Its independence as a regulator is therefore always questionable.85
2.4.2 Problems of the Legal Regime
Aside from administrative regulation, legislation is playing an increasingly
important role in regulating public companies. However, legislation in China is
usually incomplete, inconsistent, not-consecutive, lacks co-ordination, and is not
sufficiently detailed or accurate.86 Furthermore, the enforcement of legislation is also
not efficient. This part will elaborate on the problems relating to the substance and
enforcement of legislation in more detail.
2.4.2.1 Incompleteness of Law
According to Pistor, there are two types of incomplete law. Type I is the law that
broadly circumscribes outcomes without identifying particular actions, or by
specifying only a few actions. Type II is law that specifies the actions that must be
prevented, but fails to enumerate all relevant prohibitions.87 In most cases, the law in
this field falls under type I in terms of its incompleteness. A large number of legal
provisions in Chinese company law are drafted in an obscure fashion.88 Nevertheless,
China, as a civil law jurisdiction is not an appropriate jurisdiction for type I
incompleteness as this type of incompleteness is a particular characteristic of common
84 X. Cheng, 'Wuxian Tongqing Zhengjian Hui' [Embarrassed CSRC] 19th Oct. 2007, Dongfang Daily
available at <http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20071019/00394076147.shtml> accessed 20th July 2011
85 See 4.2.2.1 below 117-118
86 K.Y. Zou, 'Towards the Rule of Law: An Overview of China's Legal Reform', In G.W. Wang and J.
Wong (eds.), China: Two Decades of Reform and Change (Singapore University Press, Singapore 1999)
62
87 K. Pistor & C.G. Xu, 'Incomplete Law A Conceptual and Analytical Framework And its Application
to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation' (2003) 35(4) Journal of International Law and Politics
931, 942
88 For details, see Chapter V below
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law jurisdictions in which the court system holds a strong residual law making
power.89 Additionally, catch-all provisions generally require the enforcer to have
strong ability to exercise discretion and deal with a matter as they see fit on case by
case basis.90 Inexperienced judges in transition economies are unlikely to fulfil this
task. Thus, the nature of the Chinese legal system and the weak court system in China
make it a jurisdiction for which the catch-all provisions in Chinese company law seem
obviously misplaced.
It is important to explain why Chinese company law is drafted in this particular
style. Firstly, it is a reflection of Chinese legislators' limited legislative skill.
According to Liu's research, it is usual for the legal provisions of Chinese commercial
law to be drafted in an open-ended manner. The reason is simply that legislators are
inexperienced in that they are unable to foresee the effects of certain legal provisions
in practice. Therefore, the open-ended standard is an optimal choice for the legislator,
as it leaves greater room for China's Supreme Court to further interpret and revise
these provisions on the basis of their practical implications.91 This approach, however,
is unlikely to be efficient. It is difficult to collect feedbacks from practice, when a
legal rule is too vague to be implemented in practice. In China, the lower courts
usually decline to hear a litigant's case standing on vague legal provisions.
Therefore, many rules live only on paper. Additionally, this approach potentially
damages the consistency and stability of the legislation, as different individuals can
interpret the law in different ways. Frequent revision of law not only causes confusion,
but also damages its authority.
89 K. Pistor & C.G. Xu (n 87) 120
90 B. Cheffins, Company Law Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press Oxford 2004) 282, for
more information, see Chapter III 3.2 below
91 J.H. Liu, 'Gongsifa de Xiugai yu Jieshi: Yisifaquan de Shidu Ganyu Wei Zhongxin' [Reforming
Company Law: A Centralism of Judiciary Intervention] (2005) 3 Falv Shiyong [Journal of Legal
Application] 4. The China's Supreme Court is entitled with a power of making interpretations on laws
in according to the practical need. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Fayuan Zuzhi Fa 2006 article
33 [People's Republic of China Law of Organization of People's Court 2006]
45
Secondly, open-ended legal provisions are sometimes political instruments.
Where a particular legal provision could result in sensitive consequences, such as
opportunistic litigations, excessive free-rider problems, or even political instability,
but the government needs to enact that provision to reduce pressure on it from the
general public, this provision will be drafted with great caution. On the one hand,
such a provision may be introduced in the company law to appease a particular
interest group. On the other hand, it will be drafted as a principle without any further
interpretation to reduce its enforceability. As some Western lawyers argue, "rather
than existing to provide clear notice to private parties of legal rights and duties, PRC
legal enactments exist to facilitate management of a complex society by an
administrative state."92
Additionally, laws are not always properly disclosed by the Supreme Court,
which holds residual law-making power. An example is in cases of private
enforcement against insider-trading and market manipulation, which were banned by
the courts. Before the Securities Law 2005 came into effect93, some reports revealed
the Supreme Court had lifted the ban on private enforcement on insider-trading and
market manipulation.94 Nevertheless, this decision was merely treated as an internal
directive circulated in the court system and no formal interpretation was officially
disclosed to the general public.
2.4.2.2 Problematic Legal Enforcement: The Example of Securities
Litigation95
92 W. Hutchens (n 83) 625
93 Securities Law 2005 Article 76 & 77
94 X.M. Xi, the Vice-Principal of the Chinese Supreme Court gave a conference speech in which he
confirmed that the private securities litigation against insider-trading and market manipulation will be
accepted by lower court. For details, see 'Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Quanmian Jiejin' [No Ban on
Civil Securities Litigation], Caijing [Finance] Electronic version available at
<http://stock.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-09-03/000002626614.html> accessed 20th July 2011
95 In respect of company law litigation, there is no report case of the shareholder derivative action
against director or executives on the basis of breach fiduciary duties in Chinese listed companies in
China. Therefore, this part uses the security law cases to illustrate the problems.
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Private securities litigation generally serves two functions. Firstly, it offers
investors a means of recovering their losses. Secondly, it enhances incentives for
market participant compliance with regulations.96 In China, the first function is
partially fulfilled by private securities litigation. However, such litigation plays a very
limited role in incentivising regulation compliance.
Private securities litigation cases were not accepted by any level of the courts in
China until 2002. An important case was the Hong Guang Industry scandal. In
seeking to successfully obtain a listed position, Hong Guang Industry falsely reported
its annual profit as being 54 million RMB, while in fact it was suffering a 103 million
RMB loss. After becoming listed, the company forged the financial data of an interim
report by concealing its substantial losses and disclosing fabricated profits to general
public. After being investigated by the CSRC, an administrative fine and criminal
sanction were imposed on Hong Guang Industry and its executives. However, the
civil litigations raised by portfolio investors were declined before the courts on the
basis that "there is no cause-effect relationship between the listed company's wrongful
conduct and the loss suffered by the investors."97 In 2001, the Supreme Court issued
a Notice98 to put a ban on all types of private securities enforcements. The securities
litigation was a highly sensitive issue in China. The Chinese Supreme Court was
reluctant to expose State-owned listed companies to a flood of securities litigations. In
the meantime, as S.H. Cao, director of the Research Centre of the Supreme Court,
stated "the law and regulations on securities litigation need to be further interpreted
and most Chinese judges in lower courts also lack knowledge and experience of
handling it."99
96 W. Hutchens (n 83) 603
97 F. Liu, A Case Note of HONG GUANG Industry available at
<http://www.51lw.com/article/audit/953.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
98 The Notice on Temporarily not Accepting Securities Related Civil Compensation Case
99 An interview of Cao Shouhua available at
<http://news.southcn.com/hotpersue/.%5C200110110824.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
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During the period from 2002 to 2003, in order to ease the tension between
aggrieved investors and State-owned listed companies, the Supreme Court issued an
ice-breaking Notice.100 It confirmed that local intermediate courts would hear private
securities litigations against fraudulent misrepresentation. The Notice provided a
practical legal regime for the enforcement of securities litigations.101 In some respects,
it was enacted in a plaintiff-friendly way. For example, it gives plaintiffs an
autonomous position from which to choose which eligible parties they would like to
sue. This means plaintiffs could pursue their interests by bringing litigation action
against a "deep pocket" defendant.102 Additionally, the provision applied a statute of
limitations of two years to private securities litigations rather than the standard one
year special statute of limitations.103 From 2003 to 2007, the lower courts accepted
large numbers of private securities litigations based upon misrepresentation. The
claims of these litigations were valued at approximately 700 million RMB to 800
million RMB. Nearly 10 thousand investors brought private litigations against more
than 30 listed companies and other eligible parties. Until 2007, 80 per cent of
litigations have been properly settled.104 In several reported cases, most plaintiffs
were successful in obtaining the compensation they were claiming.105
Although the private securities litigations have improved the standard of legal
enforcement, it does not solve the issue of administrative intervention. In accordance
with the Supreme Court's Notice, private securities litigations are subject to
100 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Sujia Chengshu Yinfa De Minshi
Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [The Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning
Accepting Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False Statement on Securities and Several Provisions on
Hearing Civil Compensation Caused by False Statement on the Securities Market] (herein after Notice)
issued by China's Supreme Court on 15th January 2002
101 W. Hutchens (n 83) 604
102 C. Xi (n 47) 495 also see Provisions on Private Securities Litigation Article 28, listed companies
bear a joint and several liabilities with the directors, supervisors, underwriters who fraudulently
disclose the information.
103 WHutchens (n 83) 258
104 Y.X. Song, 'Zhongguo Minshi Zhengquan Susong' [Private Securities Litigation in China] working
paper, available at <http://songyixin.blog.cnstock.com/archives/2007/189194.html>, accessed 20th July
2011 Song is a leading securities lawyer in China.
105 Y.X. Song, 'a Case Note of Dong Fang Electronic', available at
<http://songyixin.blog.cnstock.com/archives/2007/176670.html#539098> accessed 20th July 2011 also
see C. Xi (n 47) 492-496
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administration and criminal sanction. In other words, aggrieved investors can only file
a litigation action against a party who has received an administrative fine from the
CSRC or another administrative organ like the Ministry of Finance on the basis of
fraudulent disclosure, or who has been convicted for misrepresentation by a court.
Arguably these preliminary requirements reduce the cost of evidence collecting for
private investors whilst also preventing the opening of the floodgates to litigations.
Some economic studies also indicate that, the market regulator outperforms courts as
a law enforcer, where the "costs of verifying the circumstance of specified cases and
interpreting statues are high".106 However, these preliminary eligibility requirements
directly conflict with the general principles of the Civil Procedure Act 2007.107
Furthermore, an individual investor's civil right of claim is partially controlled by
administrative authorities. In practice, the enforcement of an investor's private claim
is tightly restricted by the attitude of the administrative organs toward the fault
disclosed. It can also be argued that the CSRC as an administrative regulatory body
would adopt different standards to justify whether a disclosure is fraudulent compared
to tests used by a court in a civil litigation action.
In addition to undermining the independence of the court system, this
administrative oriented approach weakens the role of private securities litigation in
mitigating the "agency cost problem". In most cases, fraudulent disclosure is
organised by a few insiders within listed companies. In deliberately disclosing
wrongful information to the general public such persons can foresee that they may
face administrative or criminal sanctions in the future if caught. However, as plaintiffs
106 G. Edward, S. Johnson & A Shleifer. 'Coase v. Coasians' (2001) 116 (3) Quarterly Journal of
Economics 853
107 The Civil Procedure Law of People's Public of China 2007, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi
Susongfa 2007, adopted by 30th Meeting of the Standing committee of tenth National People's
Congress 28th October, 2007 effective 1stApril 2008
This pre-trail demands conflict with the general principles of Civil Procedure Law 2007, according to
Article 108 of the Act, a suit can be filed, where the following conditions are met:
(1) the plaintiff must be an individual, legal person or any other organization that has a direct
interest in the case;
(2) there must be a specific defendant;
(3) there must be a concrete claim, a factual basis, and a cause for the suit; and
(4) the suit must be within the scope of acceptance for civil lawsuits of the people s courts and
within the specific jurisdiction of the people s court where it is filed.
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will generally sue the eligible defendant with the greatest payment capacity, these
insiders can easily externalise the loss to the listed company. In Dong Fang Electronic
Plc v Cao Xiaomei and others, more than 6500 aggrieved investors raised litigation
actions against listed companies founded on their joint and several liabilities, on the
basis of administrative and criminal sanctions imposed on insiders, who directly had
engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation.108 Dong Fang Electronic plc eventually
freely allocated its shares to plaintiffs as compensation.109 In such conditions, a
reasonable assumption is that the potential loss triggered by private securities
litigation could enhance a shareholder's incentive to supervise a company's
management. However, most super-size listed companies are dominated by State
ownership, which generally suffers from the issue of "owner absence". It means both
of governmental agencies and management team of SOEs will not suffer from the loss
of the state asset. Thus, if State assets are the main source of compensation for a
plaintiffs' loss, private securities litigations are unlikely to enhance the governmental
officials' incentive in supervising the management in SOEs. The preliminary
requirements for such actions to be brought further compound this situation, since it
constrains private investors, especially institutional investors, in playing a more active
role in supervising market participants' conduct.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this chapter shows that the major problem in China's corporate
governance regime, similar to the problems in Western jurisdictions, is the "agency
cost problem". However, as a result of socio-economic differences the "agency cost
problem" bears some distinctive Chinese characteristics. Unlike in other jurisdictions,
"horizontal agency cost" and "vertical agency cost" are equally intense in China. In
108 A detailed case note of Dong Fang Electronic available at
<http://www.qingdaonews.com/gb/content/2003-02/20/content_1003459.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
109 In the case of Ying GuangXia, the approach of free share-allocation was also adopted by the
defendant to compensate the plaintiffs' loss See 'Yin Guangxia Min Shi Peichang Jijiang Shouwei' [The
End of the Civil Litigation Against Ying Guangxia] available at
<http://stock.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-05-28/000002273550.html> accessed 20th July 2011
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listed SOEs, the vertical agency cost is triggered by the "absent owner problem".
Concentrated ownership without ultimate owners weakens a majority shareholder's
supervisory power. It thus results in the "insider control" problem. In the meantime,
the concentrated ownership structure gives rise to majority shareholders undermining
minority shareholder's interests. In short, the two-tiers of agency cost are the core
problems faced by China's corporate governance regime. In order to respond
effectively to these problems, legal and administrative control strategies must be
carefully structured.
Nonetheless, existing control strategies in China are suffering from a number of
weaknesses. Although the market regulator is empowered to exercise a full-range of
regulatory powers, it cannot efficiently control agency-cost problems. The
underperformance of administrative regulations is partly because market participants
have few incentives to substantially comply with administrative regulations, and
partly because the enforcement strategy adopted by the market regulator is inefficient.
Similarly, the functions of formal legislation are curbed by a variety of constraints.
Firstly, legislation is usually poorly drafted. The legal provisions are vague and
ambiguous. Secondly, enforcement of legislation is not always effective under the
current legal framework. The analysis shows that socialist scepticism towards the
"rule of law" together with a strong administrative regulatory approach limits the role
of the judicial system. The above analysis, allows two conclusions to be made
regarding China's legal reform of corporate governance. Firstly, in essence, the major
problems experienced in China's corporate governance are similar to those
experienced in Western jurisdictions. This observation is a key pre-condition to
solving China's problems using a comparative approach. Secondly, improving poor
existing agency-cost control strategies is the major means of improving corporate
governance standards in China's listed companies. Bearing all these findings in mind,
the next two chapters will set out a methodology for China's legal reform of corporate
governance.
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Chapter III Legal Reform of Corporate Governance in China:
Does Company Law Matter?
Chapter II has revealed that Chinese corporate governance is suffering from a
series of problems. Although these problems seem to be complicated, they share some
similarities. One of the main sources of the problems is that the Chinese legal regime
fails to provide adequate protection to shareholders against incumbent managers, and
to minority shareholders against majority shareholder abuses. On this basis, it can be
concluded that "agency cost control devices" should be further improved in China.
The analysis in chapter II has already indicated that Chinese company law is not
effective from either a legislative or practical perspective. This chapter will answer
the first question posed in chapter I; namely, does company law really matter in
controlling agency cost in the Chinese context?
3.1. The Priorities of the Company Law in the Chinese Context
The "law matters" thesis has been developed by law and finance scholars.
Following empirical research, La Porta et al have concluded that law which
effectively protects shareholders' interests is the foundation for a strong and secure
securities market, as it increases investor confidence and motivates investors to invest
their money into stock markets.1 Although this argument is influential, it is
nevertheless criticised by many company lawyers. They cast doubt on the "law
matters" thesis in two respects. Firstly, law is only one element of an institutional
framework. In many developed jurisdictions, non-law components play a more
1 R. La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny 'Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economies 1
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important role in promoting the good corporate governance of public companies.2
Secondly, even if law is an important force in regulating corporate governance, its
effectiveness largely depends on the enforcement regime. In other words, the function
of good legislation is limited, if it is without the support of an effective judicial
system.3 These drawbacks to the law matters thesis warn us that it would be
inappropriate to apply the thesis directly to a specific context without careful analysis.
This part will therefore explore the questions of (1) on what basis company law has an
objective to mitigate China's corporate governance problems, and (2) why good
legislation is still important in a context where the legal enforcement is relatively
weak.
Some commentators challenge the law matters thesis by arguing that company
law is not the only device for regulating corporate governance. From research into the
UK corporate governance regime, Cheffins argues:
On balance, developments in the UK suggest that a highly specific set of laws
governing companies and financial market do not need to be in place for the
American version of corporate governance to become pre-dominant. Instead,
alternative institutional structures can perform the function "law matters"
advocates say the legal system needs to play.4
Coffee makes a similar point in his research into UK and US corporate governance
regimes. He concludes that "the principal weakness of the LLS&V thesis is its narrow
focus on enforceable legal right…. the minority right could in principle come from
2 J. Coffee, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and
Control' (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 1, B. Cheffins, 'Does Law Matters? The Separation of Ownership
and Control in the United Kingdom' (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 459, B. Cheffins, Law
Economics and the UK's System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from History (2001) 90 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 71, and B. Cheffins, 'Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy
Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies' (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1
3 M. Siems 'Shareholder Protection Around the World ('Leximetric II')' 33 (2008) Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law 111 and J. Coffee, 'Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement' (2007) 156
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229
4 B. Cheffins 'Does Law Matters?' (n 2) 461
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any source".5 Indeed, the agency cost between shareholder and director is controlled
by many other regulatory mechanisms in developed economies, including competitive
product markets, reasonable efficient capital markets and an active market in
corporate control incentive compensation for managers, sophisticated professional
accountancy and effective financial disclosure.6 In fact, these multiple non-legal
mechanisms shoulder the main burden of regulating corporate governance.
Consequently, some lawyers even argue that the company law regime merely plays a
"trivial" or "limited" part in promoting good corporate governance in the developed
economies.7
Nonetheless, the situation in China is different. Under the current regulatory
regime, the CSRC, as the sole market regulator, serves an important function in
controlling insider abuse through the enforcement of market regulations and
Securities Law. However, as demonstrated, much evidence has already shown that a
one tier regulatory regime is inadequate to effectively control the serious agency cost
problems in China.8 Therefore, developing a multi-level regulatory regime is
essential for the legal reform of corporate governance. The company law regime and
non-legal forces, both of which are the core agency cost controlling devices, are the
crucial complementary components of administrative regulation. However, unlike in
Western jurisdictions, company law must play a more important part in this regulatory
regime for the following reasons.
Firstly, protection provided by the non-legal forces might be too lax to shield
minority shareholder interests from insider abuse. Admittedly, non-legal regulatory
5 J. Coffee (n 2) 71
6 B. Black 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Market' (2001) 48 UCLA
Law Review 781
7 B. Black 'Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis' (1990) 84 NorthWestern
University Law Review 542, M. Klausner, 'The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate
Governance' (December 17th, 2004). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 300.
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=637021> accessed 20th July 2011 and also see M. Roe,
'Corporate Law limits' (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 233
8 C.X. Shi, 'Protecting Investors in China through Multiple Regulatory Mechanisms and Effective
Enforcement' (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 452
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regimes can exert pressures on managers and block-holders. However, the control
exerted by non-legal forces is generally loose, rather than firm.9 One of the standard
claims of law and economics literature is that competitive pressure may rule out
inefficient structures through a "survival of the fittest" selection process. However, it
may take time for selection pressures to act on firms operating sub-optimally
especially at a time when no inefficient structure can be observed.10 In developed
economies, loose pressures from non-legal components can secure individual
shareholder's property rights, while preserving the management's discretion in the
decision-making process. However, as stated in chapter II, both horizontal and
vertical agency cost11 poses serious risks to minority shareholder interests. As a result,
compared with shareholders in developed economies, the shareholders in China face a
much higher risk.12 Consequently, the sanctions offered by non-legal regulatory
regimes are not strong enough to control insider misconduct. Arguably, they hardly
even cause any direct loss to insiders. Most non-legal forces are capable only of
imposing a reputational sanction on companies and insiders. For example, as the stock
exchanges in China lack any independent authority, the sanction issued by the
exchanges is limited to the public criticism of companies and individuals.13 However,
Chinese market participants are not really sensitive to reputational sanctions. Mutual
trust between market participants and non-legal regulatory regimes has not been well
established, nor has an effective communication trajectory between non-legal regimes
and investors been formed. Under these circumstances, investors have to face the
question of the extent to which the message sent by non-legal sanctions is accurate
and reliable.14 By contrast, the company law regime has a stronger deterrence effect
in controlling insider abuse. The function of the company law system is based on the
heavy hand of the State. This is more demanding than the enforcement regime of
9 D. Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China', GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No.
433 available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1245803> 15 accessed 20th July 2011
10 ibid 15
11 For the definition of these two types of agency cost, see chapter II (2.3.2.1) above
12 See Chapter II (2.3.2.1 & 2.3.2.2) above




non-legal forces. The sanctions under the company law regime can impose fines on
wrongdoers and even disqualify them from again being a business manager.15 A clear
mandatory rule can send a strong signal to directors and block-holders that any
behaviour which violates minority shareholder property right is subject to serious
legal sanctions.16 Furthermore, decisions made through court procedures need to be
supported by solid evidence and to undergo complicated legal processes, rendering
the result more reliable. Consequently, sound corporate governance practice is more
likely to be integrated into manager and block-holder behaviours by strict liability
rules provided through formal legislation.
Secondly, introducing multiple non-legal mechanisms into the regulatory regime
would conflict with the local regulatory culture. The Chinese administrative culture is
oriented around a hierarchical model. The government prefers a hands on approach
under which most regulatory agencies are controlled by the State. In such a context,
there is little room for developing a set of complicated non-legal regulatory
mechanisms. For example, both Chinese stock exchanges are under the tight control
of the CSRC. The CSRC nominates the chairman and deputy chairman of these
exchanges and also appoints and dismisses their general managers and deputy general
managers. The CSRC alone has already placed substantial control on the stock
exchanges, allowing them only to have a limited range of powers.17 Clarke makes an
insightful comment on this phenomenon,
market monitoring, is disfavoured by the state. The Chinese state prefers direct
regulation by government agencies first, and indirect regulation by private
litigation in the state's courts next. Regulation by the uncontrolled institutions of
the market comes a distant third, and indeed it is hard to find such institutions in
15 Company Law 2005 art.147
16 T. Paredes, 'A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S Corporate
Law isn't the Answer' (2004) 45 William and Marry Law Review 1136
17 C.X Shi (n 8) 466
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China.18
In line with Clarke's argument, the Chinese government is more likely to employ
formal legislation rather than non-law forces in reforming the corporate governance
regime, as the former in general is easier to control. The securities litigation
mentioned in chapter II is further supporting evidence on this point19.
Thirdly, good corporate governance underpinned by non-legal forces cannot be
achieved in a short time. The development of institutions can take decades. In North's
words, institutions are the "product of a long gestation" and the "process of
[institutional] change is overwhelmingly incremental."20 There are many
uncertainties surrounding the development of institutional supports. It is a
time-consuming project for policy-makers in developing jurisdictions to understand
why institutions work the way they do and to ascertain the complementary
relationships among institutions in each setting.21 Compared to complicated non-legal
components, a good company law regime is more accessible. Black makes the
following conclusion from the experience of corporate governance reform in Russia:
Writing good laws can take years and building good institutions takes decades…
they chose to privatize immediately, and hope that the laws and institutions would
follow later. The law did indeed follow… but the privatizers hoped for more than
just decent laws. They hoped that broad private ownership would create a
constituency for strengthening and enforcing those laws. That did not happen.22
Although Chinese corporate governance reform adopts a gradualist approach
compared to Russian style "shock therapy", the urgency of calling for good legal and
18 D. Clarke (n 9) 57
19 See chapter II 2.4.2.2 above
20 D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University
Press 1990),192
21 T. Paredes (n 16) 1125
22 B. Black, R. Kraakman & A. Tarassova, 'Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What
Went Wrong' (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1731, 1753
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institutional supports in reform is very similar to conditions in Russia. Every
transition economy preparing to transfer State-owned shares to the general public
must face the problem of how to promote private investor confidence to secure the
benefits of privatization.23 Much experience has indicated that private investors are
reluctant to purchase privatised shares in conditions where legal and institutional
supports for the stock market are weak.24 In China, with the recent share-unification
regime, the government has begun to transfer State-owned shares to general public.25
Accordingly, policy-makers also need to promote private investor confidence by
introducing legal or institutional supports, which can generate immediate effects by
way of a regulatory regime. For the purposes of time-saving, formulating sound
company law is better than building a complex set of non-legal institutions.
Finally, this part does not attempt to deny the benefits of developing non-legal
forces in Chinese corporate governance reform. Rather, it uses these arguments to
highlight the advantages of employing a company law regime to promote good
corporate governance in China. There is no doubt that company law, as a regulatory
regime, has some important features which meet the demands of the reform of
corporate governance in China. These include exerting strict control over insider
misconduct, having a better level of coherence with the local regulatory culture and a
better level of accessibility for policy-makers. Furthermore, good company law is an
excellent proxy for the development of non-legal institutions. As Coffee states:
"Indeed, where legal forces exists to protect the minority shareholder, an institutional
and cultural infrastructure—composed of such important actors as security analyst,
rating agencies, and business journalist—soon follows."26 Consequently, the "law
matters" thesis is valid in the Chinese context. The company law regime can play a
23 J. Coffee, 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure'
(2000) 25 Journal of Corporate Law 1, 20-21
24 ibid 21 and B. Black (n 22)
25 For details, see C.X. Shi 'Recent Ownership Reform and Control of Central State-Owned
Enterprises in China: Taking One Step at a Time' 2007 (30) University of New South Wales Law
Journal 855
26 J. Coffee 'The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications' (1999) 93 Northwest University Law Review 696
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crucial role in the legal reform of corporate governance in China.
3.2. Company Law under Weak Legal Enforcement
A current debate on the role of company law in transitional economies centres on
the issue of the significant gap between "law on paper" and "law in practice". The
criticism is that "legal rules which are not enforced and do not influence an
individual's behaviours are not even regarded as a part of an institution."27 Indeed, if
no competent authority can enforce the legal regime, it would be pointless to claim
that company law is a reliable device. As shown in chapter II, the securities litigation
suffers from weak legal enforcement.28 As a result, they serve a limited function in
changing the behaviour of market participants. It is therefore necessary to explore
why company law is still important, even where legal enforcement is not efficient.
Many commentators attribute the gap between "law on paper" and "law in
practice" to a weak court system. As Clarke argues, "the Chinese judiciary, with its
low level of education and vulnerability to corruption and political pressure… [might
be not capable of having] … an important role to play in the development of Chinese
corporate governance norms".29 Admittedly, Clarke's argument highlights some of the
weaknesses of the Chinese judicial system. The court system even today is subject to
strict administrative controls. Its efficiency significantly lags behind that of the
developed jurisdictions. However, the weaknesses of the judicial system may be
overstated.
Firstly, the independence of the Chinese court system has long been questionable.
Nonetheless, some recent research indicates that the Chinese court system has begun
27 S. Opper & S. Schwaag-Serger 'Institutional Analysis of Legal Change: The Case of Corporate
Governance in China' (2008) 245 Journal of Law and Policy 247 for a general argument of the
divergence between "law on paper" and "law in practice", see A. Seidman & R. Seidman, 'Drafting
Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project' (1996) 44 American Journal of
Comparative Law 1
28 See Chapter 2 (2.4.2.2) above at 45-49
29 D. Clarke (n 9) 44-45
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to take an independent judicial position. Howson's research on the court system in
Shanghai finds that,
there is evidence of Shanghai courts ruling against political actors – case where
private litigants do battle against both government department and SOEs or
apparently commercial actors/investors with substantial political backing. In fact,
in all of the more than 200 full opinions reviewed, where there is a discernable
political interest the Shanghai court supported the non-state/Party interest… the
courts seem empowered to disregard formal corporate structures when they are
offered as a defence against "state" or Party cadre misfeasance.30
It could be argued that, in an economic sense, Shanghai is the most developed city in
China. Its judicial system might therefore be much more effective than in
under-developed areas. As a result, the performance of the Shanghai courts may not
represent the judicial system in China as a whole. However, Liebman also observes a
trend in which the Chinese courts have become to be more independent:
China's courts have at times appeared to signal that they are no longer solely
political tools for the state. Court rhetoric has changed over the past decade,
reflecting a modest attempt by the courts to shift from being a tool for enforcing
Party policy to being neutral forum for dispute resolution…the new education
requirements for judges represent a shift away from primary reliance on political
background in selecting members of the judiciary.31
In addition to Western commentators' findings, a more vivid example
demonstrating the increasing independence of the Chinese courts is the Hainan Kaili
case. Hainan Kaili (Kaili) is a private limited liability company seated in Southeast
30 N. Howson, 'Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts', University of
Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 09-023. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340566 8 10
31 Liebman, 'China's Courts: Restricted Reform' (2007) 21 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 18
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China. In 1998, Kaili sought a listed position on the Chinese securities market.
However, the CSRC rejected its application because there were some financial
misrepresentations in Kaili's application. In response to the CSRC' rejection, Kaili
filed an administrative petition to the Beijing Secondary Court. The court upheld
Kaili's petition. The judge held:
the key standard for judging whether a financial report includes substantial
misrepresentations is whether it is inconsistent with the accounting standards set
out by laws and regulations. In this case, the CSRC should appoint a competent
accounting authority to review Kaili's application materials and point out the
illegal components. However, the CSRC failed to fulfil this responsibility.
Therefore, the CSRC' does not have a solid stand to reject Kaili's application, and
accordingly it has a responsibility to re-evaluate Kali's application within 60
days.32
This judicial decision was not accepted by the CSRC, because it significantly
damages its authority and reputation as a market regulator. As a result, a CSRC
representative even announced that the Beijing Secondary Court's decision was
"unreasonable" and "impracticable".33 Unsurprisingly, the CSRC brought the case
before the Beijing High Court. At the second hearing, the High Court upheld both of
the Secondary Court's reasoning and decision. The judge held:
the CSRC's clerical office is an inappropriate organ to reject Kaili's application. It
is inconsistent with the relevant laws, regulations, and the approval procedure
which is set out by the CSRC itself…the decision made by the Beijing Secondary
Court is fair and just. The CSRC must re-evaluate Kaili's application in
32 Shenpanzhang Xishuo Zhengjianhui Baisu Yinyuo [An Interview of the Chief Judge of Kaili Case:
Why Did CSRC Lose its Lawsuit?] Beijing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth Daily] 6th July 2001
33 Hainan Kailian: Zhengjianhui Shangsu Neirong Shouci Duiwai Gongkai [Hainan Kaili Case: the
Reasons for CSRC's Appeal] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily] 17th January 2001 available
at <http://mil.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper250/613/class025000004/hwz310896.htm> accessed 20th
July 2011
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accordance with the relevant laws and regulations within 60 days.34
Kaili, as the plaintiff in this case, was in a far more disadvantaged litigious
position than the CSRC. From a political perspective, Kaili is a wholly private
company without any State backing. By contrast, the CSRC is a high-level
administrative organ which is directly controlled by the State Council. In such a
situation, if the courts considered political factors or were influenced by political
forces, Kaili's petition would have been dismissed at the first hearing. Indeed, even in
a technical sense, it would not have been difficult for the Beijing courts to achieve a
judicial decision, which favoured the CSRC. This is because when Kaili filed its
petition to the Beijing Secondary Court, the Securities Law 1998 had merely been in
force for a year, and the CSRC had just revised its approval procedure according to
the new securities law. Thus, during Kaili's petition, many provisions of the
newly-issued law and regulations were still untested. The court could have interpreted
them in a way that was in favour of the defendant rather than the plaintiff. However,
the Beijing courts did not do so. Instead, they protected the private party's legal rights
from the administrative regulator's abuse. Furthermore, Kaili is seated in Hainan
province, which is far from Beijing. It is therefore nearly impossible for Kaili to have
engaged in any form of nepotism with the judges in the Beijing Courts. Other than
pure legal considerations, the Beijing Courts had no additional incentive to protect
this private company.
This example coupled with the Western commentators' findings cannot constitute
a solid ground on which to conclude that the Chinese court system is now wholly
independent of political influence. However, the Chinese courts are entitled to have
some degree of independence where they deal with less politically sensitive cases.
Compared to public law cases, company law cases in general are less sensitive from a
political point of view. Furthermore, with the government conversion of State-owned
shares into private shares, the political sensitivity of corporate governance cases in
34 (n 32)
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large public company would be further reduced. It is therefore reasonable to expect
the courts to act more independently in company law cases in the future.
Secondly, many commentators claim that the Chinese courts lack sophistication
in good judicial decision making. Nonetheless, the quality of judges in China has
significantly improved in last decade. According to Judges Law 2001,35 judges must
have at least two years' working experience in law and a bachelor degree in law or a
joint law degree. Judges must also undergo more intensive legal and professional
training that previously.36 Moreover, according to a recent official strategy, by 2008
more than 80 per cent of Chinese judges had a bachelor degree and nearly 4 per cent
had a master or doctoral degree.37 Additionally, the Supreme People's Court also
requires judges under the age of 40 who do not hold a bachelor’s degree to obtain this
qualification within five years. Judges above the age of 40 have to undertake a special
legal training course lasting between 6 months to one year.38 In respect of company
law judges, there is some rudimentary evidence illustrating their ability to make sound
judicial decisions using logical reasoning. According to Xi's research on the security
litigation, even the judges in local courts have shown "a considerable level of judicial
competence and innovation in handling unprecedented private securities litigation
cases."39 Additionally, Howson's research tells us that in many Shanghai company
law cases, the courts rightly support the "self-order" of Articles of Association in
opposition to mandatory business regulation. This suggests that company law judges
in Shanghai have the awareness and the competence to protect "some area of
35 Judges Law of People's Republic of China 2001, Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegou Fguanfa 2001,
amended by 9th Meeting of the Standing committee of 22nd National People's Congress 30th June, 2001
(herein after Judges Law 2001)
36 Article 9 of Judges Law 2001
37 D.D Wang, 'Shidai Guanjianci Jianzheng Faguanduiwu 30 Nian Bianqian' [The Changes of the
Chinese Judges in Last 30 Years: Some Keywords] Fazhi Ribao [Law Daily] 7th December 2008
38 Wenping Shangqu Shuiping Tigao, Fuaguan Peixun Buneng Zhi Benzhe Wenping Qu [An Advance
Degree Does not Equal Enhanced Ability, Judges' Training Should not Solely Aim at Degree] Xinhua
Wang [Xin Hua web] 11th March 2004
39 C. Xi, 'Case Note: Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi co v ZHONG
Weida and Others Hei Longjiang High Court' (2006) 2 Journal of Comparative Law 496 in China, both
of company law cases and securities law cases are handled by commercial law court.
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semi-autonomous activities against direct state-regulation."40
In addition to the dramatic improvement of in the educational level of judges,
recent technological innovation is also widely employed to promote judicial
sophistication. Traditionally, Chinese judges worked in a relatively isolated
environment under which they could only find materials in court libraries and discuss
demanding cases with senior judges or legal scholars. It was difficult for them to
access information on how similarly-situated courts do their job. However, according
to Liebman's recent research, the problem of limited access to information is largely
mitigated by using internet. Most Chinese judges interviewed by Liebman
overwhelmingly commented that now they were able to use the internet to conduct
research to assist them in handling cases, especially hard and novel cases.41 For
example, the research showed that in the central Chinese city of Xian, judges use the
internet to consult cases decided by the Supreme People's Court and the Shanxi
Provincial High People's Court.42 The internet can effectively enlarge judges'
horizons by enhancing their communication with judges in different areas. Moreover,
technological innovation is also used to promote the court's working efficiency. For
example, in a securities law case heard by the Qingdao Intermediate Court,
approximately 3000 eligible plaintiffs filed actions against Dong Fang Electronic Co.
on the basis of misrepresentation in the security market. After the Qingdao Court
upheld the plaintiff's claims, a demanding technical problem emerged. The judges
found that calculating the compensation to be awarded to investors was extremely
difficult because the compensation for each investor varied according to two variables:
(1) the amount of shares the investor bought, and (2) the date on which they brought
the shares. In order to make a quick settlement, the court employed several computer
engineers to design software, capable of automatically calculating the precise amount
40 N. Howson (n 30) 10
41 B. Liebman & T. Wu, 'China's Network Justice' (2007) 257 Chicago Journal of International Law
257, 290
42 ibid 291, Chinese judges use internet or other method to consult cases or doing legal researches
cannot constitute a solid base upon which we can conclude that a doctrine of judicial precedent/state
decisis is emerging in China. The reason is the legal research or case consultations with the high courts
are judges' personal behaviours without any institutional support.
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of compensation for each individual shareholder. More importantly, the software
could also produce a document, which detailed how the compensation was
calculated.43 This case illustrates that using technological innovation in judicial
practice not only promotes the court's working efficiency, but also strengthens the
transparency of judicial decision-making.
Consequently, whilst compared to the court systems of developed economies, the
Chinese judicial system might be less independent and sophisticated, it is nevertheless
far from collapse. Evidence reveals that Chinese judges have an increasing level of
independence in judicial decision making, and their expertise is boosted by better
education and more intensive practical training. Generally speaking, judges have the
ability to achieve sound decisions in relatively simple cases by applying the relevant
legal rules. Moreover, with the integration of technology into the judicial practice, the
efficiency and transparency of judicial practice are further promoted. By and large,
the Chinese judicial system has the potential to play a more important role in shaping
the corporate governance regime by effectively enforcing well-designed legal rules.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is unfair to attribute weak legal
enforcement solely to the court system. If the substantive legal rules available to the
court are ill-defined, even the most sophisticated and honest judge cannot ensure that
these laws are properly enforced on a case by case basis.44 Thus, legal enforcement is
influenced by quality of legislation. As noted in the previous chapter, Chinese
company law has already transplanted a number of general principles and doctrines
from Western jurisdictions into its own legal system but failed to provide
43 C.G. Yan, 'Zhongguo Gushi Xujia Chenshu Diyi An: Quanmian Tiaojie Jiean' [The Settlement of the
First Misrepresentation Case in China's Judiciary Practice] (2008) 4 Zhongguo Shenpan [China Trial]
39, 41-42
44 B. Black & R. Kraakman, 'A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law' (1996) 109 Harvard Law
Review 1911, 1925
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supplementary explanations and interpretations.45 Without detailed interpretations,
these principles and doctrines are naturally unworkable. Furthermore, Chinese judges
do not customarily interpret legislation on a case by case basis. Thus, in many cases,
they do not have a concrete basis from which to enforce effectively laws, so weak
legal enforcement is partly caused by ill-drafted company law.
Having concluded that bad legislation deters enforcement, the next question is
whether well-drafted legislation can facilitate legal enforcement. If so, there is a solid
basis from which to claim that it is meaningful to focus on "law on paper", even in a
relatively weak enforcement regime. From a typological point of view, there is a
distinction between a rule and a standard in legislation. According to Hart, a rule
reflects a social need, which requires "over great areas of conduct, safely be applied
by private individuals by themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of
social issues".46 A standard represents a different social need, which requires the legal
provision to "leave open for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues,
which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case."47 The legal provisions of company law are more complicated than this general
classification. They can be divided into three groups, namely permissive rules also
known as enabling rules, presumptive rules and mandatory rules. In short, both
permissive rules and presumptive rules leave space for the autonomy of parties. The
former functions as a default rule which is not applied to parties, unless they choose to
opt in. The latter rule works using a gap-filling approach which is automatically
applied to the parties, unless they choose to opt out. A mandatory rule is more strict
and rigid. Like the presumptive rule, it is applied to company affairs without the need
for affected parties' affirmation. However, the parties cannot choose to opt out like
45 H. Huang & B.S. Wang argues, "indeed, the reform has introduced a number of important regimes,
but their workability is in serious doubt due to the lack of detailed and functional provision". See H.
Huang & B.S. Wang 'China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overall and Assessment'
2006 (19) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 243, see Chapter 2 (2.4.2.1) above and Chapter V
below
46 For a general conceptually difference between rule and standard, see H.L.A Hart, The Concept of
Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994) 130-131
47 ibid
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they can do under the presumptive rule.48 In most developed economies, a company
law regime is mainly constructed by permissive rules and presumptive rules.
Mandatory rules are not favoured by policy-makers, as they easily suffer from the
problem of over-inclusiveness, which could potentially damage the efficient conduct
of private parties.49 However, research suggests that although the bright-line
mandatory rule has largely been abolished in developed economies, it still facilitates
enforcement in developing economies. Paredes's research shows that easily
administered bright-line rules have comparative advantages where courts generally
lack the sophistication to apply open-ended company law standards.50 Similarly,
Black in his research on Russian company law reform also suggests that,
Whenever possible, use of bright-line rules, rather than standards, to define
proper and improper behaviour. Bright-line rules can be understood by those who
must comply with them and have a better chance of being enforced. Standards, in
contrast, require judicial interpretation, which is often unavailable in emerging
markets, and presume a shared cultural understanding of the regulatory policy
that underlies the standards, which may also be absent51
Furthermore, a positive relationship does not only exist between mandatory rules
and legal enforcement. The efficiency of legal enforcement can be upgraded by
precisely defined standards as well. Cheffins argues that precise and intricate
legislation can reduce the negative influence of unsophisticated judicial systems. He
finds that, as English judges generally have less expertise than US judges, compared
to US law, UK company legislation is drafted in a more detailed fashion. In order to
achieve this, open-ended terms are constructed in a restrictive, narrow or technical
manner by precise and detailed guidelines.52 Obviously, the sophistication of the
48 B. Cheffins, Company Law Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press Oxford 2004),
218-220
49 ibid 237
50 Paredes (n 16) 1134
51 B. Black & R. Kraakman (n 44) 1916
52 B. Cheffins (n 48) 362
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Chinese courts is not comparable with that of the UK courts. The latter are far more
professional than the former. However, the legislative experience of the UK still
provides profound insights for China's reform. It tells us that even open-textured
standards can be re-drafted into a clear and workable form which can be appropriately
managed by judges with less expertise. Consequently, both rules and standards can be
transferred into a detailed form that facilitates legal enforcement.
Moreover, bright-line rules and detailed standards would improve the quality of
legal enforcement by increasing judicial accountability. Generally speaking, they have
a high level of transparency, since policy-makers use "words with well-defined and
universally accepted meaning within the relevant community" in the drafting
process.53 As a result, rules and standards drafted in this way are easier for private
parties to understand. Furthermore, bright-line rules and detailed standards naturally
leave a little room for judges to use their discretion. It is therefore cheaper and easier
for parties and the media to detect when a judge misapplies these kinds of rules and
standards. Thus, greater accountability will force judges to make greater effort to
apply laws correctly as well as prevent them from becoming corrupt or giving unfair
treatment to certain parties.54
To conclude, the interaction between law and enforcement is complicated. On
the one hand, weak legal enforcement is not only attributable to an unsophisticated
judicial system but also to ill-defined legislation. On the other hand, although well
drafted legislation with detailed guidance is not a necessary pre-condition for effective
legal enforcement in all jurisdictions, it does have a positive relationship with legal
enforcement in jurisdictions where courts lack expertise. In short, the gap between
"law on paper" and "law in practice" in China can be partly bridged by precise
legislation with a greater level of transparency. Accordingly, in the Chinese context, it
is instructive to focus on "law on paper" despite the weak legal enforcement regime.
53 C. Diver, 'The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules' (1983) 93 The Yale Law Journal 67
54 Paredes (n 16) 1136
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Finally, weak legal enforcement is not a sufficient reason to shift our focus away
from the importance of good legislation in China. As already mentioned, beyond the
administrative regulator, the legal regime and non-legal forces are two core agency
cost controlling devices. This means that if policy makers decide not to regulate
agency cost using the company law regime, they have to resort to non-legal forces to
achieve an identical function. However, non-legal forces also demand sophisticated
institutional support. The performance of non-legal components is highly dependent
on professional lawyers and accountants. In developed economies, accountants takes
the responsibility to catch an insider's false and misleading disclosure and securities
lawyers should ensure that company's providing documents comply with the relevant
disclosure requirements.55 However, in China, both professional accountants and
securities lawyers are not well qualified to play an effective role in this regard. Some
research has illustrated that the major features of Chinese audit market include lack of
audit independence, a shortage of well-qualified auditors, and an environment of
massive corruption.56 In order to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the financial
reports provided by the public companies, the CSRC in 2001 issued a document,
which required all companies to engage in an initial public offering. All current listed
A-shares companies that conducted a secondary offering in China had to have their
Annual Reports audited by a "world renowned accounting firm."57 In practice,
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick and
PricewaterhouseCoppers (the Big Four) are dominant in the provision of accounting
services for public companies.58 However, according to empirical research, the
auditing quality of the Big Four is no better than that of local firms and there is also
no firm data to support that the Big Four are more independent than their local
55 B. Black (n 6) 796
56 X. Zhang & Xie 'Zhongou De Duli Kuaiji Biaozhun' [The Independent Auditing Standards in China],
(2000) 14 Kuaiji Shiye [Accounting Horizons] 69
57 Gongkai Faxing Zhengquan de Gongsi Pilubianbao Guizhe di 16 Gao – A Gu Gongsi Shixing
Buchong Shengji de Zhanxingguiding [Temporary Measure Regarding Additional Auditing
Requirement for Listed A Share Companies] (December 2001) issued by CSRC
58 H. Cai, 'Bonding, Law Enforcement and Corporate Governance in China' (2007) 13 Stanford Journal
of Law, Business & Finance 82, 94
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counterparts.59 Furthermore, as some reported cases indicate, foreign accounting
firms may also easily to suffer from ethical digressions when operating in China. This
is indicated in the scandal of Keloon group. Keloon, a domestic listed Chinese
company, appointed Deloitte & Touche as its external auditor in 2002. During the
period from 2002 to 2004, Deloitte & Touche issued several unreserved opinions,
which declared that Kelong's financial statements objectively reflect its financial
status. Later, the CSRC found that Kelong's financial reports had made serious
misrepresentations. It also found that as Kelong's auditor, Deloitte & Touche, not only
failed to perform due diligence, but facilitated Kelong's misrepresentation.60 Arguably,
reputable overseas auditor firms should be more independent and competent than
local Chinese firms, as they have better expertise as well as fewer connections with
their Chinese clients. However, it is not always the case. Clarke points out those
Chinese laws merely impose limited liability on the misconduct of lawyers and
accountants. Although the CSRC occasionally issues administrative fines to auditing
firms and law firms, the absence of private litigation regarding the misconduct of
auditors and lawyers means that these intermediates assume less risk when they are
involved in fraudulent activities. Therefore, ethical transgressions have come to be a
serious problem among professional gatekeepers in this under-regulated market.61
In fact, there is no solid evidence to suggest that the institutions supporting
non-legal components are more honest or effective than the judicial system. Therefore,
aside from the contribution which good company law could make to the reason of
weak judicial system, whether it means developing non-legal constraints are also
meaningless in China? The reason is the professional gatekeepers are incapable as
59 F. Liu & F.Y. Zhou, 'Gupjisida Yiweizhe Gaoshenji Zhiliang Ma—Lai Zhi Woguo A Gu Shichang de
Chubu Zhengju' [Does the Big Four Mean Higher Auditing Quality: Preliminary Evidence from
China's A Share Market] 3 2006 Asia and China Corporate Governance International Conference,
Group CWorking Paper
60 Z.W. Yu 'Kelongan Zhong Deqin de Juesefenxi' [The Role of Deloitte & Touche in Kelong case]
(2007) 50 Hezuo Jingji Yu Keji [Journal of Cooperative Economy] 50
61 D. Clarke (n 9) 26-31 for an empirical research indicates a similar result in a cultural perspective, see
J. Liu, Y. Wang & L.S. Wu, 'The Effect of Guanxi on Audit Quality in China' (2001) Journal of
Business Ethnic the authors suggest that, "State ownership and management affiliations with the
external auditor both increase the probability of receiving a clean audit opinion in China."
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well in China. This line of reasoning could simply lead China's legal reform of
shareholder protection into a deadlock. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss legal
reform in the context of a second best world in China. Institutional support is not quite
reliable in most sectors. As a result, carefully drafted law, which can minimise the
negative influence of unsophisticated institutions and judicial systems, is particularly
important in China.
To conclude, this part has tried to explain why company law matters in Chinese
corporate governance reform. In seeking to offer an insightful answer to this
important question, it has firstly mapped out the advantages of developing a company
law regime in reforming corporate governance in China. Secondly, it has shed some
light on why company law regimes still deserve attention in jurisdictions where legal
enforcement is weak. Using the associated arguments, this chapter has highlighted the
importance of company law and re-defined its role in the context of China's legal
reform of corporate governance. Indeed, company law does have its limitations. Even
a perfect legal regime cannot spell everything out.62 Nonetheless, having well-drafted
company law in place would be the first important step toward an effective
multiple-level agency-cost controlling regime in a second-best world where
institutional supports are weak or absent.
62 D. Clarke (n 9) 14
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Chapter IV. Reforming the Company Law Regime: A
Theoretical Perspective
The importance of the company law regime in promoting good corporate
governance has been demonstrated in previous chapters. However, an adequate and
complete theoretical framework through which it is practically feasible to affect the
legal reform of corporate governance using company law is still to be developed. This
is because Chinese company law still contains a large number of ill-defined and vague
rules or standards, which are incapable of fulfilling this task. Refining these legal
rules into a precise and intricate form will encounter many methodological and
technical barriers. Among these barriers, the most fundamental one is how Chinese
company law can be converted into the efficient model. Transitional jurisdictions,
including China, have already tried to provide an answer to this question by
attempting to achieve the goals of legal reform through "legal transplant". However,
this answer is not as simple as it seems to be. As indicated in chapter I, many studies
show that a mismatch between the political cultural context in a receiving jurisdiction
and the rules being transplanted can cause serious unexpected problems.1 The
following sections will therefore answer the fundamental question posed in Chapter I;
namely, why China cannot divert from the course of legal transplant in its legal
reform of corporate governance? To answer this broad theoretical question, this part
begins by answering two specific questions. Firstly, what are the technical advantages
(if any) of selectively inputting Western legal rules into the Chinese legal system?
Secondly, is functional convergence a more effective model than legal transplant, as
some lawyers would suggest? In seeking to provide convincing answers to these
questions, a direct comparison between the formal convergence model and the
1 See D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor & J. Richard, 'The Transplant Effect' (2003) 51 American Journal of
Comparative Law 163 and D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor & J. Richard, 'Economic Development, Legality,
and the Transplant Effect' (2003) 1 European Economic Review 47 see also B. Tabalujan, 'Why
Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed - Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture' (2002) 15 Columbia
Journal of Asian Law 141; J. Gillespie, 'Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural
Analysis of Market-Entry in Vietnam' (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 641 and
the scholarship of School B as cited above in section 1.2.2, at 11-12.
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functional convergence model is necessary. Through this comparison we can firstly
generalise the advantages (if any) of the formal convergence model and secondly, test
which model is more effective for China's legal reform of corporate governance.
4.1 Comparing Formal Convergence with Functional Convergence: Case
Studies
4.1.1 Defining the Formal Convergence and Functional Convergence
Models
The traditional concept of legal transplant, proposes that a rule undergoes no
change between the host jurisdiction and the receiving jurisdiction is too narrow to
interpret the phenomenon of legal borrowing. As Twinning states, "no transportation
without transformation"2 and "single importer from multiple sources"3 are currently
important characteristics of legal borrowing. Indeed, the concept of formal
convergence has enough flexibility to embrace the phenomenon of some local
elements merging into the transplanted rules. By contrast, the concept of functional
convergence is more straightforward. It refers to one jurisdiction employing legal
institutions or rules, which are different to the rules or institutions used by other
jurisdictions in fulfilling the same task. In other words, it uses a different approach to
achieve an effect of functional equivalence with other jurisdictions.
Towards this classification, it might be argued that it is difficult to draw a clear
boundary between formal and functional convergence. The difference between these
two forms of convergence may only be a matter of degree if formal convergence is
broadly defined. Both forms of convergence include some adoptions of local
characteristics, which make it difficult to distinguish one from the other. Indeed, an
inappropriate definition may lead to misleading conclusions. Defining "formal




convergence" broadly may entail a high level of flexibility with this model. In contrast,
functional convergence is narrowly defined and the rigidity of such a definition may
lead this model to lose some of its advantages.
Nonetheless, on a theoretical level, there is a long-standing debate on the
evolving path of company law among different jurisdictions. Both theories of
"functional convergence" and "formal convergence" have been well developed in the
domain of comparative corporate governance. Within this theoretical debate, China's
legal reform of corporate governance is often presented as a counterexample to rebut
the formal convergence model. The definition of formal convergence has been
provided by existing studies relating specifically to China in this context. It refers to
the legal rules or institutions, which are transplanted from Western jurisdictions into
China's legal system. Indeed, although these legal rules and institutions have been
credited with some Chinese characteristics, scholars have categorised the transplanted
rules as falling under the formal convergence model. For example, Clarke argues that
director's duties under China's Company Law 1993 are "legal borrowings", though he
notes that the transplanted duties are similar rather than the same as Anglo-American
fiduciary duties.4 Functional convergence, by contrast, has not been clearly defined
by scholars. However, the mixture of Western experience and Chinese characteristics
has been excluded from the functional convergence model by virtue of the definition
of "formal convergence". The legal rules adopted through functional convergence in
China's context are expected to be completely different to the Western legal rules.
Some scholars argue that the functional convergence should be dominated by the
Chinese ethical values.5 Consequently, the difference between "formal convergence"
and "functional convergence" and the definition of these two forms of convergence
are not the products of this piece of research. They have been already expressly or
implicitly stated by the existing studies on China's legal reform of corporate
4 See D. Clarke, 'Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China' (July 3rd 2006). George
Washington University (GWU) Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 213; GWU Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 213, SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=91378414-15>, accessed 20th July 2011
5 See section 1.2.2 above at 12
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governance. The task of the current research, as mentioned, is to provide evidence to
test the conclusions reached by these studies.
Another conceptual issue, namely the difference between functional convergence
and functional equivalence, should be clarified. According to Coffee, "functional
convergence recognises the availability of substitutes; for example, a legal system that
faced doctrinal or political obstacles to the adoption of a particular legal rule might
fashion a functional substitute that achieved similar results."6 Therefore, functional
convergence emphasizes a complete process. Its scope is larger than functional
equivalence, which is the outcome of the convergence process.
4.1.2 Case Study I: Class-voting Regime
4.1.2.1 Introducing the Case Study
This part tries to generalise the advantages (if any) of the formal convergence
model by undertaking a comparative analysis. This is a difficult task as the results
generated through a comparison of random samples may not be accurate if the
samples lack a reasonable level of comparability. Different rules or institutions may
be constrained or facilitated by different external factors, made up of different groups
of market participants, and enforced by different authorities. Under such
circumstances, the efficiency of one rule over another not might be because of the
way it is adopted, but because of the extent to which it is enforced or the manner in
which it interacts with the local context. All these variables complicate a proposed
comparison. In order to make the comparison meaningful therefore, it is necessary to
reduce the complexity to an acceptable degree.
The class voting scheme, implemented in two different contexts in China, is a
6 J. Coffee, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and
Control' (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 5
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suitable example. On the one hand, similar to its role in other jurisdictions, the
class-voting scheme works as a complementary regime for shareholder class meetings,
which are held in conditions where a class of shareholders' rights has been removed.
The scheme takes a similar form to that in other legal regimes whilst also containing
detailed differences. The class-voting regime can therefore be regarded as a formal
convergence. On the other hand, it is employed to fulfil the function of minority
protection. It therefore becomes a regime by which the minority shareholders can
block majority shareholders' decisions on some of the companies' business affairs. A
similar function in other jurisdictions is discharged by a general meeting with a
super-majority approval. From this vantage, class-voting is implemented for the
purpose of functional convergence. The nature of the class-voting regime alters
between a sample of formal convergence and a sample of functional convergence in
accordance with the different contexts in which it is applied. Additionally, no matter
in which identity, its political, cultural and regulatory surroundings do not have any
significant change. In both situations, the class-voting regime is enforced by the
CSRC and courts, applied to the public company shareholders, and surrounded by
same political and economic infrastructure. The only significant difference which can
be identified is that the legal rules are proposed to have different function in a
different context. This can be largely (if not completely) attributed to the approach by
which the regime is introduced into the Chinese legal system.
The following parts will first introduce the general background against which the
class voting scheme has been introduced. They will then provide more detail to clarify
the situations in which the class-voting scheme constitutes a formal convergence, and
those in which represents functional convergence. By comparing its practical effects
in different situations, this part will go on to form the competitive advantages (if any)
of the formal convergence in the Chinese context.
4.1.2.2 General Background
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4.1.2.2.1 Split Shareholding under Concentrated Ownership Structure
Chapter II has highlighted that concentrated State-ownership in China triggers
several serious problems.7 As such, reducing the State-ownership would be an
effective way to mitigate existing problems. However, this reduction must overcome
an institutional barrier; namely, the split shareholding structure. Up to 2005, the
shareholding structure in the Chinese stock markets had been mixed. All shares are
divided into three tiers, namely, State, legal person and A-table shares. Only A-table
shares could be transferred to the general public. Generally, State shares are held by
central and local governments, and State investment companies. Legal person shares
are held by domestic companies, such as industrial enterprises, securities companies,
trust and investment companies, banks, construction companies, transportation and
power companies and research institutions.8 A-table shares are held by the
individuals. Furthermore, State and legal person shares occupied nearly 70 per cent of
all shareholdings of public companies before 2005. This meant that merely one-third
of shares in Chinese publicly-held companies were transferable.9
4.1.2.2.2 Share-Trading Reform
In order to remove the institutional barrier to reducing State-ownership and to
upgrade the liquidity of the Chinese stock markets, some steps have been taken by
central government. In 2005, the CSRC and the other regulatory authorities published
the Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, which formally
launched a reform terminating the institutional restrictions on share trading.10
7 See section 2.3.2 above at 29-39
8 C.X. Shi 'Recent Ownership Reform and Control of Central State-owned Enterprises in China:
Taking One Step At a Time' (2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 855
9 For a detailed introduction, see C. Jian, Corporate Governance in China (RoutledgeCurzon 2005) 28;
J. Yang, 'Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate Governance' (2005) 16(1)
International Commercial and Company Law Review 12 and also C. Law and P. Wong, 'A Comparative
Analysis of Corporate Governance between the UK and China' (2006) 16(9) International Commercial
and Company Law Review 35
10 Guanyu Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Fenzhi Shidian Gaige Youguan Wenti Tongzhi [Notes on the Split
Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies] issued by the CSRC on 29thApril 2005
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According to this regulation, both State shares and shares held by legal person are
now transferable. However, unlike the rapid privatization approach adopted by Russia,
China has undertaken a far more cautious approach. In order to protect the stability of
its stock markets, State shareholdings authorised for transfer to the general public are
limited by a mandatory freeze-out period.11
4.1.2.3 Class Voting Scheme
4.1.2.3.1 Class Voting Scheme: A Theoretical Perspective
In order to clarify whether the class voting scheme is a formal convergence or a
functional convergence in this situation, it is necessary to look at how the class voting
regime works in most other jurisdictions. Maug and Yilmaz find that two-class voting
is usually used where different classes of voters have significant conflicts of interest
and where certain considerations mean that the voting power of one-class voters needs
to be significantly strengthened.12 In the context of company law, the application of
class-voting is relatively narrow. As Davies illustrates,
Under the company's constitution the approval of a class of shareholders may be
required to make a decision binding on the company, normally in addition to a
decision of the shareholders generally… the principle of separate consent is
well-established in relation to proposed alterations of the Articles where these
alterations may affect the "rights" of a class of members.13
We can use an example to further unpack the rationale behind the class voting
scheme. For example, shareholders who hold preference shares do not generally have
11 Shangshi Gongsi Jiechu Xianshou Cunliang Gufen Zhidao Yijian [Guidance on Transferring the
Converted Shares of the Listed Companies] issued by the CSRC on 20thApril 2008
12 E. Maug & B. Yilmaz, 'Two-class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution' (2002) 92
American Economic Review 1448
13 P. Davies, Gower and Davies's Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
2008) 664
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voting rights. Instead, they often have a right to obtain a higher level of dividends.
Here, if the class-voting scheme is absent, the alteration of non-voting shareholder
rights would be a matter entirely for the voting shareholders.14 Obviously it would be
unjust for voting shareholders to nullify non-voting shareholders' preference rights.
Thus, it is necessary to entitle preference shareholders to veto a proposed change.15
Consequently the essence of the class-voting regime is to prevent an unjust
arrangement between different classes of shareholders. In accordance with this
normative analysis the following parts will explore the class voting scheme in the
Chinese legal system.
4.1.2.3.2 Class voting as a Functional Convergence
Before the share trading reform is formally carried out, insider control continues
to be a particularly serious problem amongst in the Chinese listed companies because
of the concentrated ownership structure and the split share-transfer regime. Minority
shareholder interests are under a serious threat of exploitation by controlling
shareholders and incumbent managers.16 In 2004 the CSRC published the
Shareholder Protection Provisions, which enabled transferable shareholders who hold
A-table shares to have a stronger voice in the corporate decision-making process
through a class voting regime. Under this regime, the shareholders who hold A-table
shares are entitled to hold approval from several important corporate decisions as a
separate class. The affairs which are subject to their approval include substantial
corporate transactions, cash offers, right offers, convertible bond issues, substantial
asset reorganization, subsidiaries which seek overseas listing and issues which have a
14 ibid
15 ibid
16 On this point see J.Q. Jun, 'Corporate Governance in China: From the Protection of Minority
Shareholder Prospective' (2006) 2 Corporate Governance Law Review 312, as well as chapter II
(section 2.3.2).
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considerable bearing on public shareholder interests.17 The above corporate activities
must be approved by at least two-thirds of all shareholders present at the meeting and
at least two-thirds of A-table share vote holders participating in the vote, either by
attending the shareholder's meeting or via an internet voting system.18 Additionally,
in order to protect the fairness of the voting process, a disclosure requirement is
imposed on listed companies. The decisions made by the top 10 transferable
shareholders (by the amount of shareholding) on major corporate transactions must be
disclosed.19
The purpose of this whole arrangement is to protect the interests of the holders of
transferable shares. The split shareholding structure causes a conflict of interests
between transferable shareholders and non-transferable shareholders. In particular,
whilst non-transferable shareholders pay more attention to the companies' growth in a
long term, transferable shareholders are more likely to focus on the price that their
shares can realise in the short term. As a result, one group of shareholders will perfer
corporate activities which promote the company's value on the balance sheet in the
long run, whilst the other group would perfer those which can increase the share's
market price immediatly. The most likely result of this conflict is that different classes
of shareholder will make different business decisions on the same corporate activity.
Additionally, the concentrated ownership structure adds further complexity to this
issue. Controlling shareholders (usually non-transferable shareholders) are generally
the utimate decision-makers at a general meeting, even in cases where a special
resolution is applied. The split shareholding structure makes minority shareholder
(usually holder of transferable shares) interests rarely convergent with that of the
majority shareholders (usually holder of non-transferable shares). Furthermore,
concentrated State-ownership means minority shareholders have little room to make
17 Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhong Gudong Quanyi Baohu De Rougan Guiding [Minority
Shareholder Protection Provisions 2004] issued by the CSRC on 8th December 2004, art 1; see also, C.
Xi, "Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice" (2006) 9 International Company
and Commercial Law Review 251, 285
18 Minority Shareholder Protection Provisions (n16) art 1
19 ibid
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their voices heard. Taking all these considerations into account, legislators appear to
have attempted to change the imbalance in decision-making powers between
transferable and non-transferable shareholders, through the introduction of
class-voting regime.
Before examining the practical effects of the class-voting scheme, it will be
necessary to address the reason why the class-voting regime can be regarded as an
functional convergence. Research by a group of leading corporate lawyers and
economists concludes that "all of our core jurisdictions fortify minority decision rights
over fundamental corporate decisions by imposing supermajority approval
requirements".20 Taking the UK as an example, a general meeting with a special
resolution will be applied for the purpose of protecting minority shareholders' voice.
As Davies concludes,
Overall, the higher majority required for special resolutions obviously constitutes
a form of minority protection…it means, for example, that a person with more
than 25 per cent of the votes, and in practice often with many fewer votes, can
block the adoption of a special resolution.21
However, Chinese policy-makers may consider a special resolution not to be
strong enough to allow a shareholding minority to block majority shareholder
decisions that threaten their interests. Thus, they employ the more powerful class
voting scheme to guarantee that the minority shareholder voice will be strongly
represented in the general meeting. In this context, unlike the class voting regime
which will be triggered where a particular group of shareholder's right is negatively
affected by a corporate decision in Western jurisdictions22, the minority shareholders
in China can block majority shareholders' decision on key corporate affairs, even
20 On this point, see R. R. Kraakman, and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 93
21 See P. Davies(n 13) 438
22 See 4.1.2.3.1 above
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where their rights as holders of transferable shares are not or will not, be affected or
prejudiced by the decision which the majority propose to take. It might therefore be
evident why the class voting scheme can be categorised as functional convergence in
this context. The next issue to be resolved therefore is whether this regime effectively
solves or mitigates these problems when it works as a functional convergence.
Shou Lv Holding Co. (Shou Lv) was the first Chinese public company to hold a
class-meeting to approve corporate affairs. In 2004, Shou Lv proposed the launch of a
share-allocation scheme, which was an activity that had an "important bearing on
minority shareholders' interest".23 In accordance with the CSRC's regulations, a
class-meeting was held. Additionally, an internet voting system was available to the
minority shareholders. However, the holders of transferable shares who participated in
the class meeting constituted only a 6 per cent holding of the nominal value of
transferable shares. In another reported case, the participation ratio only achieved 5.6
per cent.24 It is therefore difficult to conclude whether the results of class voting
repesent the transferable shareholders' interests as a whole. Theoretically, this
phenomenon is understandable. Individual shareholders may have little incentive to
participate in the decision-making process, as they generally own shares in several
companies, and participating in the affairs of one will not typically be worthwhile.25
Secondly, provided that policy-makers realise that issues of "rationale apathy"
and "collective choice" may lead individual shareholders to take little part in the
corporate decision-making process,26 the main purpose of this rule is to encourage
institutional shareholders, as the majority holders of transferable shares, to check and
balance an insider's controlling power. However, there is much evidence to indicate
that institutional shareholders are reluctant to protect transferable shareholder interests
23 Y.L. Cheng 'Fenlei Biaojue v. Zhengji Daili Toupiao Quan' [Class Voting v. Proxy Voting] (2005) 2
Xin Caijing [The Investors] 88
24 ibid
25 See B. Cheffins, Company Law Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press Oxford 2004) 62
26 F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press
1991) 66
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as a whole by challenging a powerful majority's decision. For example, Chong Qing
Bai Hou is a listed company seated in south-west China. In 2004, it proposed issuing
additional shares to the general public. In accordance with the CSRC's regulations,
such a proposal must be approved by the holders of transferable shares as a separate
group. According to Chong Qing Bai Hou's announcement, a shareholder meeting was
held. Among those shareholders who actually attended the meeting, non-transferable
shareholders held 38 per cent of the company's total shareholdings and transferable
shareholders held merely 1.4 per cent. Although those shareholders whose holdings
occupied 98 per cent of the active shareholdings in the voting process cast their votes
in support of the proposal, it was ultimately dismissed by the remaining 2 per cent of
shareholders involved in the voting process. Worse; according to the statistics, most
individual shareholders were in favour of the proposal because of the fact that it
would have provided them with a pre-emptive right. Indeed, the proposal was
ultimately rejected because of a veto cast by an investment company, which held 56
per cent of transferable shares in the company.27 In other words, under the regulations,
no matter what other shareholder preferences are, a proposal will be dismissed only if
the majority shareholder of transferable shareholdings disapproves it. As such, the
class voting regime can, in practice, worsen problems of majority shareholder control.
Ironically, it attempts to control block-holder abuse by creating another block-holder.
Whilst the policy-makers' intention was to protect minority shareholders, in effect the
regime encourages institutional shareholders (usually the majority of the transferable
shareholders) to act opportunistically, enabling them to become involved in the
rent-seeking activities. Thus, in order to obtain extra benefits from controlling
shareholders, they block corporate decisions that are in the best interests of
shareholders as a whole.28
The lack of ex post protection exacerbates this situation. Weak legal enforcement
27 See X.N. Li, 'Chongqin Baihuo Fenlei Biaojue Zengfa Zao Foujue' [Chongqin Baihuo's Proposal of
Issuing Additional Shares Has Been Dismissed by Class-voting] Nanjing Ribao [Nanjing Daily] (29th
December 2004)
28 E.g. Y.Q. Yin, 'Fenlei BiaoJue: Ruhe Fangzhi Xinde Yigu Duda' [Class Voting: How to Control the
New Version of 'Blockholder-Control'] Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times] (5th December 2005)
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enables block-holders to ignore individual and institutional shareholder voices, which
might threaten their interests. There are several reports, which indicate that
block-holders implement business decisions rejected by the institutional or individual
shareholders in the class meeting.29 Additionally, some of them even refuse to carry
out class voting procedures in order to block transferable shareholders from having a
voice. Consequently, class-voting is passive. It does not provide minority shareholders
a voice as proposed but rather further complicates problems by creating a series of
unexpected issues.
4.1.2.3.3. Class Voting as a Formal Convergence
As mentioned earlier, the CSRC launched the share trading reform in 2005.
However, this reform encounters a technical problem. Individual shareholders, in
stock markets with low liquidity, have to pay an extra premium in order to obtain
transferable shares, because such shares are a resource of scarcity.30 Following the
share trading reform, the scarcity of transferable shares will be significantly diluted.
In other words, lifting the ban on transferring non-transferable shares will
dramatically increase the amount of transferable shares on the stock market. This will
water down the price of shares (pre-reform A-table shares) held by individual
shareholders and destroy the market confidence. For example, the state had sold off
part of its non-transferable shares in listing companies in 2001. As a response to the
government’s plan to sell off its non-transferable shares at the market price, the
Shanghai Composite Stock Index dropped dramatically by 32% within four months,
which forced the CSRC to drop the plan.31 Furthermore, a contractual relationship
between investors and companies can be traced back to their initial public offering.
However, the terms/conditions of the prospectus indicate that State and legal person
29 C. Xi (n 17) 258
30 Recall that nearly 70 per cent of shares were not transferable to the general public in Chinese stock
markets.
31 C. Xi, 'In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political
Economy of Corporate Law in China' 2006 (22) Connecticut Journal of International Law 31
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shares are not transferable.32
Consequently, it is understandable that non-transferable shareholders should pay
compensation to transferable shareholders in exchange for the transferability of their
shares. In such circumstances, the class voting scheme plays a very important role in
achieving a workable compromise between transferable and non-transferable
shareholders. Under the CSRC's regulation, the board of directors should propose a
compensation scheme and submit it to the general meeting. The proposed
compensation scheme must be approved by at least two-thirds of all shareholders
present at the meeting and at least two-thirds of A-table shareholders who participated
in the vote, either by attending the shareholder's meeting or via the internet voting
system.33
In order to establish that this class voting scheme is a formal convergence,
containing substantial components borrowed from Western legislation, it is necessary
to map the core points of share trading reform:
� When individual shareholders paid higher premiums to purchase transferable
shares from either public companies or other individuals, they entered an
agreement with non-transferable shareholders, under which only shareholders
holding A-table shares are entitled to transfer their shares freely.
� Several years later, non-transferable shareholders proposed an alteration of this
agreement with transferable shareholders to enable their share to benefit from a
full range of transferability.
� The bargaining power of A-table shareholders is far weaker than that of State
32 See F. Liu, M. Balatbat & R. Czernkowski, 'The Role of Consideration in China's Split Share
Structure Reform', (10th October 2008) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1284067>,
accessed 20th July 2011
33 Minority Shareholder Protection Provisions (n 17) art.3 and 5
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shareholders and legal person shareholders. They are unable to negotiate the
terms/conditions of the prospectus with holders of non-transferable shares, when
they enter into this contractual relationship.
The question of how a developed jurisdiction would proceed under these
circumstances is raised. UK law's reaction may be illustrative on this point. Suppose a
UK company has 100 shareholders. One of its shareholders pays 100 pounds to buy a
preference share and 99 shareholders pay 1 pound per person to buy 99 ordinary
shares. The company therefore consists of 99 ordinary shares valued 99 pounds and 1
preference share valued 100 pounds. It is assumed that the only difference between
the preference share and the ordinary shares is that according to the Articles of
Association, only the shareholder who holds preference shares can freely transfer his
share to the general public, whilst the shareholders who hold ordinary shares have no
right to do so. Later, the ordinary shareholders propose lifting the restriction on their
shares by altering the Articles of Association. A dispute between preference
shareholder and ordinary shareholders is very likely to arise here. The ordinary
shareholder may argue that a special resolution should be applied, in accordance with
s.21 (1) of the Companies Act 2006, which expressly states that a company may
amend its Articles by special resolution. Moreover, the variation of ordinary
shareholders' class right is not being altered in a manner adverse to them. Therefore, a
variation of class right is not involved in this case and class voting is not therefore
needed. If this argument is accepted, the proposed alteration will surely be approved
by the ordinary shareholders who hold 99 per cent of voting rights. This makes the
high premium paid for the preference right become meaningless. By contrast, the
opinion of the preference shareholder will be different. He or she may argue that,
although the preference right is not modified or abrogated by the proposed alternation,
the economic value attached to the right is indeed adversely affected. They will surely
request the convening of a class meeting under the s.630 of the Companies Act 2006.
This section requires the consent of 75 per cent of shareholders who hold preference
shares, at a separate class meeting, or consent in written form from the holders of at
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least three quarters in nominal value of the issued shares of that class.
In UK common law, there are two cases similar to this hypothetical scenario;
namely White v Bristol Aeroplane Co34 and Re: John Smith's Tadcaster Brewery Co.35
In both cases, ordinary shareholders wanted to issue themselves a bonus. However,
the preference shareholder felt their right was "affected" by this proposal, as their
voting power would be diluted, whilst the ordinary shareholder's power would be
increased. A clause in the Articles of Association stated that a class meeting should
convene where a class right is affected, modified, dealt with or abrogated. The Court
of Appeal dismissed this claim. It held that the preference shareholder's right was not
affected. This is because the right to one vote per share in certain circumstances
remained as before and the subject being affected was the holder's enjoyment of the
share. Therefore, the court would only uphold a preference shareholder's claim in
conditions where more explicit wording is used, clarifying that the intention of the
clause is to protect the right as well as the attached economic interests.36 The
situation in these two cases holds some similarities with the hypothetical case outlined
above. Although the preference right is not modified or removed, the interests or
powers attached to the right are affected. Overall, under UK case law, the decision of
the court largely depends on the terms of the Article of Association. In the
hypothetical case, therefore a preference shareholder's claim could be upheld by the
UK court, if the clause in the Articles use precise wording to state that the alteration
has to be approved by the class meeting where either the class right or the attached
economic interests are adversely affected.
The above highlights additional conditions that can be taken into consideration in
the Chinese context. Unlike the above UK cases, in the context of Chinese
share-unification reform, the bargaining power between parties is not equal.
Individual shareholders are unable to amend the terms/conditions of the prospectus of
34 [1953] Ch.65, (Court of Appeal)
35 [1953] Ch.308, (Court of Appeal)
36 P. Davies (n 13) 670
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listed companies. Therefore, even if the holders of non-transferable shares have a
strong desire to add a clause protecting their class rights and the attached economic
interests, they do not have power to do so. Furthermore, in an economic sense, an
A-table shareholder is the weaker party, compared to the State and legal person
shareholders. Thus, it seems fair for the CSRC to interpret the contractual relationship
between transferable shareholders and non-transferable shareholders in favour of the
former.
In essence, there is no significant difference between the class voting regime in
Chinese share trading reform and its counterpart in UK common law and statue. Both
regimes entitle shareholders with preference shares to protect their interests by
bargaining with the other class of shareholders, when their class rights or the interests
attached to those rights are subject to variation. However, the shareholder class voting
regime adopted by the CSRC contains some detailed differences from that in UK law.
Firstly, the variation of a class right in China is defined in a broader sense, including
the affected right and attached economic interests. UK common law, by contrast,
defines it narrowly. Secondly, in order to enhance transparency, majority shareholders
are subject to stricter disclosure requirements in China.37 Thirdly, the class-voting
regime can be applied to both public and private companies under UK company law.
However, in China, this regime is mainly designed for public companies involved in
the share reform project. All in all, in the context of share-trading reform, the
class-voting regime can be categorised as an example of the formal convergence
model.
With regard to its practical effects, according to empirical research, the average
participation ratio of the holders of transferable shares is 33.49 per cent and with
standard deviation 12.12 per cent. The participation ratio and support rates from the
37 Under the CSRC's regulation, shareholders who hold more than 5 per cent of non-transferable shares
bear special disclosure duties. They have a responsibility to disclose the precise amount of their
shareholding in the prospectus of share-trading reform. See Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Fenzhi Gaige
Guanli Banfa [Regulation of Public Companies' Share-trading Reform] art. 32 (2005)
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holders of freely traded shares rationally increase with the size of compensations
which indicates the wealth effect of the proposal. This empirical research is based on
the official data issued by CCER (China Center for Economic Research). These data
consist of 1326 firms which were undergoing the process of unification of
shareholding reform in 2008. In 1231 firms, the compensation has been paid to
holders of transferable shares. 40 firms have approved the compensation proposal in
ballots. Compensation proposals from 9 firms were rejected.38
This ratio is significantly higher than the ratio of participation where class-voting
is adopted as a functional convergence.39 It seems that transferable shareholders have
a stronger incentive to participate in class-voting in share-trading reform. Additionally,
the performance of institutional shareholders is more competent in this context.
According to a recent study, in share-trading reform, compensation value tends to be
higher when institutional shareholders hold a large percentage of tradable shares.40
This suggests that the voting results are more likely to represent minority
shareholders' interests as a whole. More importantly, the class-voting regime fulfils its
task by providing crucial technical support to share trading reform. As Lu, Balatbat &
Czernkowski state,
in particular, our results indicate that individual company arrangements for
implementing the reform were (at worst) not harmful of the interests of minority
shareholders. This may enhance the confidence of market participants that the
Chinese authorities will not lightly make changes which disadvantage public
investors.41
38 W.X. Hou 'Two Class Shareholder Voting in the Split Share Structure Reform' (ESRC Corporate
Governance Seminar, Queen's University, Belfast, April 2008)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328445>, accessed 20th July 2011
39 Y.L. Cheng (n 23)
40 L. Liao, M. J. Shi & H. Wang, 'The Value of Shareholder Activism: New Evidence from the
Split-share Structure Reform in China' (December 15th 2008)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316214> accessed 20th July 2011
41 F. Liu, M. Balatbat & R. Czernkowski (n 32) 2
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Until April 2007, over 1290 public companies had either completed or were
within the process of share-trading reform. These figures were comprised of over 98
per cent of the market capital of the combined Shanghai and Shengzhen Stock
Exchanges.42 This is by no means to say that the class voting scheme works perfectly
in share trading reform. Indeed, it actually means that some institutional shareholders
engage in rent-seeking during the class-voting process.43 It has nevertheless worked
as expected in eliminating a core institutional barrier that has thus far served to block
public companies from dispersing their over-concentrated ownership structure.
To conclude, the class voting is a competent regime, when it combines Western
legal rules and local resources. In contrast, it does not fulfil the task intended by
legislators, when it is implemented for the purpose of functional convergence. This
conclusion significantly diverges from the assumption that functional convergence is
the better model for the legal reform of the Chinese corporate governance.
4.1.3. Case Study II: Limitation on Company's Investment Ability
Another important example which illustrates the problematic aspects of
functional convergence is the limitation imposed on a company's ability to invest in
another corporate entity, as part of the legal doctrine enshrined in China's 1993
Company Law. This provision bears a function of protecting minority shareholder and
creditor in China. This example is weaker than the one above. It does not provide a
comprehensive comparative investigation between formal convergence and functional
convergence. Therefore, it is not able to illustrate the competing advantages of the
formal convergence model. However, it nevertheless highlights the drawbacks of
functional convergence, illustrated in the first case study.
42 'Hushen Liangshi Wancheng Huo Jinru Gugai Chengxu Gongsi Shizhi Yida 98%' [Companies
Involved in the Share-trading Reform Occupy 98 per cent of the Market Capitalization of Shanghai and
Shenzheng Stock-exchanges] Sohu Caijing [Sohu Finance] (27th April 2007) <
http://business.sohu.com/20070427/n249727979.shtml> accessed 20th July 2011
43 J.Z. Huang 'Jijin Zai Gugai Zhong De Xunzu Zhi Shou' [The Rent-Seeking Activities of Institutional
Shareholders] (2006) 6 Jinji [Economy] 62, 67
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A developed jurisdiction which is oriented around a market economy does not
protect minority shareholder and creditor interests by restricting a company's ability to
invest in another corporate entity. This is because this approach is not only awkward
but harmful. It deters the expansion of corporate groups and stifles the effective
allocation of economic resources among companies. Large-scale corporate groups
play an important role in the national economy and even in people's lives in
developed countries. As one US commentator states:
huge concentrations of private capital continue to wield extraordinary power over
decisions crucial to the lives of all Americans, decisions on rates and directions of
investment, the harvest and use of resources, the development and deployment of
technology, and the control and management or work and workplaces, to name a
few.44
Except in some extreme conditions, developed jurisdictions rarely set out a
compulsory limitation on a company's ability to invest in other corporate entities.45
Instead of using this clumsy approach, the court can lift the "veil" between a parent
company and its subsidiary to protect creditor's right in appropriate circumstances.
This places more demanding duties on both corporate groups and their
decision-makers.
In the UK, "limited liability" and "separate personality" are two fundamental
principles of the company law system. However, like many other developed
jurisdictions, the corporate veil can be lifted in appropriate circumstances. "Lifting the
corporate veil" refers to "the possibility of looking behind the company framework to
make the members liable, as an exception to the rule that they are normally shielded
44 M. Harper, 'Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational Real Entity Theory' (1989) 50
University of Pittsburg Law Review 639
45 S. 136 of the UK Companies Act 2006 prohibits cross-holding, a phenomenon in which a company
holds shares in its holding company.
91
by the corporate shell".46 According to Davies, there are at least four tests for lifting
corporate veil in the common law system. These include the "sham or facade test", the
"single economic unit test", "interests of justice test" and "impropriety test".47 In
respect of the corporate group, there is a general principle that if it can be shown that
a subsidiary acts as the agent of its parent, then, on ordinary agency principles,
liability will attach to the parent as principal.48 For example, in Re FG (Films) Ltd49,
the applicant company sought to register the film "Monsoon" as a British film, and
made a declaration that it was the maker of the film. The application was refused by
the Board of Trade on the grounds that the film had been made by a large American
Company. Under the contract between the applicant and the American company,
finance and all the necessary facilities were provided by the American company. In
this case, Vaisey J case found that "their participation in any such undertaking was so
small as to be practically negligible, and that they acted, in so far as they acted at all
in the manner merely as the nominee of and agent for an American company called
Film Group Incorporated..."
Furthermore, if the only intention behind an individual or a company forming a
subsidiary is to use it as a device to perpetrate fraud, the UK court can deny the
independent personality of the subsidiary. Case law confirms that the corporate veil
can be lifted, where the corporate entity is merely a device or mask. In Jones v.
Lipman,50 the defendant entered into a contract to sell a land to the plaintiff. However,
in order to avoid the contractual obligations owed to the plaintiff, the defendant sold
the land to a company rather than the plaintiff. The company which obtained the land
was substantially controlled by the defendant. The Court of Appeal held that "the
creature of the first defendant, a device and a sham, a mask which he holds before his
46 L. Sealy & S. Worthington, Sealy's Cases and Materials in Company Law (9th edn, Oxford
University Press 2010) 53
47 P. Davies (n 13) 203-206
48 E. Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 37
49 [1953] 1 WLR 483
50 [1962] 1WLR 832
92
face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity."51 However, this doctrine
becomes more complicated in the context of corporate groups. Davies makes
following comments on Adams v Cape Industries Plc
the court felt that it was "left with rather sparse guidance as to the principles
which should guide the court in determining whether or not the arrangements of a
corporate group involve a facade..." but, unfortunately, it declined to "attempt a
comprehensive definition of those principles."52
In addition to the doctrine of "lifting the corporate veil", the corporate group
bears demanding disclosure duties in the UK. The principle is that "the parent
company must present group financial statements as well as its own individual
statement, thus avoiding the misleading impression which the latter alone might
give."53 The corporate group's financial report must present a "fair and true" view.
Section 399 of the Companies Act 2006 imposes a duty to the directors of the parent
company. The parent company is responsible for presenting a consolidated balance
sheet and profit and loss account to general public, in order to avoid the misleading
information. Furthermore, the directors of a parent company are also responsible for
preparing individual financial reports for the parent company. Similarly, the directors
of subsidiaries must also prepare individual financial reports.54 In order to protecting
creditors, the individual and consolidated accounts in the same group must be
presented within same financial reporting framework.
By contrast, China's 1993 Company Law does not adopt the doctrines of "lifting
51 ibid
52 P. Davies (n 13) 204 and also see Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, (Court of Appeal)
53 P. Davies (n 13) 233
54 P. Davies (n 13) 709
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corporate veil" or use a consolidated financial reporting regime.55 Instead, it launches
a mandatory limitation on a corporate group's expansion, which can be regarded as a
low-cost substitute for these advanced corporate law doctrines. Article 12 of the law
says that where a company which invests in other corporate entity, the amount of its
investment shall not exceed 50 per cent of its net assets. Furthermore, this rule is not
applicable to investment companies and holding companies listed by the State
Council.
China's 1993 Company Law inherits this doctrine from its 1929 company law,
which was issued by the government of the former republic. Its provisions come from
China's local knowledge. Article 11 of the 1929 company law states that a limited
liability company's investment in another corporate entity should not exceed 25 per
cent of its registered capital. This limitation on a company's investment ability
manifests ideological considerations. In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was replaced by a
republican nation. Sun Zhongshan, the leader of the revolutionaries, believed that
private capital should not play an important role in key sectors of the national industry.
One of the important components of his political programme was called "controlling
the development of private capital" (jie zhi zi ben).56 He once said that "Bank, railway
and land, all the key sources of productivity should be owned and controlled by the
government for the purpose of prohibiting private capital manipulating the national
welfare and people's livelihood."57 In Sun's political utopia, by limiting private
capital and expanding public ownership, the working class will gain an equal
opportunity of obtaining wealth. This belief was also written into the Nationalist
Party's Manifesto issued in 1924. Here, it was written that
55 A consolidated financial reporting regime was introduced into the legal system by the Ministry of
Finance in 1995; see 'Bebing Kuaiji Baobiao Zhanxing Guiding' [Provisions regarding Consolidating
Financial Reports]. This administrative regulation was updated in 2005; see 'Qiye Kuaiji Zhunze 33
Bao: Hebing Caiwu Baobiao' [Provision regarding Company Accounting Standard No.33:
Consolidating Financial Reports] issued by the Ministry of Finance
56 J.H. Liu, Xin Gongsi Fa De Zhidu Chuangxin: Lifa Zhengdian Yu Jieshi Nandian [Institutional
Innovation of New Corporate Law: Legislative and Judicial Controversies] (Falv Chuban She 2006)
[Law Press China 2006] 37
57 See Z.S. Sun, Jianguo Fanglue [The Way of Establishing a Republic Nation] (Huawen Chubanshe
1919) [Huawen Press 1919] 103
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all large-scale of national industries, which belong to the Chinese people as a
whole, should be run by the government…this can balance the interests between
the class of capitalist and the class of industry workers…and achieving a
harmonious economic development.58
Following Sun's political beliefs, it is understandable that the limitations on a
company's ability to invest were instigated by a desire to control the expansion of
private capitalism.
However, this doctrine was misunderstood by PRC legislators, when drafting the
1993 Company Law. They wrongfully assumed that the limitation on a company's
investment in another corporate entity was a "capital maintenance" principle, aimed at
protecting company minority shareholders' and creditors' interests.59 The logic behind
this assumption is that, a company's net assets on its balance sheet are an important
criterion by which a creditor can assess a company's ability to perform. By investing
in other corporate entities, a company can reduce the transparency of its capitalization
by blurring the lines between the assets of group members.60 As a result, through this
kind of investment, it can show a strong financial ability to perform contracts, which
does not match its capitalization. For example, the registered capital of company A is
300,000 RMB. Company A and then invests 200,000 RMB in forming two
subsidiaries, namely company B and company C. Each of these subsidiaries has
100,000 RMB. Through these investments, company A's capital on the consolidated
balance sheet increases to 500,000 RMB (company A's registered capital 300,000
RMB plus company B's registered capital 100,000 RMB plus company C's registered
capital 100,000 RMB), despite the fact that there is no substantial change in company
A's structure of capitalization. Without proper disclosure, the manipulation of
58 Nationalist Party's Manifesto 1924 <http://www.hoplite.cn/templates/smzywsg0021.html> accessed
20th July 2011
59 J.H. Liu, (n 56) 39
60 E. Bicker, 'Creditor Protection in the Corporate Group', Working Paper Series, (July 2006)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=920472> 2 accessed 20th July 2011
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financial reports may lead a party who intends to enter into a contractual relationship
with this company to misjudge the company's ability for contract performance. A
company's investment in another corporate entity also increases transaction costs for
the creditors.61 Furthermore, a company's investment in another corporate entity,
especially when forming a wholly-controlled subsidiary, enables the company to use
that subsidiary as a device to circumvent law, avoid contractual obligations or
externalise commercial risks. Moreover, the limitation on investment is also deemed
to be a key instrument in preventing officials from misappropriating State assets. For
example, a government-appointed corporate officer could appropriate State-assets by
investing the capital of a SOE to a special purpose entity run by himself or his
relatives.62 The above problems are controlled by the 1993 Company Law through a
legal arrangement, which constrains the expansion of the corporate group. However,
similar problems are dealt with by more sophisticated legal rules in other developed
jurisdictions. The manipulation of company's balance sheet or the committal of other
fraud by setting up a "façade subsidiary" can be constrained by the doctrine of "lifting
the corporate veil" and the "consolidated disclosure requirement". Furthermore,
well-designed director's duties can tackle the problem of corporate officer
misappropriation.
Now that Chinese companies are deeply involved in the global competitive
market, the limitation on company investment ability set out by Article 12 of the 1993
Company Law places these companies at a disadvantage. The experience of
developed economies shows that the organization and accumulation of private capital
is important for economic development. It is therefore unwise for Chinese company
law to adhere to a legal rule which makes domestic companies lose their international
competitiveness. Unsurprisingly, this limitation on a company's ability to invest in
another corporate entity was abolished by the 2005 Company Law. It seems the
newly-implemented legal rules have adopted the experience of Western legal systems.
61 J.H. Liu (n 56) 40
62 ibid
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The doctrine of "lifting corporate veil" has been implemented in order to prohibit the
fraudulent raising of capital.63 Additionally, refined director's duties of loyalty serve
to prevent directors from misappropriating companies' assets through improper
investment. Article 20 of the Company Law 2005 states that
The shareholders of a company shall exercise their shareholders' rights in
compliance with laws, administrative rules and regulations as well as the articles
of association of the company; shall not abuse their shareholders' rights to injure
the interests of the company or other shareholders, or take advantage of the
company's independent personality or the limited liability of shareholders to
injure the interests of the company's creditors. Where the abuse of shareholders'
rights causes any loss to the company or other shareholders, the shareholder shall
be liable for compensation in accordance with the law. Where shareholders of a
company take advantage of the company's independent personality or the limited
liability of shareholders to disregard debts and seriously injure the interests of the
company's creditors, such shareholders shall bear joint and several liability for the
debts of the company.
In addition to the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine, Article 149 of the company
law imposes more demanding duties on corporate directors.64 Consequently, the legal
rule based on functional convergence is replaced by a set of more refined formal
convergence rules.
4.1.4 Generalizing the Competitive Advantages of the Formal
Convergence Model
4.1.4.1 Support from Western Experience
63 For a general introduction to the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" in company law in 2005,
see M. Wu, 'Piercing China's Corporate Veil: Open Questions from the New Company Law' (2007) 117
Yale Law Journal 329
64 For the reform of director's duty of loyalty, see Chapter V below.
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Why does the Western experience bear such a level of importance for the legal
reform of corporate governance in China? The answer is two-fold. Firstly, at least in
the field of company law reform, rules or institutions without the support of Western
legislative guidance might be of a nature that has difficulty in fitting in with the
Chinese context. At the first glance, this argument seems counter-intuitive. This is
because the standard claim is that the mismatch between Chinese characteristics and
Western experience is usually caused by transplanted rules. The following part will
further explore this argument through the insights provided by two case studies. In the
first case study, the ownership structure of Chinese public companies is split and
over-concentrated. Policy-makers attempt to enact rules, which meet the demand of
minority shareholders under a distorted ownership structure. The principal problem of
this approach is that it has a one-sided focus on Chinese characteristics, whilst
ignoring general features, which China's local context shares with Western
jurisdictions. The ownership structure of Chinese public companies has idiosyncrasies,
but an individual shareholder's behavioural philosophy is not idiosyncratic in China.
As Anabtawi & Stout argue, "from an economic perspective, the cost of trying to
influence corporate policy has typically outweighed the individual value of any single
shareholder's interest, leaving dispersed shareholders in public companies 'rationally
apathetic'."65 The Chinese minority shareholders, similar to investors in developed
jurisdictions, rationally invest their time and effort into the projects which have great
potential to maximise the profits of their investment.66 Corporate activities such as
related-party transactions and the substantial asset reorganization which are likely to
have uncertain results will find it difficult to attract the participation of transferable
shareholders (usually portfolio shareholders). Thus, the class voting regime may meet
the regulatory demands made by an over-concentrated ownership structure in the
stock market, but conflicts with individual shareholders' behavioural philosophy.
65 I. Anabtawi & L. Stout, 'Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders' (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review
1255, 1257
66 As Jensen & Meckling state, "whether they are politicians, managers, academics, professionals,
philanthropist, or factory worker, individuals are resourceful, evaluative maximizers"; Jensen &
Meckling, 'The Nature of Man' (1994) 7 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4
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Since the main purpose of this regime is to protect minority property rights by
enhancing their voice in the decision-making process, failing to motivate minority
participation makes this regime meaningless.
Additionally, "shareholder democracy" in modern company law requires
shareholder voting and cash-flow rights to be proportionate. According to this rule, a
majority shareholder enters into a company with the expectation that his or her voting
power should be stronger than that of minority shareholders. It is undeniable that the
former owns a larger per cent of residual interests in a company than the latter.
Majority shareholders are therefore having greater incentives to maximise company
profit. Davies points out that where voting and cash-flow rights are not proportionate,
there is a risk that
controlling shareholders (controlling in terms of votes rather than capital
committed to the company) will take excessive risks with the company's business
at the expense of non-controlling shareholders, who may be the majority
contributors to the company's capital. This is because controlling shareholders do
not bear a proportionate part of the risks if a strategy is unsuccessful.67
As with public companies in Western jurisdictions, the capital of Chinese public
companies is mainly contributed by majority shareholders rather than minority
shareholders. Under such conditions, giving overwhelming voting power to minority
shareholders gives rise to the risks associated with a disproportion between voting
right and cash-flow right. Majority capital investors face excessive challenges and
undertake unreasonable costs when trying to maximise their investments by engaging
in certain business activities. This includes the risk that the minority uses its power to
block the majority from undertaking reasonable and justified measures unless they are
67 P. Davies (n 13) 413
99
paid off.68 As a result, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to avoid the
class-voting regime. Moreover, there has long been argued that the direct participation
of minority shareholders in corporate decision-making reduces shareholder value.
This is because minority shareholders lack either the requisite knowledge or expertise
to make effective decisions.69 Finally, over-concentrated ownership and the split
shareholding structure of many corporate entities are of a nature that is characteristic
of a strong planned economy. As mentioned above, some steps have been taken to
disperse ownership and unify the split shareholding structure.70 Therefore, there is
little point in introducing rules or institutions to meet the special needs arising out of
these economic characteristics, which will be significantly altered, if not wholly
removed by such reform efforts.
By contrast, a class voting regime under a share-trading reform is more suitable
to the local context. By adopting Western legal rules, it sets out good incentives,
which motivate market participant compliance. Indeed, it is understandable that the
individual and even institutional shareholders would have greater incentives to
participate in class voting under share trading reform. This is because compared with
other corporate activities, the compensation schemes which usually propose a free
share-allocation to the holders of transferable shares are very likely to bring direct
benefits to them.71
The second case study also illustrates the mismatch between the local context
and the functional convergence rule. The functional convergence rule places a
mandatory limitation on a company's investment ability, which does not provide
institutional support for the development of large corporate groups. Unlike the
68 D. Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 Delaware Journal
of Corporate Law 125, 144
69 S. Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment' (2005) 118 Harvard Law
Review 1735
70 See above at section 4.1.2.2.2, 76-77
71 As empirical research has indicated, the participation ratio and the support rates from holders of
transferable shares rationally increase with the size of compensation. See L. Xiao, 'Guquan Fenzhi
Gaige De Jingjixue Yanjiu' [Shareholding Reform in China: An Economic Analysis], (2008) 10
Shanghai Jingji Yanjiu [Shanghai Journal of Economic Study] 98
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mismatch in the first case study, this one is a result of an under-developed legislative
methodology. It is driven by the belief that the best way of solving problems is
through the application of a mandatory rule, and that the primary purpose of company
law is to control corporate behaviour rather than to facilitate it. As Clarke argues, "the
[Chinese] Company Law is clearly concerned more with regulating and suppressing
than with fostering and nurturing."72
Furthermore, it deliberately ensures unfair treatment as between a private
company and large-scale State company. The law states that the limitation cannot be
applied to companies on a list provided by the State Council. Both the mandatory
limitation on company's investment and the bias against companies without a State
background manifest planned economy characteristics. These characteristics mean
that this legal rule cannot provide adequate support for a market economy system. In
particular, whilst preventing a corporate entity from manipulating its financial report
by creating a façade subsidiary is essential, it is economically inefficient to achieve
this purpose at the expense of the development of private corporate groups. The
functional convergence rule thus seems to be incapable of supporting China's
domestic companies to survive in the face of intensive international competition.
Although the newly-adopted rules through formal convergence (e.g. lifting the
corporate veil and director's duties) have not undergone much testing to prove their
effectiveness, they show a significant methodological movement from planned
economy based legislation towards market economy based legislation.
Consequently, we should accept that the insights provided by the two case
studies are limited. As many studies have indicated, rules or institutions that are
transplanted have a strong tension with the existing institutional infrastructure. These
two case studies are not adequate to prove that the formal convergence model is a
better choice than the functional convergence model in relation to every aspect of
China's legal reform of corporate governance. Rather, the results warn us that
72 D. Clarke, 'Corporate Governance in China: An overview' (2003) 14 China Economic Review 496
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although the socio-economic context and the legal infrastructure surrounding
corporate governance in China have their unique characteristics, they do share some
important generalities with their Western counterparts.
Secondly, as noted above, Chinese legislation generally suffers from a problem
of ambiguity. In light of this, guidance from Western legislation is an important
resource, which can help to bridge the gap between "law on paper" and "law in
practice" in China. However, when such guidance is absent, the poorly drafted rules
can become unworkable in a technical sense. In the case of the class-voting regime, its
ambiguous wording is widely critised by lawyers.73 For example, it contains a
catch-all provision, which states that "all actitivties which have important bearing on
the minority shareholders' interests should be subject to the approval by transferable
shareholders". However, the law does not define the meaning of "important bearing"
or provide any workable standard by which it can be assessed.74 The same problem is
well illustrated by the second case study. Many Chinese lawyers argue that the
limitation on a company's ability to invest is technically implausible.75 Firstly, it is
unclear that how the term "investment" should be defined. Generally, a company can
invest in another corporate entity by lending money or acquiring shares. Investment
by lending is less harmful than investement through share-holding in respect of
protecting minority shareholder and creditor interests, especially where the borrower
provides a guarantee to the lender. It is therefore problematic to place same limitation
on investment through lending. Secondly, a company's net assets are continuously
changing. Consequently, the law should clarify how to caculate a company's net assets,
when it makes an investment in another corporate entity. For example, company A's
net asset in July is 300,000 yuan. It invests 160,000 yuan in company B. Several
months later, company A invests another 100,000 yuan in company B, and A's net
assets at that time increase to 800,000 yuan through doing other business activities.
This scenario presents an interesting issue regarding how to define "net assets" in this
73 C. Xi (n 17) 285
74 ibid
75 J.H Liu (n 56) 42
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legal doctrine. According to the 1993 Company Law, company A's initial invesment
would be illegal, as it exceeds 50 per cent of the company's net assets. However, the
parent company's net assets are damastically increased with the development of the
corporate group at the time that it makes the second investment. In this case, whether
the company's investment behaviour is illegal depends on which net asset value on the
balance sheet is investigated by the authority. More percisely, the law should clarify
whether when a company makes multiple-investments during a certain period, the
"net assets" in the legal provsion indicate the "net assets" of company's initial
investment, or that of company's subsequent investment, or indeed the average
amount of "net assets" in company's total investments in the other corporate entity
during this period. Without clarifing this concept, this provison is not workable in
complex cases. Thirdly, the law stays silent on what sanctions will be placed on a
company that breaks this rule. The 1993 law confirms that companies have
independent personality.76 According to this doctrine, when a subsidiary is formed
through a parent company's investment which exceeds the 50 per cent net asset
limtation, there is no solid basis on which to suspend the subsidiary's corporate
identity, as the parent company's legal liability does not extend to its subsidary.
It might be argued that, many rules which are transplanted from Western
jurisdictions are poorly drafted and lack supportive interpretations. Therefore, poor
legislative quality is a universal problem in China's legislation rather than a problem
specific only to rules that are adopted through functional convergence. However, we
should note that there is a considerable difference in evolution between functional
convergence rules and formal convergence rules in China. Although legal rules
adopted through the formal convergence model suffers from problems of ambiguity,
there is still room for improvement. Firstly, such rules can be developed from bottom
to top. If a rule or institution is transplanted from Western jurisdictions and poorly
drafted, legal end-users, including judges, lawyers and market participants could
76 See Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, article 3 (1993)
<http://www.cpasz.net/xzfg/3xzfggsf01.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
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engage in self-help. They can formulate a general understanding of such legal
provisions by researching relevant Western legislation in this area. Take institution of
independent director as an example. In CNKI77 database, a search of the journal
articles which include the term of "independent director" in their titles hits 2542
results (during 2002 to 2008).78 In the same database, a search of the journal articles
which include both of "independent director" and a major foreign jurisdiction79 in
their titles hits 1736 results totally (during 2002 to 2008).80 The number of each
jurisdiction mentioned by the titles of articles is as follows:
Jurisdictions mentioned by articles' title Number of results
The US (Mei Guo) 1241
The UK (Ying Guo) 245
German (De Guo) 187
Japan (Ri Ben ) 63
These figures illustrate that the Chinese scholars and legal end-users made great
efforts in localizing the institution of independent director through researching useful
guidance from foreign experience. The policy-maker in practice has made responses




Rules related to Independent Director
2004 Shareholder Protection Provisions 2004 6 articles related to independent director
77 China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI) is the largest Chinese academic electronic
database. It includes articles published in leading Chinese academic journals, newspapers and
conferences presentations. For English introduction, see <http://eng.cnki.net/grid2008/index.htm>,
accessed 20th July 2011
78 This search is premised on the reasonable assumption that articles those titles include reference to
"independent director" predominantly discuss the institution of independent directors in their content.
79 Four major jurisdictions were used in testing the bottom to top reform of "independent director".
These are US, UK, Germany and Japan.
80 This search is premised on the reasonable assumption that articles those titles include reference to
both the term "independent director" and a foreign jurisdiction discuss the independent director from a
comparative perspective.
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2006 Corporate Governance Guidance 2006
3 articles related to independent
directors
2007
Independent Directors Provisions 81
(still in the drafting process)
48 articles related to independent
directors
Furthermore, Liebman's recent empricial research has already shows that when
Chinese judges hear difficult cases, they routinely research how similar such case has
been dealt with in developed jurisdictions for guidance.82 In practice, Western law
and jurisprudence assists judges and lawyers to localise transplanted legal rules. For
example, the experience of US securities litigation plays a vital role in the Chinese
judical practice. In Basic v. Levinson,83 the US Supreme Court adopted the
"fraud-on-the-market" theory to deal with the "systemic risk defence" in litigation
relating to corporate mispresentation.84 This US approach is appropriately used by
Chinese local courts to solve problems in Chinese securities litigation.
Secondly, a "top to bottom" evolution might also be expected where Western
experience is accessable. The Chinese Supreme Court encourages judges to widen
their horizons by learning from foreign legal theory. For example, the Supreme Court
recently issued a series of Official Interpretations (hereinafter Interpretations) of the
2005 company law.85 It also published guidance to assist judges in understanding and
applying these Interpretations. This guidance explores every article of the
Interpretations through three dimensions; namely background, relevant foreign legal
81 Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Tiaoli Zhengzai Zhiding [Independent Directors Provisions Is in
Drafting Process] Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [China Securities News] 11thDecember 2006
82 B. Liebman & T. Wu, 'China's Network Justice' (2007) 257 Chicago Journal of International Law
257, 290
83 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (Supreme Court of the United States)
84 See C. Xi, 'Case Note: Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi co v
ZHONG Weida and Others Hei Longjiang High Court' (2006) 1:2 Journal of Comparative Law 492,
496 and C.G. Yan, 'Zhongguo Gushi Xujia Chenshu Diyi An: Quanmian Tiaojie Jiean' [The Settlement
of the First Misrepresentation Case in China's Judiciary Practice] (2008) 4 Zhongguo Shenpan [China
Trial] 39
85 Zuigao Renming Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghuarenminggongheguo Gongsifa Rougan Wenti de
Guiding (I&II) [Supreme Court's Judicial Interpretations on China's Company Law 2005 I & II]
Chinese text is available at <http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=109879> accessed 20th
July 2011
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theories and judical practice. In relation to the first two dimensions, many important
Anglo-American legal theories and legislative provisions are employed to explain the
rationale behind the articles of the Interpretations. For example, in the chapter entitled
"Deadlocked Companies", a substantial amount of Western legal theory including
relevant legislation and legal concepts from the UK Company Act 1985, Delaware
corporate law and the Japanese Commercial Code are introduced to Chinese judges.86
Although the Supreme Court does not explicitly delcare that Chinese judges can
directly use these foreign legal doctrines in their daily practice, it expects that
advanced foreign jurisprudence to provoke judicial thought so as to develop a feasible
solution to demanding cases in practice.
By contrast, rules adopted as functional convergence do not usually undergo a
"bottom to top" or "top to bottom" process of evolution. As a result of
under-developed legislative skill, both of case studies indicate that the rules are
difficult to apply in practice. In turn, the unworkable rules neither provide much
practical feedback to legislators, nor are they supported by Western experience. Thus
two major channels precipitating improvement are blocked. Unsurprisingly, they are
eventually replaced by more sophisticated transplanted rules, when the law is
reformed. Consequently, at least in the field of company law, the guidance of Western
jurisprudence and law provides important support to legal end-users in understanding
and to localizing the ambigous legal rules of Chinese company law.
4.1.4.2 Complementarities
Many argue that the cross-reference of corporate governance rules from different
systems encounters structural problems. As Gilson notes in his literature:
Changing the form of an institution, in order to enhance its own efficiency in
response to changing economic conditions, initially may result in a reduction, not
86 ibid 109-117
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an increase, in overall system productivity…. The new form may not be
complementary to the other institutions that make up the system, which can result
in a reduction in the performance of even those institutions whose form remains
unchanged.87
A large number of Western legal rules have already been transplanted into the
Chinese legal system through legislation.88 Arguably, legal transplants in the context
of company law no longer follow a "piece-meal" approach. There is therefore an
advantage to using a transplanted rule in that it would be complemented by other rules
or institutions of the same legal origin. For example, the 2005 Securities Act
transplanted the concept of "sponsor" into the Chinese legal system. Art.11 states that,
An issuer which files an application for public issuance of shares or convertible
corporate bonds by means of underwriting according to law or for public issuance
of any other securities, to which a recommendation system is applied, as is
prescribed by laws and administrative regulations, shall employ an institution
with the qualification of recommendation as its "sponsor". A sponsor shall abide
by operational rules and industrial norms and, on the basis of the principles of
honesty, diligence and accountability, carry out a prudent examination of
application documents and information disclosure materials of its issuers as well
as supervise and urge its issuers to operate in a regulated manner.
The institution of "sponsor" is also applied in the share trading reform.89 In
accordance with the CSRC's regulations, public companies must employ a sponsor to
assist in drafting the documents relating to compensation schemes.90 The sponsors,
who are sophisticated financial intermediaries, bring important expertise in the
87 R. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function', (2001) 49
American Journal of Comparative Law 329, 339
88 See H. Huang & B.S. Wang 'China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overall and
Assessment' 2006 (19) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 229
89 Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (n 9) art.1
90 ibid art.2(2)
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drafting process of such compensation schemes. Furthermore, they also engage a
responsibility to work as a "gatekeeper" by supervising the drafting process of the
compensation scheme, and preventing any unlawful activities.91 Consequently, the
involvement of security lawyers and auditors should improve the quality of
compensation schemes. Well-designed compensation schemes create a good starting
point for procedures that follow, including the application of a class voting regime. To
sum up, the emerging complementary system would facilitate the practical effects of
transplanted legal rules.
By contrast, a class voting regime as a functional convergence does not integrate
into the existing legal regime well. As the first case study shows, there is no
complementary institution to encourage minority shareholders to participate in a class
meeting. Secondly, when majority shareholders circumvent the class meeting, no
means of relief is available to minority shareholders. Finally, no rule or standard can
prevent institutional shareholders from engaging in rent-seeking activities during class
voting. A similar problem can also be found in the second case study. The lack of
complementary strategies, such as an effective enforcement mechanism, means that
there is no help for minority shareholders or creditors when they become aware of an
unlawful investment made by the company. There is also no properly authorised
institution to investigate a company's investments in any given period. This shortage
of complementary strategies means that the functional convergence rules become
difficult apply.
4.1.4.3 Time-saving
The "convenience" thesis, already supported by existing studies, is further
supported by the above case studies. In 2004, as the performance of the Chinese stock
markets was approaching a bottom-line, the central government decided to promote
91 X. Tang 'Protecting Minority Shareholder in China: A task for Both Legislation and Enforcement' In
H. Kanda, K. Kim & C. J. Milhaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia
(Routledge 2008) 150
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this performance by unifying the split shareholding structure. In order to respond
quickly to the stock market calamity, this reform was initialled without adequate
preparation. The CSRC, as the executor of the reform, needed to design a workable
reform proposal in a short space of time. At this time of urgency, the time-consuming
procedure of developing new rules risked delaying the reforming process. Introducing
well-developed Western rules by way of reform therefore presented itself as a
reasonable solution. As Chinese economic development in the last three decades has
been dramatic, legislators have had to continuously update legislation to mitigate
newly-emerging problems and support further economic development. Furthermore,
as the second case study indicates, Chinese companies are increasingly facing fierce
competition on the global market. In order to survive in this competition, legislators
have also had to have quick responses to prompt the competitiveness of Chinese
companies. Thus, adopting Western legal rules and institutions seems to have been a
viable option as it is the most convenient way for legislators to make an immediate
response to changing circumstances.
4.1.5. Conclusion
This part has attempted to fill a gap in the research on legal reform of corporate
governance in China by answering two important questions: (1) what are the technical
advantages (if any) of selectively inputting Western legal rules into the Chinese legal
system? (2) Is functional convergence a more effective model than legal transplant, as
some lawyers have suggested. The case studies have shown that it is undeniable that
the formal convergence model possesses some overwhelming advantages when
compared with the functional convergence model. Firstly, introducing Western
experience into the Chinese legal system does not always cause conflict. At least the
first case study shows that China's public companies and its domestic market, share
some important features with their Western counterparts. In contrast, the functional
convergence model which places a one-sided focus on Chinese characteristics may be
difficult to apply in meeting the demands of the generalities between China's domestic
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market and its Western counterparts. More importantly, so-call Chinese characteristics
in the field of corporate governance, including State control, over-concentrated
ownership, and split shareholding structure are the main objects of economic reform.
Consequently, there is little point in drafting legal rules to fit in with economic
components that are in any case due to be reformed. Moreover, the Western
experience provides the technical support, which is helpful to activate the legal rules
in practice. In contrast, rules adopted through a functional convergence model usually
suffer from the problem of ambiguity. Legal end-users generally receive little
guidance on how to use these rules and standards. Moreover, transplanting rules and
legal institutions from Western legal systems is more efficient. Some indications have
shown that transplanted rules have come to constitute a complementary system. The
individual transplanted rule can promote the productivity of a whole system through
its complementary effect. Thirdly, transplanting rules from Western jurisdictions is
more time-saving. It can provide a fast response to the newly-emerging problems
arising out of economic transition and the competitive global market. Finally, in
relation to the second question, the results of this case study indicate that the formal
convergence model is a better choice than the functional adoption model for China's
legal reform of corporate governance.
Nevertheless, the above case studies do have their limitations. Their results may
be not accurate or representative in all conditions. As micro-studies, they do not shed
much light on the rationale behind the reasons for finding the formal convergence
model to be the better model. In order to overcoming these limitations, the next part
will go one step further by discussing what determines the important role taken by
formal convergence model in China's legal reform of corporate governance.
4.2. What Determines the Role of the Formal Convergence Model in
China's Legal Reform of Corporate Governance?
This part will deal with the limitations of the above case studies by exploring the
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determinants of the formal convergence model. It argues that there is juxtaposition
between path-dependent trajectories in China's legal reform of corporate governance.
Moreover, the two path-dependent trajectories have different effects on the reform.
Additionally, law not only reacts but also shapes its economic and cultural context.
The economic and cultural components influenced by the transplanted law are also
therefore important determinants.
4.2. 1. "Path Dependence" in Comparative Corporate Governance
The essence of the path-dependence theory92 is to emphasise the "lock-in" effect
and "self-reinforcing" consequences of the development of a system. In an economic
sense, path-dependence results in "lock in" and "self-enforcement" effects through
positive feedbacks and increasing returns.93 The cost of switching to a previously
discarded alternative accumulates over time, rendering whole change less and less
likely.94 Economic considerations, such as "fixed cost", "learning effects", "network
effects", and "adaptive expectation" make an existing institution "extremely difficult
to abolish."95 Furthermore, a well-established institution is usually protected by an
elite group. The path dependence theory plays an important role in moving the
discussion of institutional stability beyond the unassailable notion that "history
matters".96 In respect of comparative corporate governance, as mentioned in Chapter
I, path dependence theory is used to explain the persistent differences between the
corporate governance regimes of dispersed ownership systems and block-holder
systems.97
After briefly introducing the general concepts of the path-dependence theory, in
92 For a general conceptual discussion of path-dependence in the context of corporate governance, see
M. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics' (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641
93 T. Boas, 'Conceptualizing Continuity and Change: The Composite-Standard Model of
Path-dependence' (2007)19 Journal of Theoretical Politics 33, 37
94 ibid
95 J. Mahoney, 'Path-Dependence in Historical Sociology' (2000) 29 Theory and Society 507, 515
96 T. Boas (n 93) 34
97 See Chapter I (n 5)
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the following parts, this paper will place the Chinese experience within this
theoretical framework. It will divide the path-dependence effects of China's corporate
governance reform into two levels. One level is "rent-protection path-dependence",
which refers to a strong combination of "clientelism" and "corporatism" in China's
political-cultural context. The other level is "efficiency-driven path-dependence",
which refers to "comparability" between a newly-enacted rule and the existing legal
regime in China.
4.2.2. Dual-levels of Path Dependence in the Context of Chinese
Corporate Governance Regime
4.2.2. 1. Level one: Rent-Protection Path-Dependence
Bebchuk & Roe find that players who enjoy rents under an initial structure might
have both the incentive and the power to impede changes under this structure.98
Although this part focuses on the evolution of the company law regime rather than the
corporate governance system, the "interest group" argument still has robust
explanatory power. Some Western commentators have pointed out that China's
dramatic economic development in last three decades is regarded as an exception to
the "right hypothesis".99 The assumption made by the "right hypothesis" is that
economic growth requires a legal system, which offers stable and predictable property
and contractual rights.100 However, even today China does not possess an efficient
legal system, comparable to its phenomenal economic development. Thus, there must
be some alternatives or partial substitutes for the "rule of law" in China. The argument
provided by Jones offers a widely accepted explanation for this phenomenon. She
argues that "clientelism" and "corporatism" are substitutes for the legal regime in
98 L. Bebchuk & M. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance'
1999 (52) Stanford Law Review 127
99 D. Clarke, 'Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: the China Problem', (2003) 51
American Journal of Comparative Law 89
100 ibid
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"Chinese capitalism", which underlie China's remarkable economic development.101
Although Jones argues that these alternative trajectories are even more effective than
a formal legal system in promoting economic development in China, some
commentators assert that the strong tie of "clientelism" and "corporatism" hinders the
transplant of corporate governance rules from the "rule of law" system.102 The
following parts will further apply Jones's argument in China's legal reform of
corporate governance.
"Clientelism"103 refers to a close-knit society, which is highly reliant on personal
relationships, and networks of familial, personal and social connection.104 The
network which facilitates exchange of personal and knowledge based resources, for
mutual protection and for aid can be traced back to the traditional nepotism of
Chinese emperors, as well as the corruption and particularism of Chinese dynastic
bureaucracy.105 Peerenboom divides clientelism into two groups. "Horizontal
clientelism" refers to the relationships between equal parties. By contrast, "vertical
clientelism" refers to the patron-client relationship between supervisors and
subordinates.106 On the one hand, it can be argued that the transaction cost between
parties is reduced by a business model in which personal relationships play an
important role. This is not only because parties who do business with their familiar
partners will suffer less from the costs of asymmetric information, but also because
strong networks of social connection facilitate the flow of information between
101 See J. Carol, 'Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal
Change in China' (1994) 3 Social and Legal Studies 195
102 C.W. Huang, 'Worldwide Corporate Convergence Within A Pluralistic Business Legal Order:
Company Law and the Independent Director System in Contemporary China' (2008) 31 Hasting
International Comparative Law Review 361, 433-434
103 For a general introduction of China's culture of Clientelism (also known as Guanxi) in the
commercial realm, see Heidi von Hoivik, 'East Meets West: Tacit Messages about Business Ethics in
Stories Told by Chinese Managers' (2007) 74 Journal of Business Ethics 457; T. Dunfee, and D. Warren,
'Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China' (2001) 32 Journal of Business
Ethics 191; and M. M. Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China
(Cornell University Press 1994)
104 See R. Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press 2002)
466
105 E. Todeva, 'Business Network in China: Legacies and Practice', In S. Clegg, K. Wang and M.
Berrell, (eds.), Business Network and Strategic Alliances in China (Edward Elgar 2007) 256
106 R. Peerenboom (n 104) 466
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parties.107 This reduction of transaction cost contributes to economic development.
On the other hand, this interlaced personal network strengthens "rent-protection"
path-dependency. In respect of corporate governance, horizontal clientelism may
range from appointing an executive's friend or relatives to be the company's senior
officer to passing a corporate opportunity to an executive's family member. Vertical
clientelism in general is more harmful than the horizontal clientelism, as it usually
involves government official or judicial corruption.108 Vertical clientelism may range
from local government administrative intervention in a law suit against a local firm to
leaking official confidential information to a market participant. Both horizontal and
vertical clientelism involve a system of exchanging interests. Imagine a purchasing
manager deciding to buy overpriced supplies from a personal acquaintance who in
turn helps the manager's son into a prestigious school.109 Imagine also a government
official giving a preferential policy to a company in exchange for a position of senior
executive with handsome remuneration for his son. In the first scenario, the
purchasing manager realises his personal interests at the expense of shareholders’
interests. In the second scenario, the governmental official gains personal benefits
from his governmental authority. In both cases, the persons in power, whether
economically or politically, have strong rent-creating and rent-seeking ability in this
cultural environment. The following part will explain these points using a group of
cases.
Keloon's scandal exemplifies horizontal clientelism in corporate governance.
Keloon is a State-owned company seated in Guangdong province. In 2001, it was
involved in serious financial trouble. The local government decided to sell it to Gelin
Keer, a domestic private company listed on Hong Kong's Growth Enterprise Market.
After this acquisition, Gelin Keer's chairman of the board, Gu Chujun, took a seat on
107 R. Gilson, 'Controlling Family Shareholder In Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational
Exchange' (2007-2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 633
108 Braendle and others, 'Corporate Governance in China - Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by




Keloon's board. In order to fully control Keloon's financial resources, Mr Gu filled
Keloon's board with his own confederates. Two years after the acquisition, Mr Gu's
confederates occupied 6 of the total 7 positions of the board. Another of Keloon's
major institutional investors who held nearly 7 per cent of its shares had no voice on
the board. Furthermore, Mr Gu's personal connections extended to all key sectors of
the company, from production to accountant department. Three years after the
acquisition, CSRC's investigation found that Mr Gu had appropriated nearly 3.4
billion RMB (approximately £22 million sterling) from Keloon by moving these
funds to other business entities owned by him. The investigation also indicated that
Mr Gu's personal connection and network played a key role in this financial crime.
Three directors of Keloon, Liu Yizhong, Jiang Baojun and Zhang Xinhan assisted in
money transfers between Keloon and Gelin Keer, although they clearly knew these
activities were illegal. The money which was handled by them totalled 187 million
RMB (approximately £12.5 million sterling). Liu Yizhong, Mr Gu's other friend who
was a director of an accountancy firm, provided assistance by making false statements
in Keloon's financial report. Clearly, the barriers to "insider control" are largely
eliminated by deeply embedded "clientelism" in China's commercial world. The
interest-exchange system facilitated Mr Gu's misappropriation.110
Additionally, the appointment of an independent director in China's listed
companies provides numerous examples of horizontal interest-exchanging. According
to a news report, a listed entertainment corporation based in Xi An selected a famous
TV producer as its independent director. The TV producer frankly declared: "The
manager is my friend!" Similarly, Sinor, a Chinese clothing manufacturer which is
listed on Shenzhen Stock exchange, appointed a famous TV star as its independent
director. The TV star Mr. Zhang publically admitted that the major investor of the
company is, in fact, one of his best friends. Both the TV producer and the TV star
110 See Ke Long An Shimo [The Outline of Keloon Case]
<http://tech.sina.com.cn/e/2008-01-03/11141951481.shtml> on 21st Shiji Jingji Baodao [21st Century
Economy Daily] 3rd, January 2008 accessed 20th July 2011; and Gu Chujun de Ke Long Tikuanji
[Keloon, An ATM for Gu Chujun] <http://homea.people.com.cn/GB/41392/4596318.html> accessed
20th July 2011
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were obviously without legal or accountancy training. Therefore, they were only
directors for the purposes of "window-dressing". Moreover, the TV producer and
star's reputations were promoted by being appointed independent directors in listed
companies. In return, their appointment secures some loose external supervision for
the controlling insiders of these companies.111
If the former cases are indicative of horizontal clientelism, vertical clientelism is
well portrayed by a more recent case. Huang Guanyu is a top Chinese entrepreneur.
According to Forbes Magazine, Mr Huang had the distinction of being the richest
man in China from 2006 to 2008, and is the founder and chairman of Gome Group,
the largest electronics retailer in China. Mr Huang is also an owner of a super-size
real estate company which is listed on the domestic stock market and Hong Kong
Stock Exchange. In November 2008, Mr Huang was suspected of being involved in
share-price manipulation. Further CSRC investigations discovered that the businesses
belonging to Mr Huang and his brothers relied largely on insider-trading, operating
illegal business and engaging in commercial misrepresentation to general public.
What was most shocking was the fact that at least nine senior officials were alleged to
have provided protection for Mr Huang's illegal business activities. In order to
achieve such "high-level protection", Mr Huang formulated a complicated social
network, important members of which included the Mayor of Shen Zhen, the Director
of the Ministry of Public Security's Department of Anti-Financial Crime and the
Vice-Principal of Guangdong Province's People's Political Consultative Conference.
All these high-rank government officials were arrested as a consequence of their
involvement in Mr Huang's case.112
111 Li. L.M, 'Duli Dongshi Bianyuan Hua Wenti Yanjiu' [Independent Director, Only A Decoration?] In
B.S. Wang (eds.), Zhuan Xing Shiqi Gongsi Fa de Xiandai Hua [Modernizing Company Law in
Transition Context] (She Hui Ke Xue Wenxian Chuban She 2003) [Social Science Press 2003] 133,
133-135. Also see S.B. Shen & J. Jing, "Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?"
(2005) 27 Loyola Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 223, 237-238
112 See ‘Sheji Huang Guangyu de Zhongguo Gaoguan’ [The Senior Officials who are Connected with
Huang guangyu] <http://www.cnfol.com/> accessed 20th July 2011 and Huang Guanyu An Shimo [A
Outline of Huang Guangyu Case] summarised by Caijing Magazine <
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009/hgy/> accessed 20th July 2011
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Another case that exemplifies horizontal clientelism is the Zijin Mining scandal.
Zijin Mining is China's largest gold producer. In 2010, it was responsible for an acid
spill that polluted a river and poisoned 1,890 metric tons of fish in Fujian Province.
As a listed company, Zijin Mining should have disclosed complete and accurate
information about this disaster to the general public in a timely fashion. However,
Zijin Mining delayed disclosure of the incident for nine days and local government
deliberately played a role in assisting the company to conceal the environmental
disaster. According to the subsequent investigation, there was an interest-exchanging
relationship between Zijin Mining and local government officials. Many retired senior
officials took seats on Zijin's board, and some even possessed a significant number of
shares in Zijin Mining. For example, Mr Zheng, a retired local government senior
official, held a shareholding valued at 9 million RMB (approximately 900,000 pound
sterling). In return, local government not only lost administrative supervision of the
public company, but also provided assistance in concealing its unlawful activities.113
Whilst these cases are illustrative, they nevertheless present an extreme. Most
interests-exchange activities in China are not so severe, being often at the edge of
legality without necessarily breaching law. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that
clientelism is supported by a "rule of man" regime, as opposed to a "rule of law"
regime which would keep it in check. A person in power can create and seek rents
only in an environment where their powers are under-regulated. If legal regimes and
enforcement mechanisms are strengthened, there would be less opportunity for
"rent-creating" and a higher cost for "rent-seeking". However, this also means that
special interest groups currently benefiting from the existing framework of clientelism
are incentivised to block any significant reform from "rule of man" towards "rule of
law".
"Corporatism" is regarded to be a middle ground between liberalism and
113 For a detailed case report, see <http://news.163.com/special/00014IT2/zjkyfsxlsg.html> accessed
20th July 2011, English version available at
<http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-05/05/content_22499213.htm> accessed 20th July 2011
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Marxism. It refers to a strong central government authority with the existence of some
private interest groups who enjoy a certain degree of autonomy.114 With a strong
tradition of totalitarianism, China survives by maintaining an accomplished
hierarchical system, which can be traced back to the influence of Confucianism.115 As
early as the late 19th century, when the concept of a "company" was first introduced
into China, the Qing government attempted to control corporate practice by
establishing a number of government controlled companies. In these companies, the
government had the power to dispose of the company's assets and appoint its directors
and managers.116 After China became a republic, whether under the control of
socialism or nationalism, there was no significant change in the strong controls
exercised by the government over Chinese companies. Even after the formal
implementation of the "socialist market economy" in 1990s, despite the transfer of
underlying ideology from Marxism to Corporatism, governmental control on
companies was still stringent. "Corporatism" in the context of corporate governance is
mainly manifested by two institutional arrangements. One is administrative regulation
and the other is the exercise of direct control of companies by the establishment of
Party organization in listed companies.117
The CSRC issued a large number of market regulations. Unlike the flexible
approach adopted in some Western Jurisdictions, the CSRC's regulations are usually
legally binding. For example, the CSRC's Principles of Corporate Governance for
Listed Companies says that "the Code is applicable to all listed companies within the
boundary of the People's Republic of China. Listed companies shall act in the spirit of
114 H. J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism", (Armonk 1996)
115 Y.W Wei, 'An Overview of Corporate Governance in China' (2003) 30 Syracuse International &
Comparative Law Journal 26
116 J.M Dou, Research on the History of Corporate Ideology in China (1999) 21-22; see also Chi-Kong
Lai, 'China's First Modern Corporation and the State: Officials, Merchants, and Resource Allocation in
the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, 1872-1902' (1994) 54 The Journal of Economic
History 432, where the author finds that ‘The [Qing] government had long been recruiting private
entrepreneurial and material resources to launch various kinds of joint ventures, often adopting
different approaches to what was called "official supervised merchant enterprise" (kuan-tu shang-pan).’
117 As MacNeil argues, the Chinese socialist market does not rely upon rule of law but upon a large
number of administrative regulations and the direct control of shares in listed companies: I. MacNeil
'Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: the Case of Chinese Listed Companies' (2002)
2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289, 339
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the Code in their efforts to improve corporate governance"; and article 91(5) of the
code states "A listed company shall disclose information regarding ... the actual state
of corporate governance of the company, the gap between the company's corporate
governance and the Code, and the reasons for the gap." Additionally, the CSRC's
regulating power extends to the inner affairs of public companies. It requires "local
governments to ensure that companies under their jurisdiction amended their Articles
of Association to reflect the Guidelines on Articles of Association."118 In practice, the
CSRC's intervention reaches every corner of a public company's corporate
governance. For example, in 2002, the CSRC urged the Tianjin Capital Environmental
Protection Company to improve its corporate governance by the end of the year.119
The CSRC's report highlights that one of the issues which this listed company needed
to be improve was the fact that memos on directors' meetings were too simple to
record clearly individual directors' opinions.120 This level of scrutiny is obviously out
with the usual regulatory supervision provided by a typical market regulator in a
market economy system.
In addition to the mandatory market regulations and administrative interventions
in a company's inner management, the CSRC's enforcement mechanisms are
sometimes without a consistent inner logic. As Clarke argues,
Sometimes, it [the CSRC] threatens to use these powers; other times, intriguingly,
it does not. Still other times it simply declares that certain acts will not be valid
under certain conditions, but it does not automatically follow that other
government agencies in China, particularly courts, will give effect to that
declaration if it seems to go beyond the CSRC’s authority.121
118 D. Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China' GWU Law School Public Law
Research Paper No. 433 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1245803> 41
119 See Notice issued by CSRC at 22nd, July 2002 (2002 number 8). Available from <
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/>
120 ibid
121 D. Clarke (n 118) 36
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Consequently, although we cannot deny that mandatory administrative
regulations, intervention in a company's inner affairs, and even the CSRC's erratic
enforcement of the regulations contribute to improving the corporate governance
regime of public companies, all these regulatory approaches also contribute to a
rent-creating and rent-seeking process. Enacting mandatory regulation is creates rents.
Intervening in a company's affairs can sometimes be to seek rents. Whether or not to
enforce a rule in certain conditions, sometimes largely depends on political
considerations.
Despite having indirect control, the State places direct control on super-scale
public companies through State-ownership. As highlighted above, most of China's
listed companies are controlled by the State. Through State-ownership, the
government can control the company not only through shareholder power, but through
the organization of the Communist Party in the company. Article 19 of the 2005
Company Law says,
The Organization of the Chinese Communist Party shall be established in the
company based on the Provisions of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist
Party to carry out activities of the party. The company should provide all
necessary conditions to assist the activities of the party organization.
The organization of the communist party plays an important role in State-controlled
companies in practice. This is because the board of directors usually gives
unconditional approval to business proposals made by the Party organization.122
Furthermore, other research shows that 92 per cent of directors are party members,
suggesting that a correlation between the appointment of directors and the power of
122 C.E. Bai, 'Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Biange' [The Reform of Public Company's Corporate
Governance] (Tsinghua University) <http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20090411/15146092369_2.shtml>
accessed 20th July 2011
120
the Party still exists.123 This result is confirmed by research on China's political
control of listed companies, which suggests that local party committees in listed firms
remain involved in all major corporate decisions, especially those relating to
personnel.124
To conclude, under corporatism, the government can ensure that large-scale
private businesses do not engage in business activities which threaten the Communist
Party's interests. They do so through mandatory administrative regulation, whilst
ultimately controlling important sectors or resources, such as the military industry, the
power and energy industry, and public communications through State-ownership. The
major aim behind adopting Corporatism is therefore to solidify the controlling party's
political totalitarianism.
Corporatism and clientelism are mutually reinforced in China's "rule of man"
regime. Clientelism provides cultural soil for the growth of corporatism. Corporatism
grants strong administrative powers to governmental authorities and officials, which
enables them to seek rents. Although adopted to protect the Party's totalitarianism, the
culture of clientelism, in tandem with the relatively weak legal system, gives rise to
rent-seeking activities which realise personal benefits for State officials rather than
securing Party interests. A report issued by the State-owned Asset Supervision and
Administration Commission highlights that there is a positive link between
concentrated ownership and official corruption.125 To elaborate, the greater the
proportion of State-ownership in a public company, the more serious an official's
corruption becomes. Therefore, in a cultural environment based on clientelism,
officials have incentives to encourage policy-makers to enhance "corporatism" on an
123 L.H. Tang & J.Y. Wang 'Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China's Listed
State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy' (2007) 7 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 143, 155
124 V. Nee, S. Opper and S. Wong 'Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China' (2007)
3:1 Management and Organization Review 27; see also E.C. Chang & S.M.L. Wong, 'Political Control
and Performance in China's listed Firms',
<http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/working_paper_updates/pdf/wp1067b.pdf> accessed 20th July 2011
125 A SASAC's research report available at <http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/index.html>
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ideological level. Unfortunately, in China, many authorities have two identities. They
are both "policy-maker" and "policy-enforcer". A typical example of this type of
authority is the CSRC.126 Corporatism in turn reinforces the role played by
clientelism within the institutional framework. In order to guarantee that all key
positions are assigned to members who are willing to act in the Party's or
government’s interest, positions in State-influenced companies are assigned on the
basis of personal connection rather than achievement.127 Gilson and Milhaupt's recent
research supports this observation. They find that
[in China] "Princelings" (taizi dang)-children of influential party members, whose
nickname derives from their quasi-hereditary privileges. The term is also used
more broadly to refer to those closely connected to the Party establishment
through marriage or collegial relationships. The Princelings operate outside of
established hierarchies, wielding influence beyond and across the separate
spheres of politics, business and the military. The links between party officials
and business managers are extensive and lucrative. In 2002, Newsweek reported
on an internal Party survey indicating that ninety-eight per cent of senior officials
had relatives in significant business or government positions.128
This observation is supported by empirical evidence as well. Indeed, one survey
targeting 215 mid-rank officials in Nanjing province indicates that 56.9 per cent of
interviewees acknowledged that personal relationships and social networks are the
most important factors in securing their political promotion in the future.129
Consequently, the tie of corporatism and clientelism constitutes "rent-protection
126 See Chapter II, section 2.4.1
127 Braendle and others (n 108) 10
128 R. Gilson & C. Milhaupt, 'Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing
Democracies' (2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 227, 266 and X.L. Ding, 'In formal
Privatization through Internationalization: The Rise of Nomenklatura Capitalism in China's Offshore
Businesses,' (2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science 121
129 M. Tian 'Chuzhang de Zhengzhi Jingjixue' [Political-Economy of China's Mid-rank Officials],
Financial Times (Chinese version) <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001030741?page=2> accessed 20th
July 2011
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path dependence". Social networks are likely to undermine the "rule of law" by
obstructing its development and implementation.130 Bestowing preferential treatment
upon an individual who has a close relationship with persons in power violates the
fundamental values of the rule of law, namely "fairness", "accountability" and
"transparency". In addition, corporatism leads to Party domination of the legal system,
and the subordination of law to administrative policy. In the last resort, the Party is
above law.131 Indeed, there is little point in relying on the courts and legal professions,
when local governments are the only agencies able to compel performance or enforce
an agreement.132
Both corporatism and clientelism are deeply embedded in Chinese cultural and
institutional settings. Privileged interest groups under the current institutional regime
and cultural environment will make efforts to block any significant change towards a
"rule of law" system. Rent-protection path-dependence is therefore unlikely to be
completely overcome in a short period. The existence of clientelism and corporatism
creates difficulties in promoting corporate governance in public companies through
the "rule of law". It also means that China cannot adopt a whole set of Western
institutions and legal rules. Furthermore, company law needs to be equipped with
mechanisms tailored to the specific characteristics of the Chinese context, in order to
respond to the influences of corporatism and clientelism. More importantly, the
question is raised as to whether these conclusions mean that the findings of the above
case studies which declare the formal convergence model has a variety of advantages
are wrong. Indeed, it raises the question of whether these conclusions mean that the
functional convergence is, in fact, a better model for dealing with China's problems
after all.
4.2.2.2. Level Two: Efficiency-driven Path-Dependence
130 R. Peerenboom, 'Social Network, Rule of Law and Economic Growth in China: The Elusive Pursuit
of the Combination of Private and Public Ordering' (2002) 31 Global Economic Review 1
131 W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal System of Asia and Africa (2nd edn,
Cambridge University Press 2006) 592
132 R. Peerenboom (n 130)
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As Roe states, "rules might be path dependent because the identity of the locally
efficient legal rule-the rule efficient for a given country-might depend on the rules and
structures that the country had at earlier times."133 Following this argument, the
essence of "efficiency-driven path-dependence" is about an initial condition of a
system, and how does this initial condition change or influence the development of
the whole system. This part will therefore begin by determining the starting point of
the evolution of the Chinese company law system. It will then go on to analyse how
"efficiency-driven path-dependence" influences the evolution of company law reform
in China.
4.2.2.2.1. The Starting Point of China's Legal Reform of Corporate
Governance
When the first company code in Chinese history was adopted in the early 20th
Century, Chinese intellectuals believed that the corporate system was a dynamic
power for the rise of the Western economy. For example, the following comments
were made:
Industry and commerce [in China] cannot progress if a corporate system is not
developed. Then China will never become rich and strong. The corporation is one
of the decisive factors that enable British merchants to dominate the world. As a
result, although other countries including France, Spain, and German have spared
no effort in competition, they are no match.134
However, both ruler and scholar encountered an inevitable problem when they began
to draft the company code; namely, how to develop a company law system in a
modern commercial cultural desert. Weber concludes that "the legal forms and
133 L. Bebchuk & M. Roe (n 98) 155
134 J.M Dou (n 116) 13-14
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societal foundation for capitalist 'enterprise' were absent" in traditional China.135
Fairbank makes a similar point by arguing that "non-development of Chinese law
along lines familiar to the West was plainly related to the non-development of
capitalism and an independent business class in China."136 In respect of the company
law, Kirby puts it as:
Prior to the Company Law of 1904, very little in written Chinese law addressed
the regulation of private economic activity. Qing China had no commercial code,
nor, really, a civil code. What it did have, in the form of the Great Qing Code,
been primarily a penal code, pre-eminently concerned with the regulation and
punishment of officials.137
In respect of commercial law related elements, the Great Qing code only
included the civil activities, such as marriage and the succession of property, which
were important for the Confucian Family system. Furthermore, there wasn't even a
formal institution for settling commercial disputes.138 This shortage of local
knowledge of commercial litigation can be partly attributed to Confucian moral
standards. Confucius once said: "The Superior Man cares about virtue; the inferior
man cares about material things. The Superior Man seeks discipline; the inferior man
seeks favours."139 Again, on another occasion, Confucius told a student that "the
Superior Man is aware of Rightness, the inferior man is aware of benefit."140 It is
understandable that ancient Chinese officials, who were trained in Confucian
philosophy, were reluctant to be involved in commercial disputes, as pursuing profit
was morally suspect under Confucianism, not to mention the dispute triggered by
135 M. Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (H H. Gerth Trans., Free Press 1951)
85
136 J. Fairbank & M. Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 1992) 185-186
137 W. Kirby, 'China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century
China' (1995) 54 Journal of Asian Study 43, 44
138 D. Faure, 'Zhongguo Ziben Zhuyi De Mengya' [The Emerging Capitalism in Ancient China] (2002)
1 Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu [The Journal of China's Economic History] 62
139 'Analects of Confucius' (English Version) available
<http://www.kzxy.com.cn/Article/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=3138> accessed 20th July 2011
140 ibid
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seeking personal benefit.141 The legal gap, at that time, was filled by private force.
According to Kirby's observations, commercial dispute resolution was usually dealt
with by local notables, based on the detailed regulations of guilds and families as well
as on longstanding custom. However, decisions would normally be based on a
considerable degree of personal comprehension of local practices on the part of the
decision maker.142 The lack of a uniform commercial code and a heavy reliance on
personal understanding and comprehension severely undermined the justice of each
decision. Therefore, a mechanism of commercial dispute settlement based on formal
legislation was not established in China until 1904.
In addition to a shortage of legal institutions, Chinese businessmen had little
knowledge of "capital balance". They rarely had any awareness of "bad debt" and
"depreciation of industry materials". Lack of advanced financial techniques
compounded the difficulty of expanding the scale of private industry.143 All these
observations indicate that, China, as an agricultural country, did not have sufficient
local resources or knowledge through which a modern company law system could
evolve spontaneously. The anxiety of suffering a shortage of local resource was also
reflected by an Imperial Edict issued in 1903, which said:
Commence and the encouragement of industries have ever been from ancient
times to the present a matter of real importance to governments, but according to
old tradition, We have looked upon industries and commerce as a matter of the
last importance…now We appoint Prince Tsai-chen, Yuan Shih-k'ai and Wu
Ting-feng to arrange, first of all, a Code of Commercial Law, which may serve as
a standard.144
141 D. Faure (n 138) 62
142 W. Kirby (n 137) 45; and also S. Mann, Local Merchant and the Chinese Bureaucracy 1750-1950
(Stanford University Press 1987)
143 D. Faure (n 138) 62
144 'Recent Chinese Legislation Relating to Commercial, Railway, and Mining Enterprises with
Regulations for Registration of Trademarks and For the Registration of Companies' 10 (2nd edn,
translated by E.T. William Trans. Mercury Limited 1905)
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Beyond the pre-modern commercial culture, external pressures played an
important role in forcing China to adopt Western law. China's sovereignty since the
1840s was restricted by the system of extraterritoriality. In the Sino-British Treaty of
Commerce of 1902, Great Britain proclaimed her willingness to relinquish her
extraterritorial privileges, "when she is satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the
arrangement for their administration, warrant her doing so."145 Therefore, in order to
abolish the extraterritoriality system, the implementation of a large number of
perceptibly Western rules and standards into the Chinese legal system through legal
transplant became not only inevitable but necessary.
It seems that both internal and external factors required the Qing government to
use the transplant approach in developing its own company law system. In fact, the
earliest Company Code in China, Company Law 1904, copied many articles from
Japan's Commercial code.146 In 1914, Company Law 1904 was replaced by more
detailed legislation, namely the Ordinance Concerning Commercial Law Association
1914. This law mainly copied German law and included some elements from common
law systems.147
Some scholars argue that these two company codes did not have a deep influence
on China's business practices, because the instability of society, weak economic
infrastructure and foreign economic monopolies slowed down the growth of
commercial law culture in China. Additionally, the development path was also
hindered by the cultural gap between the traditional Chinese culture, which
emphasises the family economy based on clan relationships, and Western company
law culture, which emphasises the effective allocation of public capital and
cooperation disregarding business partners' identity.148 Indeed, famous political
145 W. Kirby (n 137) 44
146 J. Farrar, 'Developing Corporate Governance in Greater China' (2002) 25 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 466
147 Xin Shang Fa [New Commercial Law] (Min You She1914) [Min You Press 1914]
148 Y.W. Wei, 'A Chinese Perspective on Corporate Governance' (1998) 11 Bond Law Review 363,
366-367
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reformer, Liang Qichao, says that, "the commercial code is merely a copy of the
Western law. The legislators do not understand the spirit of law and the commercial
practice. The law is inapplicable."149
Even in such conditions, the adoption of company laws still bought some
changes to commercial practice in China. By 1910, there were 197 limited liability
companies and 68 joint venture companies in China. The 1914 Company Law
introduced the concept of "legal person" into China's legal regime.150 This concept
was embraced by the local businessmen. As a commentator says in 1922,
"recognizing a company's legal personality enhances its foundation…promotes its
business credit and facilitates its expansion".151 Another comment made in the same
period says, "legal personality makes distinction between the companies' properties
and the shareholders' personal properties. It reduces disputes between shareholders
and creditors."152 With the practice of the company laws, Chinese legislators began to
appreciate that company law should meet the demand of the local context. A corporate
law book published in 1934 states that "law should be based upon local business
reality, it is not necessary to form an identical law with that of the European
countries."153 In this period, even Western commentators took a fairly positive view
of China's legal reform. Kirby argued that this period was the "Golden Age" of
company law in China.154 Pound, a distinguished American legal scholar and
educator, made the following comment on China's commercial legislation:
The Chinese Civil Code was chiefly influenced by the Swiss, which thus far is the
high-water mark of Continental codification. But the Chinese Civil Code made
149 Q.C. Liang 'Jinggao Guozhong Zhitan Shiyezhe' [Some Suggestions for the Domestic
Entrepreneur], in Yin Bin Shi Heji [A Selection of Work of Yin Bin Study] (volume 21)
150 Z.L. Lu, 'Ren Xianbing, Qingmo Gongsilv he Beiyang Zhengfu Shiqi Gongsi Tiaoli de Bijiao
Yanjiu' [The Company Law in Qing Dynasty and Northen Warlords Government] Yi Bin Xueyuan
Yuanbao [Journal of Yi Bin University] 27
151 Shi Bao [Daily News] 30th December 1913
152 H.T. Bi 'Guanyu Woguo Gongsi Shang Jige Wenti de Shangque' [Some Comments on China's
Company Law] (1932) Falv Pinglun [Law Review] 455
153 X.T. Fei, 'Gongsifa Yaoyi' [The Essence of Company Law] (Shanghai Faxue Jv 1934) [Shanghai
Law Press 1934]
154 W. Kirby (n137) 48
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some notable improvements, especially in incorporating commercial law, doing
away with an artificial historical separation in Continental law, and some
borrowing from Anglo-American law… the Chinese codes will rank easily with
best examples of modern legislation.155
Nonetheless, the socialist government did not protect and further develop this
emerging modern commercial law culture. Instead, it destroyed this valuable
experience during the planned economy period (1949 to 1978). Throughout this
period, there was nearly no room for the development of commercial law culture, as
no market competition was allowed and nearly all business activities were controlled
by State authorities. Additionally, the weak commercial culture developed from 1904
to 1949 was destroyed by political movements. There was a vacuum in the study of
modern company law during these movements. The Cultural Revolution prohibited
any study of the "West" or "Tradition". By 1957 the government began a political
event called the "anti-right wing movement" (fan you yun dong), where people who
studied any western subject were regarded as "right-wing supporters".156 Learning
from "tradition" was prohibited by the Socialist Party as well. In 1974, the Party
released a document which required all Chinese to participate in a campaign of
attacking Confucian philosophy (Pi Lin Pi Kong). In the Party's eyes, Confucius
represented Feudalism and its traditions.157 In addition to banning the study of the
"West" and "Tradition", the Cultural Revolution vitally disrupted the education system.
According to Meng & Gregory's research, within the Cultural Revolution, senior high
school stopped student recruitment for 6 years, whilst universities stopped student
recruitment for an even longer period. Many individuals missed their chance to obtain
155 R. Pound, 'Law and Court in China: Progress in Administration of Justice' (1948) 34 American Bar
Association Journal 273, 274; see also R. Pound 'Progress of the Law in China' (1948) 23 State Bar
Journal 354
156 Q.M. Sun, 'Zhengfeng Fanyou Yundong de Yuanyin Hezai?' [The Reasons for the Anti-right Wing
Movement in China] (2003) 5 Tongji Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Tongji University] 6
157 'Xianqi Pilinpikong de Xin Gaochao' [The Movement of Attacking Confucius and Linbiao] (1974)
3 Guangxi Shifan Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Guangxi Shifan University] 7-9 and M. Goldman, 'China's
Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-1974' (1975) November, China Quality 436
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university degree.158
The evolution of China's company law which started with the Company Law
1904 and Company Law 1914 was abruptly halted by the Cultural Revolution. After
the Revolution, there were some experiments enacting laws to govern State-owned or
foreign-invested enterprises, such as the Industry and Enterprise Law 1988, the
Wholly-Foreign Invested Enterprise Law 1986, the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures Law 1979, and the Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures Law 1988.
However, these laws which were still based on Socialism were merely for the
purposes of transition. After 1992, the government required State-controlled
enterprise to establish a "modern enterprise system" with "clarified property rights,
designed authorities and responsibilities, separate government and enterprise
functions, and established scientific management".159 Against this background, the
evolution of China's company law was recommenced in the 1990s. A respected
Chinese company law scholar, Liu, describes the legislative process of Company Law
1993 by borrowing Mr Deng Xiaoping's famous metaphor of China's economic
reform. He says that drafting the Company Law 1993 was like "crossing a river by
feeling stones" (mo zhe shitou guo he).160 The 1993 Company Law, which was
drafted without the support of a scientific legislative methodology, was surrounded by
uncertainties. For example, the corporate structure established by the 1993 Company
Law adopted a German-style two tier model under which a company, no matter its
scale, must have a board of directors and a supervisory board.161 However, the
arrangements of this two tier structure are fundamentally different from that of
German law. According to Company Law 1993, there is no hierarchical relationship
158 X. Meng, and G. Robert, 'Exploring the Impact of Interrupted Education on Earnings: The
Educational Cost of the Chinese Cultural Revolution' (January 2007), IZA Discussion Paper No. 2548.
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=958710> accessed 20th July 2011
159 See 'Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de
Jueding' [Decision on Socialist Market Economy] issued by 14th Central Government Commission
section 2, (1993) <http://www1.china.com.cn/chinese/archive/131747.htm> accessed 20th July 2011.
See also Chapter II above, at section 2.3.1.
160 J.H. Liu, 'Gongsifa de Xiugai yu Jieshi: Yisifaquan de Shidu Ganyu wei Zhongxin' [Reforming
Company Law: A Centralism of Judiciary Intervention] (2005) 3 Falv Shiyong [Journal of Legal
Application] 5
161 Company Law, (1993) (n 75) Chapter 3,
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between the board of directors and the board of supervisors. Both directors and
supervisors are appointed by shareholders.162 In contrast, under German law,
directors are overlooked by supervisors and may be appointed by them.163 Some
argue that China's corporate structure was transplanted from Japanese law.164 Indeed,
ostensibly, the corporate structure adopted in the 1993 law is very similar to that of
the Japanese law. However, legislators have ignored that Japan's corporate structure
was built around three major elements: life-time employment contracts, cross-holding
networks, and a main-bank system with strong external monitoring powers.165 In
China, these key external elements closely connected with Japan's corporate structure,
were absent. Instead, during the 1990s, nearly all enterprises had controlling
State-shareholders. Empowering general meetings to appoint directors and
supervisors exaggerated the "insider-control" problem.
This example highlights the dilemma faced by legislators. On the one hand, the
shortage of learning from the "West" and "tradition" places Chinese legislators in an
embarrassing position. Most of them are not equipped with the theories of modern
company law, nor even systematic legal training. Despite a superficial understanding
of Western company law, nearly no local commercial knowledge and academic
resource can rely on. Thus theoretical foundation for drafting company law is weak.
On the other hand, the commercial practices that used to be controlled by the State
provided little guidance to legislators as to how the "socialist market economy" would
develop in China. At the time, China's economic reform was also at its starting point.
As the prospects of economic reform were unclear it was difficult to predict the
post-reform economic infrastructural needs to be met by company law.
162 ibid, article 38
163 Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act] (1965) article 84
164 D. Feng, 'Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Moshi De Yanjin' [The Evolution of China's Corporate
Governance Regime] (2003) 43 Beijing Daxue XueBao [Journal of Beijing University] 207; M. Siems,
'Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law' (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 55,
66
165 Miwa, Yoshiro and Ramseyer, J. Mark, 'The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative
Corporate Governance' (September 2001), Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 333,
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=285254 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.285254> accessed 20th July 2011 See also R.
Gilson & C. Milhaupt, 'Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate
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All these difficulties forced legislators to face a same question as their
predecessors in Qing Dynasty, in drafting the first company code. The adoption of the
"socialist market economy" leads legislators to tackle the question of how to establish
a company law system in an environment where commercial activities are stifled and
local legislative resources are absent. Similarly to the 1904 Company Law, the
Company Law 1993 was, to a large extent, a copy of Tai Wan's company law.166 As a
result of the poor theoretical grounding of legislators, some Western rules were
introduced into the Chinese legal system. For example, legislators established a basic
modern corporate structure consisting of a shareholder meeting, a board of directors,
and a board of supervisors, as well as an accountability mechanism for directors and
supervisors.167 Although the Company Law 1993 was significantly revised, the
reforming approach based on legal transplant was subsequently consistently
reinforced in the Company Law 2005. A large number of Western rules including
institution of independent director, directors' duties of loyalty, derivative actions,
shareholder's appraisal rights, and cumulative voting, etc. were introduced into
Chinese legal system.168 There are two major reasons for continuing this approach of
legal transplant.
Firstly, the purpose of the company law regime is to encourage economic
development. Like the Qing government, the socialist government had a strong desire
to boost the domestic economy using a good company law regime. As R. Peerenboom
argues, "the legal system also performs an enabling function by creating the basic
infrastructure for transactions, including markets, security exchanges, mortgage
systems, accounting practices, and so on"169 After China entered the WTO, as with
166 M. Siems (n 164) 66
167 Company Law (1993) (n 75), article 38, 103 & 214, 215
168 B.S. Wang & H. Huang (n 87) 229-249; J.V. Feinerman, 'New Hope for Corporate Governance in
China?' (2007) 191 The China Quarterly, 590, 600; and K.B. Pissler and J.H. Liu, 'Corporate
Governance of Business Organizations in the People's Republic of China: The Legal Framework After
the Revision of the Company Law in 2005' (October 22, 2010), SSRN Working Paper Series
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695888> accessed 20th July 2011
169 R. Peerenboom (n 104) 36
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many other jurisdictions, China's policy-makers had to provide an efficient company
law regime, which not only promoted the competitiveness of domestic companies in
the global product market, but also attracted foreign investment. The Western rules,
especially the Anglo-American corporate law rules, sent a strong signal to Chinese
policy-makers that the adoption of these rules makes Chinese companies achieve a
same degree of success as Western companies.170 The pressure from competition in
the international market led Chinese legislators to adopt a legal instrumentalism in
reforming company law.
This assumption of good law resulting in rapid economic development leads to
another phenomenon by which the adoption of some rules in legal reform are driven
by the desire to perfect legal theories of positive law rather than create a legal regime
that fits its socio-cultural context. For example, Tang in his article says that, "the new
laws [China's Security Law 2005 and Company Law 2005] have been widely
applauded in China. The revision will raise China's score in the shareholder protection
index developed by La Porta and colleague in their 'Law and Finance' article."171 This
drive for legal perfection is explained by Watson's argument, which claims that
"general law reform should primarily be approached not from the angle of what
people in society want in particular situations, but from the angle of improving the
quality of the Source of Law".172 It is undeniable that legislators engaged in Chinese
legal reform sought to equip Chinese law with more sophisticated Western legal rules,
which temporarily failed to fit the socio-cultural context, though they may have
significant potential to promote economic development in the long run.
Secondly, the influence of interest groups also acts as "convergence force" which
exerts a decisive influence on China's company law reform. Some Chinese lawyers
argue that the recent development of China's company law regime can be attributed to
170 C. Xi (n 31) 37
171 X. Tang (n 91)
172 A. Watson, 'Society's Choice and Legal Change' (1980-1981) 9 Hofstra Law Review 1473, 1481
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the lobbying efforts of institutional and individual shareholders.173 The Chinese
media have significantly more autonomy in reporting on financial misconduct than
they do on reporting on most other areas of Chinese law and society.174 According
Kang & Shi,
Finance, sports, entertainment, and technology have been key areas where the
Chinese press has made significant but gradual progress in their freedom of
reporting and commenting Chinese newspapers and magazines have also played
an active role in exposing corporate fraud and pushing corporate governance
legislation.175
The voice of shareholding minorities, as articulated through the media, exerts
significant influence on policy-makers. It is often argued that the Chinese government
might have little incentive to protect the minority rights, as this might expose the
State-ownership to extensive risks. However, following the ideology of a harmonious
society, Hu Jintao & Wen Jiabao's government pay particular attention to the lobbying
efforts by institutional and minority shareholders.176 This ideological change could be
explained by an official statistic which indicates that, by 2007 nearly 100 million
individual stock accounts had been opened in China. In Beijing and Shanghai, the
quantity of individual stock accounts exceeded four million, which was nearly equal
to the total number of families in these two large cities.177 In such circumstances, a
weak company law system might enable powerful insiders to make themselves better
off at the expense of a vast number of middle-class family interests. This unfair
distribution of social welfare will intensify the contradictions between different social
173 J.Y. Wang 'Rule of Law and Rule of Officials: Shareholder Litigation and Anti-dumping Investment
in China' The Foundation for Law Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies, University of Oxford <http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Jiangyu%231%23.pdf>
accessed 20th July 2011
174 ibid 38
175 See also Y. Kang, L. Shi, E.D. Brown, 'Chinese Corporate Governance: History and Institutional
Framework', Centre of Corporate Ethnics and Governance Report (Rand Corporation 2008)1, 32
176 C. Hawes 'Interpreting the PRC Company Law Through the Lens of Chinese Political and
Corporate Culture' (2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 813
177 D.K. Bao 'Yi Yi Gu Min' [One Hundred Million Individual Shareholders] Caijing Shi Bao [China
Business Post] 19thMarch 2007
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classes and may even threaten the government's legitimate position.178 Making the
company law system achieve some important international standards sends a strong
signal to individual shareholders that the law offers them adequate protection.
Consequently, due to a shortage of local knowledge at the starting point of
company law development as well as pressures from globalization and individual
shareholder lobbies, the legal transplant approach is a reasonable and pragmatic
choice for policy-makers wishing to develop Chinese company law. Some scholars
show that the formal convergence model causes conflicts between transplanted rules
and the socio-economic context. However, this analysis allows us to understand that
there is no firm evidence to establish that an effective alternative, capable of replacing
the transplant approach existed at the time when the evolution of the company law
started during in Qing Dynasty. Some scholars believe that a functional convergence
approach based on Confucian morality would be a capable alternative to the formal
convergence model. Nevertheless, Confucian morality cannot be shown to enhance
the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in the global market. Equally, Confucian
morality cannot be evidenced as being capable of translation into a set of workable
rules, which offer substantial protections for minority shareholders. Additionally, even
in the unlikely event that it was possible to prove that a functional convergence model
based on Confucian morality is a better choice, this model would still not be an
efficient means of abolishing the formal convergence model. The following parts will
explain the reasons for this argument.
4.2.2.2.2. The Key Components of Efficiency-driven Path Dependence
4.2.2.2.2.1 Sunk Adaptive Cost
"Sunk adaptive cost" indicates the phenomenon whereby once costs are sunk into
an existing system without the existence of any better alternatives, maintaining this
178 On a similar point see C. Xi (n 31) 31
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system is efficient.179 As mentioned above, a large number of rules from civil law and
Anglo-American systems have been introduced into China's company law regime. In
order to illustrate the considerable quantity of the transplanted rules and institutions,
this part uses anti-director and anti-block-holder indexes to test China's legal reform
of corporate governance. Anti-director and anti-block-holder indexes are sets of
standards, which have been developed by a group of law and finance scholars. These
indexes are usually used to evaluate the quality of a shareholder protection regime
within a given jurisdiction.
Shareholder Protection Regime (China)
I. Shareholder protection against executives Legal Resources





(a) Shareholder can email their vote to the
company
Yes181
(b) Shareholders are not required to deposit prior to
the AGM
(c) Cumulative voting or proportional
representation of minorities in the board of directors is
allowed
Yes182 Yes183
(d) An oppressed minorities mechanism is in place Yes184
(e) The minimum percentage of capital that is
necessary for a shareholder to call an extraordinary
general meeting is equal to or less than 10%
Yes185
(f) Shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can
179 C.W. Huang (n 102) 370
180 R La Porta and others, 'Law and Finance' (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 10
181 Corporate Governance Guideline 2002 art. 8
182 Company Law art.106 (2005)
183 Corporate Governance Guideline 2002, art. 31
184 Company Law art.152 (2005)
185 Company Law art.102 (2005)
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only be waived by shareholder votes
B. Additional protection
(a) Securities litigation against executive
misrepresentation
Yes186
(b) Executive duties of loyalty Yes187
(c) Derivative Action by Shareholders Yes188
II. Minority protection against blockholders 189
A. Anti-block index
(a) Shareholder may take judicial recourse against
decision taken at a shareholder meeting (SHM)
Yes190
(b) At least 50% of total voting shares must be
represented at a SHM for it to take a binding decision
Yes191
(c) Mandatory takeover bid Yes192




(a) Compulsory independent board members Yes194 Yes195
(b) Class shareholder voting scheme by which
minorities are enable to have a voice in corporate
decision-making
Yes196
186 Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian
Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [The Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Accepting Civil Tort Dispute
Cases Caused by False Statement on Securities] and Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Shujia
Chengshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian De Rougan Guiding [Several Provisions on Hearing Civil
Compensation Caused by False Statement on the Securities Market Provisions] issued by Chinese
Supreme Court on 1st September 2003
187 Company Law (2005) art.148
188 Company Law (2005) art.152
189 K. Pistor, M. Raiser & S. Gelfer, 'Law and Finance in Transition Economy' (2000) 8 (2) Economics
of Transition 325, 360. This table does not contain the variables of the anti-block index which overlap
with the LLSV' index.
190 Company Law (2005) art.22
191 Company Law (2005) art.104
192 Securities Law of the Peoples Republic of China, art.88 (2005)
193 Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [CSRC's Takeover Provisions], art.13
194 Company Law Company Law (2005) art.123
195 Corporate Governance Guidelines (2002), Chapter 5:Independent Directors
196 Minority Shareholder Protection Provisions 2004
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(c) Limitations on block-holder's controlling
powers (e.g. majority shareholder's fiduciary duties) Yes197
(d) Proxy Voting Scheme Yes198
As the above table shows, the current legal regime includes nearly all the
international standards for shareholder protection. It can be argued that some of these
transplanted rules may not work well in China and may even cause some problems.
However, it would be inefficient to abolish these rules at a time when they are
developing into an integrated system, given the significant investments made in
creating this system. All companies aligned their business forms and management
structures with this legal framework. Both market participants and legal end-users
have invested time and effort into learning, and adapting to, this system. Consequently,
the cost of change could outweigh any advantages accruing from such change. The
rational solution, therefore appears to be, as Roe's phrases it, to "resurface" rather than
"revolutionize" the existing system.199
4.2.2. 2.2.2 Learning Effect
"Learning effect" refers to the phenomenon whereby the more one model is used,
the more its efficiency can be improved vis-à-vis other alternatives.200 As noted, the
legal end-users have already made great efforts in learning the Western legal theories
(not only the company law theories) so as to solve the Chinese problems.201 The
"learning effect" is not limited to the legal end-users, who use the law in their daily
work, but extendable to the people who work under the regulation of the laws. If the
laws change fundamentally, the market participants are not only forced to re-invest
their efforts to learn the new law, but also compelled to change the existing business
197 Corporate Governance Guidelines (2002), art. 19
198 Articles of Association Guidelines 2006, art. 61; and Corporate Governance Guidelines 2002, art. 1
199 M. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics' (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 650
200 T. Boas (n 93) 37
201 B. Liebman & T. Wu (n 81) 291 and above at section 4.1.4.1, 102-104
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customs. All these activities increase the costs of judicial and business practice.
4.2.2.2.2.3 Network Effect
The "network effect" in economics indicates that the demand for a technology
and its value to each current user increases with each additional unit sold.202 The
network externality effect also exists in the East Asian jurisdictions of company law
reform. All the major East Asian jurisdictions, except North Korea, have westernised
their company law regime. Japan's commercial code has transplanted many important
elements of U.S company law.203 South Korea has also introduced some crucial
institutions from Anglo-American legal systems into its company law regime.204
Hong Kong's company law, needless to say, inherits many key doctrines and traditions
from UK company law.205 The movement toward Western law in East Asian
jurisdictions encourages Chinese legislators to adopt a similar approach in reforming
China's company law. For example, the 1994 company law is nearly a copy of the
Taiwan Company Law. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Chinese corporate governance
structure can be regarded as a transplant from Japan. Firstly, adopting a similar rule of
law can reduce the transaction cost of international business between Chinese
companies and companies from neighbouring States. Secondly, the experiences of the
legal practice of company law in other East Asian jurisdictions, especially Hong Kong,
are valuable resources for China in improving its own company law regime.206
4.2.2. 2.2.4 Complementary Effect
202 T. Boas (n 93) 37
203 Miwa, Yoshiro and Ramseyer (n 164) see R. Gilson & C. Milhaupt, 'Choice as Regulatory Reform:
The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance' (2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 343
204 Jay Choi, Sae WoonPark, and Sean Sehyun Hoo, 'The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea' (2007) 42 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 941;
and see B. Black and others, 'Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing
International Competition' (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 537
205 J. Farrar, (n 146) 474
206 For the influence of East Asian Jurisdictions on China’s legal reform of corporate governance, see
above section 4.2.2.2.1 at page 129, the example of Japan, and also see page 130, the example of
Taiwan.
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"Complementarities" refer to the fact that costs that are sunk into professional
institutions, which are developed to facilitate the operation of the current system and
to maintain and continue them are often efficient.207 The above case study provides
an example of an emerging complementary system.208 Under the current company
law regime, a complementary system is becoming increasingly obvious. For example,
with the introduction of director’s duties of loyalty, derivative actions are necessarily
introduced into China's legal system, as a complementary mechanism for enforcing
the doctrine of the duty of loyalty. Similarly, sub-committees under the board of
directors are necessarily implemented in order to facilitate the institution of an
independent director. This makes directors have a better understanding of their
responsibilities. The function of a single transplanted rule therefore is enhanced by
this complementary system.
Overall, the evolution of company law seems to be locked into efficiency-driven
path-dependence. Even if the functional convergence model can be shown to be more
beneficial than the formal convergence model, it is still inefficient to replace the
formal convergence model where it is not possible to prove that the benefits of the
functional convergence model outweigh the costs of replacing the formal convergence
model.
4.2.3. Beyond Path-dependence: Convergence through Congruence
This part goes beyond the singularity of path-dependence. Indeed, law does not
merely react, but shapes economic and cultural contexts. One of the leading examples
of the "law matters" thesis is La Porta et al's empirical research on the relationship
between shareholder protection and the development of financial markets across
jurisdictions. La Porta et al argue that strong investor protection fosters valuable and
broad financial markets, dispersed ownership of shares and efficient allocation of
207 C.W. Huang (n 103) 370
208 See above at section 4.1.4.2.
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capital across firms, since good protection motivates people to invest their money into
stock markets.209 In addition, Gilson's research also supports the "law matters" thesis.
Gilson points out that in 1999 the German government eliminated capital gain tax on
the sale of stock in German corporations by other German corporations, with the
explicit goal of eliminating barriers to dissipate concentrated cross-holding.210 Under
the "law matters" thesis, a well-functioned legal regime can accelerate the
transformation of the economy.
In China, the law does influence the cultural and economic context. Firstly,
contractual convergence plays an important role to make some parts of the Chinese
economic and cultural context congruent to that of the Western Jurisdictions. Coffee,
in his article, once declares that "large firms can choose the stock exchange or
exchanges on which they are listed, and in so doing can opt into governance systems,
disclosure standards, and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than those
required or prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation." 211 Much evidence
shows that Chinese public companies are increasingly convergent with their
counterparts in developed jurisdictions through international listing. For example,
foreign companies listed in the UK are responsible for complying with the Combined
Code and those listed in the US have to reach the standards set out by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since the early 1990s, there have been an increasing number of
the Chinese companies to raise capital on overseas stock markets. A survey indicates
that 82 Chinese companies were listed on overseas stock exchanges in 2004. By the
end of 2006, this figure increased to 99. By the first half of 2009, 156 Chinese
companies were successfully listed on world leading stock exchanges, including the
New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange, the Hong Kong
209 R La Porta and others, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of
Financial Economies 1
210 R. Gilson (n 87) 342
211 J. Coffee, 'The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications' (1999) 93 Northwest University Law Review 651-652
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Stock exchanges and the Singapore Stock Exchange.212 The Chinese public
companies, in seeking to list on the foreign stock exchanges, had achieved a
substantial level of similarity with their overseas competitors, at least on a structural
level. Being foreign listed expands the participation of Chinese public companies in
the global economy and substantially enhances their information disclosure and
accounting practices.
The impact of contractual convergence is not limited to the foreign listing
companies, but it is extendable to the domestic companies. Accession to the WTO
presents the toughest test that China's weak legal system has yet had to face. As part
of the conditions for WTO membership, China has promised to live up to
international standards of transparency, accountability and fairness. In response to this
challenge, enhancing the flexibility of company’s Article of Association, as an
important step toward contractual convergence, is increasingly recognised by China’s
Company Law. In 2005 Company Law, 31 articles explicit that certain legal
requirements can be opted in or opted out by Article of Association or shareholder
agreement. In contrast, the Company Law 1994 only has 15 articles, which enable the
company to make their own arrangement by Article of Association. Under such
legislative regime, individual market players can achieve contractual convergence
with international standards by arranging its Article of Association. Furthermore,
CSRC’s listing rules and guidance also requires the public companies to adopt some
core international standards of corporate governance. Guideline of Article of
Association for Listing Company is an important device to achieve this purpose. This
regulation includes 12 chapters and 198 articles. Its requirements arrange from
companies’ shareholder meeting to companies’ financial and accounting system. The
provision on independent director213 and cumulative voting214 can be regarded as
important evidence of contractual convergence.
212 Zhongguo Haiwai Shangshi Gongsi Minglu [List of China's Over-sea Listed Companies]
<http://www.globalipo.cn/shangshigongsiml.asp> accessed 20th July 2011
213 See article 104 of the Guideline
214 See article 82 of the Guideline
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In addition to the revision of company law and CSRC’s guideline, the process of
contractual convergence is also accelerated by foreign investors those are invited to
invest in Chinese public companies. In 2006, CSRC, People’s Bank of China and
State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly issued a document, namely
Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment within the Borders of China
by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors.215 According to the regulation, foreign
fund-management company, insurance company, securities company and commercial
bank, which achieve certain policy requirements (mainly on company’s investment
ability, its fund-management and investment experience)216 can invest in Chinese
public companies. By September 2009, 87 foreign institutional investors, including
UBS, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, were licensed to invest on the Chinese
stock markets. There is little doubt that these top quality international investors can
promote the compliance of key international standards in China’s domestic listing
companies. Some studies also indicate that accounting standards and information
disclosure on China's stock markets have been enhanced by the widespread
participation of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). Finally, as Howson
concludes that "China's firm organization and governance has seen a formal
convergence with the Western shareholder-oriented model."
In addition to the changes closely related to corporate governance issues, the
broader legal and economic infrastructure has also experienced a significant
movement toward the Western style market economy. The recent adoption of the
Property Law in China lays down a foundation for the market economy by taking a
substantial step towards the protection of private property rights. As some
commentators indicate, this law for the first time in Chinese history grants equal
protection to both public and private property, breaking up the orthodox ideology in
215 Hege Jingwai Jigou Touzizhe Jingnei Zhengquan Touzi Guanli Banfa [Measures for the
Administration of Securities Investment within the Borders of China by Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors] issued by People’s Bank of China and State Administration of Foreign Exchange on 26th
August 2006
216 ibid article 6
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favour of public ownership against private ownership and individual liberty.
Additionally, the banking sector has also experienced a fundamental reform. Through
selectively implementing a series of international standards and best practice, the
major State-controlled commercial banks are now equipped with internal regulatory
systems appropriate to independent commercial entities.
Mapping out all these changes, it is not intended to prove that the Chinese legal
and economic infrastructure is well suited to the adoption of Western legal rules and
institutions. It is true that most overseas listed companies retain their Chinese
characteristics. Similarly, the contractual convergence which is mediated by the 2005
Company Law and CSRC’s regulations may not control the Chinese corporate
governance problem well. It is equal true that a number of difficulties limit the QFIIs'
role in the corporate governance of China's public companies. Additionally,
legal-economic infrastructural reform is also suffering from various problems in
China. However, all these legal-economic movements toward a Western style of
corporate governance or market economy at the very least motivate or force Chinese
public companies to establish a modern corporate governance system. A clear
example lies in the fact that the roles of shareholders, stakeholders, directors and
employees in Chinese public companies, are all instantly recognizable to anyone who
is familiar with a Western model of corporate governance. Evidence of changes the
cultural context is also more difficult to gather. However, it at least shows that
transplanted rules and institutions are capable to conveying a sound commercial
culture to China's context. Consequently, there is a possibility to graduate change the
cultural context by implementing appropriate legal rules and institutions. With the
multi-level reforms in economic and legal sectors, the economic-cultural context
surrounding the legal reform of corporate governance will share more and more
commonalities with that of Western jurisdictions. As a result, legal rules and
institutions which harmonise local features with Western experience are fit for
application in the Chinese context.
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In addition to promoting economic reform, the transplanted legal rule or
institution gradually changes China's commercial culture. Taking the independent
director requirement as an example, many argue that traditional Chinese culture is
dominated by collectivism. Therefore, independent directors are reluctant to act
independently. However, some recent cases have shown that independent directors in
China have begun to challenge block holder misconduct. The most recent reported
cases are those of Jiarui New Materials Co. (Jiarui) case and Yahua Holding Co.
(Yanhua). Jiarui was a listed company domiciled in Hunan Province, the central area
of mainland China. In 2005 Jiarui granted a guarantee against its block holder’s bank
loan, which was nearly six times larger than Jiarui's total net assets. This activity
explicitly violated CSRC regulations as well as Company Law 2005. The company's
three independent directors suggested that the board cancel the guarantee and enhance
the risk management regime of the company. Additionally, in order to reduce the
ultimate control of the block-holder, they vetoed the appointment of a director
nominated by the block-holder. Yahua is also a listed company located in Hunan
province. In 2007, Yahua was involved in a take-over transaction. The buyer who
prepared to purchase Yahua's shares required the block-holder to appoint two
consultants of its related companies as Yanhua's directors before the takeover was
closed. This violated the CSRC's takeover provisions. One of the company's
independent directors cast his vote against this appointment and disclosed the
information by public notice. Prior to both these two cases, in 2004 there was a
series of cases in which independent directors had made their voices heard to
challenge block-holders and the insiders using their controlling position. As we can
see, the implementation of the independent director institution reduces the influence
of collectivism, whilst fostering a culture of "independence".
4.2.4. Concluding Remarks
Firstly, the two levels of path-dependence determine which approach, formal
convergence or functional convergence, is more suitable for China's company law
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reform. In response to "rent-protection path-dependence", a company law regime in
the Chinese context should be equipped with some characteristics, which make it
effective and efficient in protecting shareholder interests in a clan and
friend-relationship based commercial environment and corporatism based economic
and financial policy environment. In this regard, Western law may not provide much
guidance. This observation leads us back to the "context theory" by which law should
be suitable to the local socio-cultural context and existing legal-economic
infrastructure.
Nonetheless, the research on "efficiency-driven path-dependence" illustrates that
China's case is more than complicated. In order to maximise the "learning effect",
"network effect" and "complementary effect" of the existing system, it would be
inefficient to abolish the current reform approach which is based on legal transplant.
The evolution of Chinese company law is extremely sensitive to its starting point, an
serendipitous decision on legal transplant that underwent little scientific analyse
before being adopted in the original position makes for very heavy influence over the
development of today's company law regime in China. As a result, a considerable gap
between the existing legal regime and the local socio-cultural context exists.
Furthermore, for several reasons, the legal regime is locked into a model, which
conflicts with some intrinsic characteristics of China's political-cultural context. In
other words, a transplanted legal rule which fits the existing legal regime may not fit
in with the local socio-cultural context.
Secondly, the previous investigation explains the second and third questions
posed in Chapter I.217 "Lock-in effect" and lack of modern commercial culture gives
Chinese legislators few technical options when drafting company law. Legal
217 See above at section 1.2.3: (2) If Western transplanted rules do not work well in the Chinese context,
why do Chinese legislators persistently introduce legal rules or institutions from Western jurisdictions
into China's legal system? Is the decision irrational? (3) In Western jurisdictions, lawyers and judges
generally treasure their domestic legal traditions. Why then do Chinese commercial lawyers and judges,
tend to take significant amounts of experience from Western jurisdictions, whilst deliberately keeping a
distance from China's own cultural and legal traditions?
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transplant seems to be the only pragmatic approach. In addition, perfecting the
company law regime is not, to a large extent, aimed at meeting the demands of the
socio-cultural context, but to making theoretically perfect law that acts as a dynamic
force to drive economic development. Indeed, regarding law to be a dynamic force
that leads economic development is a long-standing view held in Chinese governance
culture. It is reflected by Deng Xiaoping's famous "two hand theory", in which, on the
one hand, the economy must be developed, and on the other hand, the legal system
must be strengthened to maintain an environment for such development.218
The reason that legal elites intentionally divorce the current legal regime from
traditional legal culture is partly because of the lack of a domestic commercial law
culture and partly because of anxiety over the fierce competition of the global market.
Firstly, historical study of the development of company law in China shows that a
commercial culture was stifled in ancient China. Both government officers and the
market participants have little knowledge of modern commercial practices. Given
China's pre-modern commercial law culture, it is difficult to foster a strong and
effective company law system, which can well support the development of a market
economy. As a result, local customary law and practice are usually dismissed in
China's legal reform as being "backwards" or "old and bad habits", impeding
economic and legal development than enhancing them.219
Secondly, when China was forced to open her doors to the Western world in
Qing dynasty, Chinese scholars were faced with the issue of how to enable Chinese
enterprises to have strong competitiveness amongst global competition. As Li
demonstrates,
It would be a tool for promoting China's industrial development. Modern
218 X.P. Deng, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selection of Works by Deng Xiaoping] volume 3 (People's
Publisher 1989) 107
219 J. Cheng, 'The Transformation of Chinese Law: From Formal to Substantial' (2007) 37 Hong Kong
Law Journal 689, 737
147
industrial capitalism, it was believed, demanded Western, corporate structures to
do business. Only by changing the legal and economic foundations of business
relationships could Chinese entrepreneurs hope to compete with their Western
and Japanese counterparts. A central goal, therefore, was to promote the creation
of Chinese companies to compete with the foreigners who were producing and
marketing their goods on Chinese soil.220
For the next 100 years after the Qing dynasty launched China's first company law
code, although a series of legal revisions reflected different ideologies imposed by
different governments, two beliefs rarely changed throughout China's modern history.
Firstly, the belief that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between Western-style
company law and a strong national economy. This is a belief on which laws have been
drafted. The second belief is that modern company law is a major device in promoting
the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in the global market. These two beliefs,
derived from anxiety about modernization, drive Chinese legislators to adopt a
utilitarian approach towards company law reform.
This economic oriented view adopted by Chinese legislators towards company
law is not without theoretical support. There is a dichotomy between "instrument law"
and "culture-based law".221 Under this dichotomy, the law in the instrumental
extreme is relatively culture-neutral, compared with the culture-based law. Cotterrell
further develops this classification. According to his theory, there are four pure types
of "community"; namely, instrumental community, traditional community, community
of believe, and affective community. Company law, as a major component of
commercial law, belongs to the category of instrumental community and is relatively
culturally neutral in nature, especially when it is compared with family law or
constitution. This is because the law in this category is tied to "economic interests
220 C. Li, 'Gongsi Lv 1904 Yu Zhongguo Gongsifa De Xiandaihua' [The Company Law 1904 and
Modernization of China's Company Law] 1974 (10) Zhongda Faxue Pinglun [Zhongshan University
Law Review] 174; and W. Kirby (n 136) 43
221 R. Cotterrell, ‘Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?’ In D. Nelken and J. Feest (eds.), Adapting
Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 80
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rather than national customs or sentiments."222
Thirdly, the striking tension between transplanted law and local context is not
still. The correlation and interaction between China's reform of its company law
regime and the development of economic infrastructure from a historical perspective
illustrate that the law can modify the economic context in certain conditions. As a
result of the influence of foreign laws and transplanted laws on the domestic
jurisdiction, some important economic components in China have gradually become
congruent to those of developed jurisdictions.
To conclude, some may argue that the "rent-protection path-dependence" resists
the "rule of law" system. The inherent characteristics of China's political and cultural
context determine that company law reform should rely on Chinese local knowledge.
However, we should note these unique Chinese characteristics now rest on a
wide-range of commonalities between China's legal-economic infrastructure and that
of the West. Consequently, China's approach to company law reform should be
capable of achieving a balance between local resources and Western experience. This
finding also suggests that the conclusion of the case studies is not a coincidence.
Although a formal convergence model causes many problems from the perspective of
rent-seeking path dependence, compared with the functional convergence model, it is
still a more pragmatic and feasible approach in a transitional jurisdiction, which does
not possess a vigorous domestic commercial law culture and has been locked into the
model of legal transplant.
4.3. Conclusion
This chapter sketches out the methodological issues involved in China's legal
reform of corporate governance by answering questions about whether the formal
convergence model has competing advantages when it is compared with the
222 ibid 82
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functional convergence model, and what those advantages are (if any). Following
these enquiries, this chapter has undertaken a comparative study of the formal
convergence model and functional convergence model using case studies. The results
of these case studies indicate that the formal convergence model, at least, has three
competing advantages: (1) it is supported by Western experience; (2) it has a
complementary effect; and (3) it is time-saving. In the final part this chapter
formulated the rationales behind the findings of the case studies by analysing what
determines the formal convergence model's role in China's legal reform of corporate
governance. It puts the evolution of Chinese company law into a theoretical
framework of path-dependence. The two levels of path-dependence and Westernised
economic components are the key determinants in favour of the formal convergence
model. Finally, by reviewing the findings of this chapter, it solves the two interesting
puzzles presented in Chapter I and provides some theoretical insights regarding the
scholarship on China's corporate governance. In the following chapter, this paper will
focus on how to re-formulate the existing agency-cost controlling devices following
the formal convergence model in practice.
150
Chapter V. Modelling an Efficient Company Law Regime for
Controlling Agency Cost: A Comparative Study between China
and the UK
5.1. Introduction
Former chapters have located the major problems of China's corporate
governance regime and their legal implications. Furthermore, they have engaged in
some theoretical analysis on several important topics. These included (1) the
importance of the company law regime in China's legal reform of corporate
governance; (2) the advantages of utilizing the formal convergence model in
reforming China's company law; and (3) the determinants of the advantages or
priorities of the formal convergence model. This chapter attempts to make a more
practical contribution to this paper. On the basis of the theoretical conclusions
achieved in former chapters, it deals with the most troublesome problem of China's
company law system; namely, the fact that it is "rich in principles but lacks details."1
It focuses on several key legal provisions, which are assigned to regulate agency
problems. By comparing these provisions with similar legal principles in the UK, it
identifies what needs to be improved for the sake of improving the effectiveness of
these provisions. Furthermore, on the basis of comparative study, it provides some
detailed suggestions on how to transform these important legal provisions into a more
efficient model.
5.2. Director's Fiduciary Duties
1 Y.W. Wei, 'Director's Duties under Chinese Law: A Comparative Review' [2006:3] University of New
England Law Journal 31, 55
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5.2.1. General Background2
In accordance with the Companies Act 2006 (hereinafter 2006 Act), "directors"
include any person occupying the position of director, regardless of title.3 Article 3 of
the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 says that directors are the
managers of the business of a company. In addition, the 2006 Act has little to say on
the appointment of directors, leaving this matter to a company's Articles of
Association.4 This legislation requires a public company to appoint at least two
directors.5 Additionally, there is a minimum age requirement for directors6. The Act
allows legal persons to be directors of the companies, though at least one natural
person must also act as a director of a company.7 It is widely accepted that the
intentions of the company can be derived from the intention of its officers and agents.8
In Bolton Engineering v Graham9, Lord Denning LJ held that:
Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will.
Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of
the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.10
As it represents the state of mind of the company, a wide range of managing powers
are bestowed upon the board through a company's Articles of Association. Notably,
2 For general empirical comparative research on the board of directors between China and the UK, see
J.Z. Yang, 'The Anatomy of Boards of Directors: An Empirical Comparison of UK and Chinese
Corporate Governance Practices' (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 24
3 Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), s.250
4 L. Sealy & S. Worthington, Case and Materials in Companies Law (9th edn, Oxford University Press
2010) 264 On a similar point, see P. Davies, Gower and Davies's Principles of Modern Company Law
(8 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 307 article 17 of the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008
(SI 2008/3229) directs that a director may be appointed by an ordinary resolution of the members or by
co-option by directors.
5 CA 2006 s.154
6 ibid s.157
7 ibid s.155
8 B. Pettet, Company Law (2nd edn, Person Education Limited 2005) 147
9 [1957] 1 Q.B. 159
10 ibid 173
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authority to exercise the company's powers is delegated, not to individual directors,
but only to the directors as a board. The board may sub-delegate that power to
individual directors and other officers.11
Generally, the board has the following powers:
� to change the company's capital structure, management, and internal control
structure;
� to approve annual reports and accounts;
� to approve contracts entered into by the company which are not in the
ordinary course of business;
� to appoint or remove the company secretary and external auditors; and
� to approve nominees to the board following recommendation by the
nomination committee.12
By contrast, the Chinese Company Law 2005 does not provide a definition of
director. Instead, it gives a definition of senior executive. According to the law,
"senior executives" refers to managers, vice managers, persons in charge of the
finance of a company, and the secretary of the board of directors in a listed company,
as well as any other person indicated in the Articles of Association. Additionally,
senior executives bear director's fiduciary duties.13 As in UK law, there are rules
relating to the number of members on a board, which in Chinese public companies is
11 P. Davies (n 4) 307 and see article 5 of the Companies (Model Article) Regulations 2008 (SI
2008/3229)
12 C. Law and P. Wong, 'Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis between the UK and China'
(2006) 16(9) International Company and Commercial Law Review 350, 355
13 Company Law art.148 (2005)
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restricted to 5 to 19 members.14 Additionally, a person shall not be a director where
he is without the capacity of civil conduct or only with limited capacity of civil
conduct.15 Under the current legislation, the chairman of the board, executive director
or manager can be the representative of the company by the authorization of the
Article of Association.16 However, the Chinese law contains no provisions clarifying
that the state of mind of the company is equal to the state of mind of the board as a
whole or that of the general meeting17.
Under Company Law 2005, a director's managing powers include:
� determining the company's operating and investment plan;
� establishing the company's internal management structure; and
� hiring and replacing general managers and deciding issues concerning their
compensation.18
In China's Company Law 1993, some provisions regarding director's duties have
14 ibid art.109 (2005)
15 According to articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General
Principles of the Civil Law of People's Republic of China], adopted by 4th Session of the Standing
Committee of the 6th National People's Congress, April. 12, 1986, (effective January 1, 1987), a person
under 18 years of age has limited capacity of civil conduct and a mentally ill person who is unable to
account for their conduct shall be a person having no capacity for civil conduct. Additionally, a person
who has reached the age of 16 but not the age of 18 and who earns his/her own living shall be regarded
as a person with full capacity for civil conduct. Therefore, someone who has reached 16 years of age
and has no mental illness can be appointed a director of a company.
16 See Company Law art.11 (2005); and C.B. Xie, 'Gongsi Daibiaoquan Zhidu Jiqi Dui Zhongguo Lifa
De Jiantao Yu Gaige Wenti Yanjiu' [Examining and Reforming the Legislative System on Corporate
Representation] In B.S. Wang (eds.), Zhuanxing Zhong De Gongsifa De Xiandaihua [Modernizing
Company Law in Transition Context] (Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe 2003) [Social Science
Academic Press 2003] 100
17 In Chinese legislation, the general meeting usually refers to the "supreme organ" or "authorized
organ". Furthermore, Company Law (2005) also grants a power of business management to the general
meeting. On this point see M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge University Press
2008) 154
18 It is summarized by Takeshi Jingsu in 'Corporate Governance for Listed Company in China-Recent
Moves and Improve the Quality of Listed Company' (2007) 10 Nomura Capital Market Review 36,
38-39
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been set out.19 However, that Law did not intentionally include a "duty of loyalty" by
explicitly stating that directors owe duties of loyalty to the company. Rather, these
duties were first introduced into the Chinese legal system by Company Law 2005.
Article 148 of the 2005 Law says directors owe duties of loyalty to the company and
that directors or senior managers must avoid the following:
� misappropriating the company's property;
� depositing the company's funds into his or any other individual's personal
account;
� violating the Articles of Association, without the approval of the general
meeting or the board of directors, including loaning the company's funds to others
or providing securities to any individual;
� entering into an agreement or transaction with the company by violating the
Articles of Association or without the approval of the general meeting;
� exploiting corporate opportunities by taking advantages of his position, or
operating business competes with the company he works for, without the
approval of the general meeting;
� misappropriating commissions from transactions between the company and
other parties;
� disclosing the company's confidential information without permission;
� other acts which are inconsistent with the duties of loyalty to the company.
19 For director's duties in Company Law (1993), see generally Z.Y. Jin, 'The Role of Shareholders in
Enforcing Directors' Duties: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom and China' (2006) 17(11)
International Company and Commercial Law Review 318
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The Law states that the income of any director or senior executive from any act
in violation of the preceding paragraph shall belong to the company.
By comparing these duties of loyalty with the "no conflict rule" which is an
important part of fiduciary duties in the UK, similarities become apparent. According
to UK law, directors are not allowed to make a profit out of the following scenarios
without the approval of the board or general meeting:
� a transaction with the company;
� the director's personal exploitation of the company's property, information or
opportunities; or
� the receipt benefits by a third party because of a director exercising their
directorial functions in a particular way.20
Clearly, the content of duties of loyalty in Chinese company law closely resembles
that of fiduciary duties in the UK. This is not only because the fundamental duty of a
fiduciary is to be loyal to the trustee in the UK21, but also because the Chinese duties
of loyalty are mainly concerned with the "no-conflict rule".
Despite these similarities, an important characteristic makes Chinese duties of
loyalty different from UK fiduciary duties. The above sub-provisions all focus on how
to prevent a director from being put in a position where their interests conflict with
those of the company. This characteristic shows that the ambit of duties of loyalty is
considerably narrower than that of UK fiduciary duties. According to the 2006 Act, in
addition to the former three sub-groups, there are another three groups of duties, which
20 P. Davies (n 4) 497, and CA 2006, s.175
21 P. Koh, 'The Director's Fiduciary Obligations-A Fresh Look?' (2003) 62(1) Cambridge Law Journal
42 Also see L. Sealy, 'Directors' Duties in the New Millennium' (2000) 64 Company Lawyer 64
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directors have; namely:22
� they must remain within the scope of the powers which have been conferred
upon them;
� they must act in good faith to promote the success of company; and
� they must exercise independent judgment.
5.2.2 Why are Fiduciary Duties Transplantable?
Before discussing how to improve China's company law by transplanting legal
rules from UK law, it is necessary to consider one thing that could seriously thwart the
transplant of fiduciary duties. It could be argued that a similar set of duties exist in
civil law system and they also can be applied in the context of director’s duties.23
However, it seems that China’s newly-revised company law transplants these duties
from Anglo-American Jurisdictions rather than Civil Law Jurisdictions.24
This is the fact that this group of duties is deeply embedded in the UK's legal
tradition.25 Fiduciary duties under Equity refer to the idea that beneficiaries are
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of their trustees, or, more generally, that
principals are entitled to the single-minded loyalty of their fiduciaries. It demands a
22 P. Davies (n 4) 497 and CA 2006 sections 171, 172 and 173.
23 See Black. B, Cheffins. B, Gelter. M, Hwa-Jin. K, Nolan. R, Siems. M, & Prava. L, "Report to
Russian Center for Capital Market Development: Comparative Analysis on Legal Regulation of the
Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and Executive Organs of Companies (English
Language Version)" (February 2008). ECGI - Law Working Paper Series 103/2008 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001990, 29. Director’s fiduciary duties also exist in Germany.
24 For this point see Xi. C, 'Foreign Solution for Local Problem? The Use of US style of Fiduciary
Duty to Regulate Agreed Takeover in China' (2008) 11 Journal of Chinese Economy and Business
Studies 408 and N. Howson also indicates that in his article, new Article 148 [of company law 2005]
which for the first time in China’s corporate law, directly address directors’ and officer’s fiduciary
duties, and in a distinctly Anglo-American Way. See N. Howson, 'The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak
Its Name: Anglo-American Fiduciary Duties in China's 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations
of Prior Convergence' in H. Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim, C. Milhaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate
Governance In East Asia, (Routledge 2008) 193
25 L. Sealy, 'Director as Trustee' (1967) 83 Cambridge Law Journal 83
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general denial of self-interest.26 A director's fiduciary duties come from his or her
trustee-like position. By contrast, Chinese lawyers have not developed such a solid
theoretical framework to explain the nature of duties of loyalty.27 Although the Trust
Law 200128 introduced relationships of trust into the Chinese legal system, this does
not play a major role in business life nor do judges or market participants have an
in-depth understanding of this concept.29 Therefore, the comparison between the
fiduciary duties in the UK and the duty of loyalty in China may be characterised as
being "a dry juxtaposition of the rules of one legal culture with those of another",30
which is criticised by some comparative lawyers. Indeed, it is reasonable to ask how
Chinese legal end-users can understand standards or rules developed from Equity,
which is a concept with which they are unfamiliar.31
26 S. Worthington, Equity (Oxford University Press 2006) 131
27 In Chinese academia, there is a debate on the nature of duties of loyalty. Some argue that as Chinese
judges and lawyers are not familiar with the concept of "trust", the legislator should borrow an
equivalent concept (mandate relationship) from civil law jurisdictions to interpret the nature of the
relationship between the director and the company. On this point see, D.W. Li, D.H. Liu & X.Y. Qian
'Dongshi Falv Yanjiu' [Legal Analysis of Corporate Director] (2002) 02 Jiushi [Knowledge Seeker] 53
and Z.L. Cheng & L.W. Pu, 'Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Dongshi Quanli Jianguan' [Supervising The
Managing Powers of the Directors in Chinese Listed Companies] Colloquium Paper of Chinese Bar
Association Annual Symposium (2001)
<http://ckrd.cnki.net/grid20/detail.aspx?filename=ZHQL200111003045&dbname=CPFD2001>
accessed 20th July 2011
28 Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa 2001, [Law of Trust of the People's Public of China (2001)],
adopted by 21st Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress, April 28,
2001
29 For example, see M.N. Zhang, 'Dongshi Diwei Yanjiu' [Examining Director's Legal Position] (1998)
2 Dangdai Faxue [Modern Law Science] 46. Clarke argues that the fiduciary duties which come from
the law of trust are unlikely to work in China, as there is no equivalence of a trust relationship in the
Chinese legal system, D. Clarke, 'Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China' (July 3,
2006), GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 213 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=913784>
accessed 20th July 2011. However, recently both legislators and legal researchers have begun to focus
on the implementation of "fiduciary duties" in Chinese legal system. For example, the Shareholder
Protection Provisions 2004, Article 5(1) say that blockholders owe fiduciary duties (cheng xin yi wu)
to the company and its shareholders. For academic studies see X. Tang, 'Konggu Gudong De Shouxin
Yiwu: Cong Meiguo Fa Shang Yizhi' [Controlling Shareholder's Fiduciary Duties: Transplanting from
the US], In B.S Wang (eds.), Zhuanxing Zhong de Gongsifa de Xiandaihua [Modernizing Company
Law in Transition Context] (Social Science Academic Press 2003) 534; T.S. Zhou, 'Dongshi Chengxin
Yiwu De Goujian: Yingguo Gongsi Fa De Qishi' [Formulating Director's Fiduciary Duties in Chinese
Context: Some Lessons Provided by the UK Law] (2009) 04 Beijing Gongshan Daxue Xuebao,
[Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University] 105; and J.B. Lou, H. Yan & Y. Zhao, 'Gongsi
Fa Zhong Dongshi Jianshi Gaoguanrenyuan Xinyi Yiwu De Falv Shiyong Yanjiu' [The Studies on the
Application of the Duties of Loyalty to Company's Director and Executives] in P.Z Gan, L.F Liu (eds.)
Xin Leixing Gongsi Susong Yinan Wenti Yanjiu [Practical Issues of the New Company Law] (Perking
University Press 2009) 306
30 P. Legrand, 'How to Compare Now' (1996) 16 Legal Studies 232
31 For a similar point, see J.Q. Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China: From the Protection of Minority
Shareholder' (2006) 2 The Corporate Governance Law Journal 311, 331
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However, the nature of director's fiduciary duties may be not as influential as it
appears in this particular context. Firstly, fiduciary duties in the context of company
law are no longer mysterious Equity principles. They have been legislated by the UK's
2006 Act and developed into a series of legal provisions. By integrating the Equitable
principles into statue, the culturally specified characteristics of fiduciary duties of
trustees in Equity are fading. By contrast, its technical characteristics are further
enhanced. To elaborate, through legislation, the inscrutable Equitable considerations
behind fiduciary duties are translated into "technical language", which is
comprehensible to a well-trained company lawyer with a civil law background. For
example, Japan, also a civil law jurisdiction, has successfully adopted
Anglo-American fiduciary duties in its Commercial Code, although this took several
decades.32 This phenomenon partly proves that cultural barriers are not
insurmountable in transplanting Anglo-American fiduciary duties to a civil law
jurisdiction. Moreover, the essential elements of fiduciary duties have already been
adopted by Chinese law. As mentioned, the concept of the duty of loyalty which is
based on the no-conflict rule, is an important part of Company Law 2005.
Furthermore, in practice, Chinese judges have used some core elements of fiduciary
duties to solve practical problems. The Equity doctrine of "proper purpose" is an apt
example. In the context of company law, the "proper purpose" doctrine primarily
requires a director, who is in the trustee's position to maximise shareholder interests.
Although this doctrine is not formally adopted in China's company law, judges in
Beijing have cited it as the underlying principle for their judgments. In 2006, Beijing
Zi Qiao, a real estate company, filed a claim against its director on the basis of a
breach of the director's duties of loyalty. In this case, the defendant had a personal
grudge against other executives in the company. A strong desire for revenge led him
to enter into a complementary contract with the company's debtors on behalf of the
company without undergoing the formal decision process required by the Articles of
Association. This agreement waived the company's contractual rights valued at
32 H. Kanda & C. Milhaupt, 'Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in
Japanese Corporate Law' (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 887, 897
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4,000,000 RMB (approximately 400,000 pounds sterling). The court held that the
defendant beached the director's duty of loyalty on the basis that the director's
decision in entering into the contractual relationship was not for a proper purpose,
namely maximizing the company's interests, but rather for retaliating against his
colleagues and the company.33
The former analysis does not attempt to deny that fiduciary duties, to some
extent, are cultural phenomenon. Instead, it suggests that cultural barriers which stand
in the way of legal transplant are surmountable, especially where Equitable principles
have been translated into technical terms through legislation, while some of key
elements have been adopted by the receiving jurisdiction. Thus, even though Chinese
legal end-users have little knowledge of the Equitable considerations behind fiduciary
duties, this shortage of knowledge may not influence their capacity to appropriately
appreciate and use the concept of fiduciary duties to deal with practical problems in a
technical sense.
In addition to cultural considerations, others argue that Anglo-American style
fiduciary duties demand support from a sophisticated court system. Their application
and enforcement requires that the court system be empowered with a wide-range of
residual law-making powers. In a transition economy, the court system may not be in
a position actively to develop rules for regulating executive behaviour.34 Nevertheless,
Howson's research on Chinese judicial enforcement of the director's duty of loyalty
under the 1993 Law suggests otherwise. Howson finds that the duty of loyalty was not
even formally introduced by the 1993 Company Law and that Chinese judges
aggressively went beyond what was permitted in legislation. He writes that the
"Chinese court has been proven perfectly willing and technically able to invoke and
enforce, on their own and without authorization—and with respect of individual cases
33 (2006) Yi Zhong Min Chu Zi Di 05884 [Beijing First Intermediate Court (commercial court) no.
05884]
34 K. Pistor, and C.G. Xu, 'Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the
Incomplete Law Theory', In C. Milhaupt (eds.), Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law
and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals (Columbia University Press 2003) 77
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having no precedent-like effect—basic corporate fiduciary norms."35 This research
has provided much evidence to suggest that the duty of loyalty can be properly
utilised by Chinese judges, even without the support of detailed legislation. Pistor and
Xu's argument alleging that Anglo-American fiduciary duties need the support of
judicial direction is correct. Nonetheless, in the case of China this argument may only
suggest that as a transitional jurisdiction, it needs to positively adopt a more elaborate
version of fiduciary duties rather than abolishing these doctrines.
In sum, as a result of cultural and institutional differences, copying the UK's
fiduciary duties into China's company law directly will not work. Therefore, the
demands of Chinese company law are important. The following parts will locate the
legal rules which are still ambiguous or absent in the regime of director's fiduciary
duties. Following that, it will select some legal doctrines from the UK and adjust them
to make them capable of dealing with China's problems.
5.2.3. What Needs to be Reformed?
As mentioned above, compared with the UK's fiduciary duties, the duty of good
faith has not been adopted in Chinese company law. This raises the question of
whether China's company law needs this doctrine to cope with director misconduct.
One might argue that as duties of care and loyalty have been transplanted into the
Chinese legal system, the duty of good faith is no longer needed. It is widely accepted
that there are two types of director for whom the duty to act in the interests of the
company may pose particular difficulties. These are directors of subsidiary companies
and nominee directors. These two types of director are more likely to pursue a holding
company or nominator's interests than the company's interest.36 Similarly, research on
Delaware corporate law indicates that traditional duties of care and loyalty are not
35 N. Howson, 'The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-American Fiduciary Duties in
China's 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence' in H. Kanda, Kon-Sik
Kim, C. Milhaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance In East Asia, (Routledge 2008) 198
36 B. Pettet (n 8) 173
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adequate to cover all types of improper conduct by directors or managers, where a
company is controlled by an imperator CEO or controlling shareholder with a passive
board. The duty of good faith plays a fundamental role in extending the contours of
director's duties in this context. It covers most of the important types of case in which
a manager's conduct although improper does not violate the duty of loyalty.37
It is common that listed companies are controlled by a single majority
shareholder in China.38 As a result, many directors are nominated by the majority
shareholders of listed companies. According to He's research on 348 listed companies
in 2004, the companies in which the chairmen of the board were nominated by
controlling shareholders occupied 87 per cent of all samples.39 Similarly, the
empirical evidence provided by NANKAI University strikingly found that only 11.36
per cent of Chinese listed companies implemented the cumulative voting scheme40 in
appointing directors.41 This means that minority shareholders have little power in
appointing directors in China. However, listed companies usually declare that they are
fully independent from their holding companies and holding companies will not exert
any level of influence on a subsidiary's management nor on their usage of corporate
assets. Nevertheless, in practice, a large number of directors and executives still
manage the business in favour of the majority's interests rather than the company's
interests. According to Cheng and Pu's survey on nominee directors in Chinese listed
companies, nearly all the nominee directors interviewed expressly acknowledged that
37 M. Eisenberg, 'The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law' (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate
Law 1, 27
38 See above Chapter II at section 2.3.2.2
39 W.D. He 'Shenjiaosuo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhuangkuang Diaocha Baogao' [Empirical Studies on
the Listed Companies' Corporate Governance Regime in Shen Zheng Stock Exchange] Zhengquan
Shibao [Securities Times] 18th December 2003
40 Company Law (2005) art.106
41 Nan Kai Daxue Gongsi Zhili Yanjiu Zhongxin [Corporate Governance Research Centre Nankai
University] "Shang Shi Gong Si Zhi Li Ping Jia Yan Jiu Bao Gao" [Evaluation of the Listed
Companies' Corporate Governance] Zhengquan Ribao [Securities Daily] 24th February 2004
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they would pursue the nominators' interests rather than those of the company.42
Therefore, the absence of a duty of good faith may mean that a director's misconduct
cannot be properly regulated in China.
Secondly, unlike the UK's fiduciary duty which is a mixture of various legal
standards, tests and rules, other than the catch-all in sub-provision 8 of the Company
Law 2005, nearly all the sub-provisions of that law are bright-line rules. Furthermore,
none of these rules are drafted in a detailed manner, nor are they equipped with
sufficient operative guidance. Arguably, bright-line rules are easier to understand and
be enforced by the judges. However, they usually suffer from a problem of
under-inclusiveness. Consequently, the form of this set of provisions needs to be
updated by more sophisticated standards and tests.
The major tasks of a comparison between the UK's director's fiduciary duties and
China's director's duties of loyalties are as follows:
� to enlarge the ambit of the duties of loyalty (Task I)
� to insert operative standards and tests for the doctrine of "no-conflict
interest" in China (Task II)
Having addressed the above tasks, the following elements of fiduciary duties will
then receive particular focus within each of those tasks:
Task I
� the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and not for any
42 Z.L. Cheng & L.W. Pu, 'Wo Guo Shangsi Gongsi De Dongshi Quan Ji Jiankong' [Controlling
Director's Powers in China's Public Company], Colloquium Paper of Chinese Bar Association Annual
Symposium 2001
<http://ckrd.cnki.net/grid20/detail.aspx?filename=ZHQL200111003045&dbname=CPFD2001>
accessed 20th July 2011
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collateral purpose;
� the nominee director's duty of good faith;
Task II
� the duty of a director not to put themselves in a position where their personal
interests may conflict with those of the company; and
� the duty not to appropriate assets belonging to the company.
5.2.4 Task I: Enlarging the Ambit of Duties of Loyalty
As there are few relevant resources in China that can be compared to UK case
law, this section will primarily focus on the extent to which duties of good faith in the
UK can be transformed into a set of manageable provisions for dealing with Chinese
problems.
5.2.4.1 The Duty to Act Bona Fide in the Best Interests of the Company
and Not for Any Collateral Purpose
Following the recent company law reform in China, some elements of the duty of
good faith have already been transplanted into the legislative framework in a
piece-meal manner. The Company Law 2005 says that directors shall comply with
laws, administrative regulations and their Articles of Association. According to
Delaware corporate law, this provision covers an important aspect of the duty of good
faith.43 In addition, the Corporate Governance Guidance for listed Companies
(Corporate Governance Guidance) issued by CSRC lays down a duty under which
43 Under Delaware corporate law, a director is not allowed to maximize corporate profits by violating
law or regulations. See M. Eisenberg (n 36) 31
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directors must faithfully, honestly and diligently perform their duties in the best
interests of the company and the shareholders as a whole.44 However, firstly, as
quasi-legislation, the enforceability of the CSRC's Guidance is questionable. It is
difficult to see the basis on which the CSRC would enforce this provision unless
breaches were to cause a market failure. Secondly, this provision cannot escape being
symbolic and therefore difficult to put into practice due to the number of undefined
terms that it contains. For example, what does "faithful, honest and diligent
performance" refer to in this particular context? These observations suggest that
whilst Chinese legislators may be aware of the importance of the duty of good faith,
legal rules regarding this concept are ill-formulated.
In order to implement the duty of good faith, the fundamental question to be
addressed is in whose interests directors should work. In the UK, the interests of the
company traditionally equate to the long-term interests of its shareholder, specifically,
"the shareholders' interests collectively" or "the shareholders' interests, present and
future".45 Under the 2006 Act, a fundamental change in this doctrine was made.
According to this Act, directors, whilst ultimately required to promote shareholder
interests, must take account of factors affecting the company's relationships and
performance, such as stakeholder's interests. The Act reminds directors that
shareholder value relies on the successful management of the company's relationship
with other stakeholders.46 In practice, this "enlightened shareholder approach" may
not give rise to increased legal liability on the part of directors.47 This is because the
only duty at stake is the duty to promote the success of the company, and as long as
directors have made good faith business judgments with reasonable care, skill and
diligence they are unlikely to be in breach that duty.48 Overall, "enlightened
shareholder value" is radically different from the "pluralist approach". The latter
44 Corporate Governance Guidelines, art.33
45 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 301 and Davies (n 4) 507
46 L. Miles & M. Lower 'Giving Effect to the Statutory Duty of Loyalty' (2006) 5 Sweet & Maxwell's
Company Law Newsletter 1
47 See Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 321
48 ibid
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requires the director give equal consideration to stakeholder interests in making a
business decision. However, under the current regime, the members' interests are still
paramount, but the interests of stakeholders are to be taken into account when
determining the best way of promoting the members' interests.49
In contrast, the Chinese Company Law 2005 does not clarify whose interests the
director should work for. The CSRC's Corporate Governance Guideline answers this
by saying that a director should work for shareholders' interests as a whole.50
However, another article says that listed companies are obliged to ensure that
stakeholder interests are properly protected.51 The socialist tradition exerts deep
influence on corporate legislation whereby employee interests are strongly protected.
A series of provisions in the Company Law are highlighted for this purpose:
� Company shall hear and consider employees' opinions and suggestions,
where the company proposes to re-structure its organization.
� The company which is invested by two or more State-owned enterprises,
board of director should consist of employee representatives.
� The company shall appoint employees representatives as the members of
supervisory board. The employee representatives must be no less than one third
of the board members.
Creditor protection has also been enhanced by recent legal reforms. According to
the Guidance issued by the Chinese Supreme Court on implementing the Company
49 Davies (n 4) 508
50 Corporate Governance Guideline art.33
51 ibid art.81
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Law 200552, if a director fraudulently appropriates a company's assets or accounting
documents, creditors are entitled to sue the director on the grounds of a breach of the
duty of diligence.53
After this belief introduction, some distinctions can be drawn between the
China's company law regime of directors and its UK law counterpart. Firstly, the
board structure is different. In China, the supervisory board, which represents the
stakeholders' interests, is parallel to the board of directors. It is bestowed with a wide
range of powers by which it can restrict improper business decisions being made by
directors.54 In the UK, however, due to its one-tier board structure, it is necessary for
the board of directors to weight up conflicts between shareholder and stakeholder
interests. Secondly, Chinese company law encourages stakeholders to monitor or
participate in the company's decision-making process. By contrast, in the UK, the
simple fact is that the central management of the company's business is in the hands
of the board.55 Overall, in China because the supervisory board is able to review and
adjust decisions which shareholder profits are maximised at the expense of
stakeholder’s interests, it is understandable that directors are required primarily to
consider shareholders' long term interests in their management under the two-tier
board structure.
The second question is how to test whether a director is acting in bona fide best
interests of the company. The "duty of good faith" is a widely used doctrine in the
Chinese civil law system, especially in contract law. It is an underlining principle,
52 Zuigao Renming Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghuarenminggongheguo Gongsifa Rougan Wenti de
Guiding (I&II) [Supreme Court's Judiciary Interpretations on China's Company Law 2005 I & II]
Chinese text is available at <http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=109879> accessed 20th
July 2011
53 Chinese Supreme Court's Guidelines on Company Law 2005 (II), articles18 and 19
54 Company Law art. 54 (2005) and CSRC Corporate Governance Guideline Chapter 4
55 Davies (n 4) 410
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which both parties to a contract must obey.56 However, no evidence indicates that the
"duty of good faith" in contract law is able to solve company law issues, despite the
fact that companies might be regarded as a nexus of contracts.57 As already
mentioned, the Company Law 2005 provides an objective standard to test whether a
director operates the company's business in good faith. According to the law, directors
are held liable to a company for loss caused by their conduct when it breaches law,
regulations or the company's Articles of Association.58 This objective standard is a
workable criterion. Nonetheless, it may still suffer from the problem of
under-inclusiveness. A director may pursue his personal interests at the expense of the
company's interests by means that circumvent the rigid bright-line rules under current
legislation. For example, the chairman of a board may appoint their friend or family
member to be a senior executive in the company. Such a chairman (usually the insider
who can take de facto control of the board) may proceed with such an appointment
despite knowing that their friend or relative is clearly incapable of being a senior
manager because, for example, they are without any business experience or are
ill-educated. In such a case, the shareholders or liquidators may be able to sufficiently
prove the existence of the above facts as well as loss (e.g. payment of high
remuneration made to this person) caused by this decision. However, the director will
not be accountable for the company's loss, if the court applies an objective test to this
case. The director's decision does not breach any law or regulation, even though the
chairman may not be able to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the
appointment is underpinned by valid commercial reasons.
56 The concept of "good faith" plays a very important role in Chinese contract law and property law.
Generally, "good faith" in a civil law context is recognised as a tool through which a judge can exercise
their discretionary power to fill the gaps in different cases. On this point see G.D. Xu, Minfa de Yiban
Yuanze: Chaoyue Chengwenfa de Xianzhi [General Principles of Civil Law: Overcoming the
Limitations of Statutes] (Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe Di er Ban 2001) [2nd edn, China
University of Political Science and Law Publisher 2001] Chapter 3. However, in the context of Chinese
company law, "good faith" is still an under-developed legal theory.
57 There is a radical difference between a contractual relationship in the context of a company and a
normal arms-length transaction. For example, fiduciary principles are uncommon in contract relations
which are based on arms-length transactions: See F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic Structure
of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1991) 90
58 Company Law art.113 (2005)
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It could be argued that judges can rely on the catch-all in sub-provision 8 of the
2005 law to hold a director liable for this improper decision. However, not only is a
judge's ability to exercise discretionary power on a case to case basis questionable,
but without thorough interpretation or operative guidance, this provision itself does
not make much sense. Besides this ambiguous catch-all provision, an additional
bight-line rule is implemented by Company Law 2005 prohibiting directors from
promoting majority shareholder interests at the expense of the company. Under the
law, any loan or guarantee provided to a majority shareholder or de facto controller
should be approved by disinterested shareholders at the shareholders meeting.59 In
other words, directors must not provide loans or guarantees to the above persons
without the consent of the members. Whilst easy to enforce, this rule only addresses
one small facet of a huge pitfall. Again the preceding analysis highlights that such
fragmented rules cannot provide an all-round control on a director's immoral conduct.
Consequently, more specific standards and tests by which "good faith" can be more
accurately assessed should be introduced into the Chinese legal system. UK case law
provides some valuable experience in this regard.
The underlying principle of good faith can be found in Re Smith and Fawcett
ltd60. Lord Green MR held that "[directors] must exercise their discretion bona fide in
what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in the interests of the
company".61 In other words, judges are well suited to enforcing standards and
integrity, but not to undertaking a review of corporate decisions on an objective
basis.62 This view is confirmed by the more recent case of Regentcrest v. Cohen.63
Here, it seems that the judge was not applying an objective test of good faith e.g.
would a reasonable director in the circumstances have thought this action was in the
interests of the company? Rather, he simply tested the credibility of the directors'
59 ibid art.16
60 Re Smith and Fawcett ltd [1942] Ch.304
61 ibid 306
62 L. Sealy 'Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions' (1989)15 Monash University Law
Review 265
63 [2001] BCC 494 (Chancery Division)
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assertions regarding their subjective motivations.64 Accordingly, under the regime of
2006 Act, "success" is to be determined on a company-by-company basis. It is for the
directors to interpret the company's objective and to make practical decisions about
how best to achieve them.65 Both UK case law and statute suggest that directors are
entitled to decide what the best interests of the company are and that their decisions
are not generally subject to second guessing by the courts. Easterbrook and Fischel
have made an insightful analysis of the rationale behind this legal arrangement by
explaining why same judge who decides on whether an engineer has designed
compressors on jet engines properly cannot review a company manager's decision:
Businesses rarely encounter "sure things". Often managers must act now and
learn later; delay for more study may be the worst decision; the market will
decide whether the decision was good…How can the court know whether a poor
outcome of a business decision is attributable to poor management (inputs) or to
many other things that affect firms?"66
However, this does not mean a director's business decision is not subject to
judicial review under any circumstance. According to Gower,
in most cases compliance with the rule that directors must act honestly and in
good faith is tested on common-sense principles. The court will ask itself whether
it is proved that the directors have not done what they honestly believed to be
right, and normally accepting that they have unless satisfied that they have not
behaved as honest men of business might be expected to act.67
Similarly, in judiciary practice, some cases confirm that director's business decision
can be reviewed by court objectively. Pennycuick J. in Charterbridge Corp Ltd v
64 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 325
65 ibid 320
66 F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel (n 57) 98-99
67 P. Davies (n 4) 388
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Lloyds Bank Ltd68 said that:
the proper test, I think, of whether a director of a company has acted bona fide in
the interest of the company … must be whether an intelligent and honest man in
the position of a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the
existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were for
the benefit of the company.69
In practice, the court requires the plaintiff to prove the bad faith or dishonesty of the
director.70 As Sealy says, the best approach in applying the duty of good faith is to
regard it as the ground upon which a corporate decision may be challenged as
irregular and held to be void or voidable.71 Following this line of thought, several
grounds for challenging business decisions under the duty of good faith can be
identified; namely, "improper motives", "abused or exceeded or not genuinely
exercised power" and "unreasonableness".72
In Howard Smith ltd v Ampol Petroleum ltd73, Lord Wilberforce held that "in a
case that the court has found that directors have believed they were acting bona fide in
the interests of the company. The court must find whether the purpose for which the
director acted was objectively proper or improper".74 This means that directors might
act in complete subjective good faith, but find themselves in breach of the
requirement to act for proper purpose.75
68 Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] C.h. 62;
69 ibid 74
70 B. Black, B. Cheffins, M. Gelter, Kim, Hwa-Jin, R. Nolan, M. Siems, and L. Prava, ‘Report to
Russian Center for Capital Market Development: Comparative Analysis on Legal Regulation of the
Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and Executive Organs of Companies (English
Language Version)’ (February 2008), ECGI - Law Working Paper Series 103/2008
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001990 34> accessed 20th July 2011
71 L. Sealy (n 62) 268
72 ibid 268
73 Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum ltd [1974] A.C. 821, PC 835
74 ibid 835
75 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 311
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In Punt v Symons & Co Ltd.,76 in order to pass a special resolution, the directors
issued new shares to five additional members. Byrne J held that,
It is argued on the evidence that but for the issue by the directors of the share
under their power as directors, and, therefore, in their fiduciary character under
the general power to issue shares, it would have been impossible to pass the
resolution proposed; and that the shares were not issued bona fide, but with the
sole object and intention of creating voting power to carry out the proposed
alteration in the articles...if I find as I do that shares have been issued under the
general fiduciary power of the directors for the express purpose of acquiring an
unfair majority for the purpose of altering the rights of parties under the articles, I
think I ought to interfere.77
In Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd,78 the directors of the defendant company, in order to
forestall a takeover bid, had issued shares with special voting rights to the trustees of a
scheme set up for the benefit of the company's employees. This was held to be an
improper use of the directors' powers to issue shares. Buckley J. held:
It is not, in my judgment, open to the directors in such a case to say 'We
genuinely believe that what we seek to prevent the majority from doing will harm
the company and therefore our act in arming ourselves or our party with sufficient
shares to outvote the majority is a conscientious exercise of our powers under the
articles, which should not be interfered with'. Such a belief, even if well founded,
would be irrelevant ... The power to issue shares was a fiduciary power and if, as
I think, it was exercised for an improper motive, the issue of these shares is liable
to be set aside.79
76 [1903] 2 C.h 506
77 ibid 513
78 [1967] Ch. 254 (Chancery Division)
79 ibid 268
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In Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood,80 the court created an objective
standard for testing the improper purpose. In the event that a director's decision is
challenged, the court will take the four-step test: (1) identify the power whose
exercise is in question; (2) identify the proper purpose for which that power was
delegated to the directors; (3) identify the substantial purpose for which the power
was in fact exercised; and (4) decide whether that purpose was proper.81 The answers
to the above questions can in general be found by reviewing the company's Articles of
Association and other shareholder agreements. As Lord Hoffmann states "An abuse
[improper and unlawful exercise] of these powers [fiduciary power] is an
infringement of a member's contractual rights under the article"82 The test for
improper purpose is an objective one, even if it is applied to a director's subjective
motivations.
Additionally, "patent unreasonableness" is an important test for the duty of good
faith, since a director's unreasonable decision may breach his duty to act in the
genuine belief that he is acting in the best interests of the company. In Brady v
Brady83, Lord Oliver held,
The words "in good faith in the interests of the company" form, I think, a single
composite expression and postulate a requirement that those responsible for
procuring the company to provide the assistance act in the genuine belief that it is
being done in the company's interest.84
The test of genuineness was also applied in the Halt Garage case85. In this case, a
company paid remuneration to a sick director who took no part in the business. After
the company was insolvent, the liquidator brought proceedings claiming the whole of
80 [2002] All E.R. (D) 307.
81 ibid. See also Z.Y. Jin (n 19) 318
82 Sherborne Park Residents Co Ltd, Re (1986) 2B.C.C 582
83 [1989] A.C. 755, HL
84 ibid 778
85 Re Halt Garage [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016
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the sick director's remuneration. Lord Oliver held that "in the postulated circumstance
of a wholly unreasonable payment, that might, no doubt, be prima facie evidence of
fraud…the real test must, I think, be whether the transaction in question was a
genuine exercise of power".86 As Sealy states,
the court normally only reviews the integrity and regularity of the process of the
decision made by corporate organ, and not the reasonableness of result; but,
exceptionally, a result may be so unreasonable that the court is entitled to infer
that it has not been reached by proper purpose.87
Consequently, patent unreasonableness may lead a court to conclude that a director
does not achieve a minimum threshold of genuineness for the duty to act in good
faith.
Finally, as Gower says, "good faith must not only be done but must manifestly be
seen to be done."88 According to this Equitable principle, directors should not put
themselves in a position where their interests will conflict the company's interests.
Thus "conflict of interests" is another ground on which the court could reach a
conclusion of bad faith.
Studying UK case law deepens our understanding of the vital role played by the
duty of good faith in modern company law. Some Chinese legal commentators have
already concentrated to these issues. Many of them suggest that an American style
86 ibid. See also L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 273
87 See L. Sealy (n 62) 277. However, in the UK, some cases indicate that the court may not inquire
whether the director's honest belief was a reasonable one. (e.g. Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v. Cohen
[2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 80). The pre-condition is that the director provides evidence to prove that there were
valid commercial reasons upon which the decision was made. See P. Davies (n 4) 388, and Bishopsgate
Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No.2) [1994] 1 All ER 261, CA. In this case, the plaintiff
proved that the company had suffered a loss caused by the director's unreasonable decision. The Court
of Appeal held that the burden of proof will be upon the director to demonstrate the propriety of the
transaction.
88 P. Davies (n 4) 529
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business judgment rule should be adopted in China.89 Generally, the business
judgment rule involves a presumption that a director has acted on an informed basis,
in good faith, and in the interests of the corporation. A plaintiff must rebut one or
more these presumptions, in order to challenge a director's decision.90 The
presumptions include:
� A judgment has been made. In other words, a director would not qualify for
protection under the rule where they failed to make due inquiries or take action;
� a reasonable decision-making process was employed by the director in which
he informed himself on the business judgment which he reasonably believed
appropriate under the circumstances;
� the decision was made in subjective good faith; and
� the director and officer do not have any conflict of interests in the transaction
which is approved by the decision.91
However, as in the UK, the subjective business judgment rule is not always
strictly applied during the process of judicial review. The US courts in some cases
also employ objective standards to review the quality of a decision. For example, in
Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v New York Mercantile Exchange92, Judge Friendly held that
in determining whether a person made a decision in good faith it was relevant
89 For example, see X. Xu & Z.R. Yang, 'Dongshi Yiwu yu Shangye Panduan Yuanze' [Director's
Duties and Business Judgment Rule] (2001) 05 Falv yu Shehui Fazhan [Law and Social Development]
40; Y. Tao 'Shangye Panduan Yuanze yu Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili' [Business Judgment Rule and Chinese
Corporate Governance] (2004) 04 Shangye Yanjiu [Commercial Research] 19; and H.G Li & H.Ge,
'Zai Zhonggou Shixing Shangye Panduan Yuanze' [Implementing Business Judgment Rule in Chinese
Context] (2007) 18 Gongong Yanjiu [Public Science] 23
90 B. Black and others (n 70) 47
91 M. Eisenberg 'The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law'
(1993-1994) 62 Fordham Law Review 437, 441
92 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984).
175
whether the decision had rationality … We mean only a minimal requirement of
some basis in reason … Absent some basis in reason, action could be hardly in
good faith even apart from ulterior motive. 93
To sum up, although the tests for duty of good faith are subjective, both UK and US
courts have developed some objective standards to prevent the serious problems
arising in circumstances where an irrational business decision is protected solely
because it is made in subjective good faith.94
According to the above analysis, standards for the duty of good faith have been
introduced to protect the director's business discretion rather than to impose excessive
legal liability on directors. By contrast, the main aim of China's regime should be
different as its main purpose is to make directors accountable for their misconduct.95
Although protecting a director's business discretion is always important, in China a
director's misconduct is under-regulated. A few vague provisions are therefore
seemingly insufficient to restrict a director's improper motivation.
Regarding the implementation of the duty of good faith, dual levels of duties
(duties of administrative regulation and duties of legislations) should work as
complementary parts in China. This is because the divergence between standards of
conduct and the standard of review can result from the effects of imperfect
information96. The first level of duties could be introduced by the CSRC in the form
of administrative regulations. This level of duty might include a detailed outline of
best practice in a director's decision-making process. The standards for best practice
should mainly be based on objective elements and drafted in plain language, which
makes them more accessible and easier to understand. This ex ante duty would lead a
good results, as recent empirical research shows that in Chinese listed companies, a
93 ibid 677-678. See also M. Eisenberg (n 91) 442
94 M. Eisenberg (n 91) 442
95 See, for example, Y.K. Zhu 'Lun Dongshi Wenze de Chengxin Lujing' [Duty of Good Faith:
Approaching the Director's Accountability] (2008) 3 Zhonggou Faxue [China Law Science] 86
96 M. Eisenberg (n 91) 438
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director's knowledge of the best corporate governance practice has significantly
improved. Some directors have already begun to consider the CSRC's practical
guidance before making decisions.97 The second level of duty which should be
introduced in the form of legislation should be less demanding than the first. For
example, under the first level of duty, it may be expected that directors act as
intelligent and honest entrepreneurs in exercising their decision-making powers.
However, under the second-tier of the duty, evidence which suggests that a director's
business judgment has not been exercised intelligently is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption that the director acted in the bona fide interest of the company, if the
director can provide a valid commercial reason for this decision.
Essentially the following legal rules should be inserted into the regime of ex post
duties under which a court can review a director's decision:
1. Establishing an overriding principle under which a director should act in the
bona fide best interests of the company.
1.1 The interests of company can be interpreted as the long-term interests of the
shareholders as a whole.
1.2 The director's decision is presumed to be made in good faith unless one of the
following criteria has been met:
1.2.1 any undisclosed conflict of interest (direct or indirect) by the director;98
and
1.2.2 any improper purposes of the director's decision, two basic tests for
improper purposes should be established.
97 N. Andrews & R. Tomasic, 'Directing China's Top 100 Listed: Corporate Governance in an
Emerging Market Economy' (2006) 2 (3) The Corporate Governance Law Review 246
98 For details of this doctrine, see section 5.2.5 below.
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1.2.2.1 The director exercises his power unconstitutionally or for a purpose
which is inconsistent with the initial purpose for which the power is delegated to the
director by the Articles of Association.
For the above test, the four-step assessment99 used in Extrasure Travel
Insurance Ltd v Scattergood could be borrowed by Chinese judges to decide whether
a director has used his powers unconstitutionally. For the Chinese listed companies,
their Articles of Associations are relatively reliable resources for judges to decide
whether the object of a director's decision is proper. This is because unlike
quasi-partnership companies, listed companies are more likely to pursue a
professional legal service in drafting their Articles of Association. In most cases, the
quality of the Articles can be guaranteed by the involvement of law firms. Moreover,
in China, the Articles of listed companies must be drafted in accordance with the
standards laid down by the CSRC' Corporate Governance Guideline and the
Guideline for the Listed Company's Articles of Association. Additionally, a company's
Articles of Association must be reviewed by the CSRC before it is permitted to be
listed on the stock market. Therefore, in general the purpose for which the power is
delegated will be properly clarified by the Articles. Moreover, all listed companies'
Articles of Associations are drafted in accordance with the same administrative
regulations and reviewed by same market regulator. Consequently, the key articles of
the Articles of Associations of different companies should be similar. The
harmonization of key provisions of Articles of Association reduces the judicial cost in
enforcing the duty of good faith because judges need only to review or interpret
similar articles.
1.2.2.2 a patently unreasonable or irrational business decision which is not
founded on the director's honest belief that he is acting in the best interests of the
99 (1) identify the power whose exercise is in question; (2) identify the proper purpose for which that
power was delegated to the directors; (3) identify the substantial purpose for which the power was in
fact exercised; and (4) decide whether that purpose was proper.
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company;
For this test, a substantial loss to the company does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that a director has acted in bad faith where he can prove that his decision
was honestly made in the best interests of the company. In such a case, one criteria
which can be employed is whether a director can prove the obvious positive
connection between their decision and the interests of the company in the
circumstances in which the decision was made.
We should recognise that "patently unreasonable", "honest belief" and even the
"improper purpose rule" are standards which are difficult to interpret. The
effectiveness of their application is largely based on judicial discretion.100 The fact
that Chinese judges generally lack commercial expertise poses a particular difficulty
to the implementation of these standards. For instance, they may not be sophisticated
enough to decide whether a business decision is made in the honest belief of the best
interests of a company by reviewing detailed factual evidence. Nevertheless, even
though this set of standards is not perfectly manageable for Chinese judges, it is still
much more workable and pertinent, compared with the catch-all provision which says
"other activities which breach the duties of loyalty".101 Introducing these standards
into Chinese company law significantly upgrades the accessibility and transparency of
a director's duty of loyalty. When legal certainty is promoted, the reasonable
expectation is that companies or their shareholders will become more active in filing
litigations against director decisions that are in breach of the duty of good faith. The
courts will in turn have more opportunities to develop their professional skills as well
as the standards for testing these duties in accordance with practical experience. As a
result, directors will also find increasing risks involved in serving the majority
shareholder or personal interests at the expense of the company's interests.
100 Even in the UK and US, the duty of "good faith" is regarded as a notoriously ambivalent concept.
On this point see Sealy (n 60) 268 and M. Eisenberg (n 91) 441
101 Company Law art.149(8) (2005)
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2. any intentional breach of law, regulations and articles of association.
This final objective test which has already been adopted in Chinese law should
be retained. This is because it is an important element of the duty of good faith and is
highly congruent with existing bight-line rules in legislation.
5.2.4.2 Duty of Good Faith: Nominee Director
The starting point for good faith in the context of nominee directors can be found
in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer.102 Here, a majority
shareholder maximised his own interests at the expense of the company's interests by
setting up a competing business and cutting of the company's suppliers. The majority
shareholder's nominee directors were aware of the majority's intention to destroy the
company, but kept silent and failed to take necessary steps to protect the company
against the majority's misconduct. In this case, Lord Denning concluded that,
They [the nominee directors] probably thought that "as nominees" of the
co-operative society their first duty was to the co-operative society. In this they
were wrong. By subordinating the interests of the textile company to those of the
co-operative society, they conducted the affairs of the textile company in a
manner oppressive to the other shareholders.103
This decision clearly stated that the nominees' duties were owed solely to the
company, and they are bound to exercise their powers and discretions in the interests
of the company in preference to the interests of their principal.104 Adhering to this
principle, the decision of Kregor v Hollins105 affirms that an agreement is unlawful,
where it contains a provision under which a nominee director must subordinate the
102 [1959] AC 324.
103 ibid 368
104 E. Boros, 'The Duties of Nominee and Multiple Director' (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 211, 213
105 (1913) 109 LT 225
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company's interests to their nominee or a particular group of shareholders.106
In the Boulting v ACTAT107 Street J narrowly interpreted this principle. He held
that once a director has taken his position on the board he must exercise his power
only in the interests of the company as a whole considering the interests of the
members as a collective group in preference to the interests of his appointer.108
However this strict approach is widely criticised by lawyers as "impossibly high" or
to "ignore the commercial reality"109. Parsons stated:
The director who is a nominee of a substantial shareholder is between the devil
and the deep blue sea. Happily perhaps for his peace of mind he is most often
unaware of the company law principles. No doubt he will only remain a director
while he furthers the wishes of the shareholder by whom he was appointed.110
The strict test under which a nominee director must not take their nominators'
interests into consideration may put the nominee in an impossible position. Under
these circumstances, a more lenient approach to the nominee director's duty should be
adopted. In Re Broadcasting Station 2GB111, the strict approach was tempered in
Jacobs J's judgment. His lordship reached the view that nominee directors can have
regard to their nominator's interests provided that the director has a reasonable belief
that he is acting consistently with the company's interests as a whole.112 This
objective standard arguably is more consistent with the general commercial reality.113
106 (1913) 109 LT 225
107 [1963] 2 QB 606
108 P. Crutchfield, 'Nominee Director: the Law and Commercial Reality' (1991) 12 Company Lawyer
109, 138
109 E. Boros (n 104) 218; and P. Crutchfield ibid 138
110 R. Parsons 'The Directors Duty of Good Faith' (1956-1957) 5 Melbourne University Law Review
418
111 (1913) 109 L.T. 225, 228, C.A.
112 See P. Crutchfield (n 108) 139
113 ibid. However, others have argued that from a practical point of view, the difference between Jacobs
J's approach and Lord Denning's decision is ambiguous and immeasurable. Different approaches may
achieve the same conclusion in practice. See E. Boros (n 102) 218
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Nominee director's duties are subject to a legal vacuum under Chinese law, as the
Company Law 2005 is silent on these duties. By contrast, the CSRC has made some
effort to regulate the relationship between nominee directors and their nominators by
imposing duties on majority shareholders rather than nominee directors. For example,
Art.26 of the Corporate Governance Guideline says that the board of directors and
supervisory board of listed companies are independent organs which are not subject to
the majority shareholder's control. The majority shareholder and its subsidiaries must
not directly or indirectly influence the business and investment of listed companies
and their subsidiaries through any informal procedure (e.g. mandate or instruction). In
addition, Art.27 prevents the majority shareholder and its subsidiaries from entering
into competing business with a listed company. Aside from the issue of the extent to
which the CSRC enforces these legal principles, the real concern here is that majority
shareholder's duties should not be isolated from a nominee director's duties. Generally
majority shareholders' who prejudice minority interests need their nominee directors'
assistance to do so, especially in the listed companies where ownership and control is
separate. As Lord Denning held in Boulding v. Assn. of Cinematograph Television
and Allied Technicians114,
take a nominee director, that is, a director of a company who is nominated by a
large shareholder to represent his interests. There is nothing wrong in it. It is done
every day. Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director is left free to exercise
his best judgment in the interests of the company which he serves. But if he is put
on terms that he is bound to act in the affairs of the company in accordance with
the directions of his patron, it is beyond doubt unlawful.115
The law should send a clear signal that nominee directors would be in breach of their
duty if they prefer their nominator's interests to those of the company, where they
honestly believe that a nominator is acting in his own interests to the detriment of the
114 [1963], 2 A.C. 606
115 ibid 626-627
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company. Therefore, an approach which only imposes duties on majorities is not
sufficient to protect the Company's interests.
The absence of a nominee director's duty can be attributed to ideological
considerations. As we have already mentioned, employee representation on the board
of director is a mandatory requirement for companies which are mainly invested in by
the State. Therefore, such a law may conflict with China's socialist tradition, where it
includes a strict rule under which nominee directors must exercise their powers in the
interests of the company while disregarding the nominator's interests. However, the
difficult position taken by the employee nominated director is not an issue unique to
China.
In response to this issue in the UK, the suggestion made by Bullock Committee
was that
[it] would be unrealistic not to expect … employee representatives … to argue
strongly at board level for the interests of their constituents… [but their ultimate
duty should be]… to weigh up the differing and conflicting interests in the
company in order to reach decisions which they genuinely believe to be in the
company's overall best interests.116
This suggestion, which is similar to the approach adopted by Jacobs J in the Re
Broadcasting Station 2GB case, may be workable in the Chinese context. However,
an unanswered question is whether an employee director should be entitled to
subordinate the company's interests to the employee's interests in accordance with the
socialist tradition. A recently issued administrative regulation provides guidance in
this regard. The Regulation on Employee Directors in Wholly State-Owned
116 Bullock Committee Report (1977) para 52. See also E. Boros (n 104) 216
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Enterprises117 suggests that there is no difference between the duties of employee
directors and other non-employee directors and that an employee director should
carefully weight up the conflict between company and employee interests. These
provisions and the Bullock Committee's suggestions are essentially similar. Both
suggest that it goes too far to allow an employee director to pursue their nominator's
interests at the expense of the company's interests.
Overall it is not unrealistic to implement a nominee director's duty of good faith
in the Chinese context. A statutory enactment similar to Ghana's Companies Code
which enables nominees to give "special but not exclusive consideration" to the
interests of the class they represent should be introduced in China.118 The reform
proposal is as follows:
A nominee director is presumed not to be in breach their fiduciary duties by
taking their nominator's interests into consideration or acting in accordance with their
nominator's instruction, unless one of the following circumstances is present:
(1) in so doing the director does not have a bona fide belief that he is also
promoting the interests of the company as a whole; or
(2) no honest and reasonable director could have formed the view that in so doing
the director was also promoting the interests of the company as a whole.119
These dual standards adopted in Re Broadcasting Station 2GB are combined
using both subjective and objective tests. The first circumstance above is a subjective
test which is only satisfied where the plaintiff can prove that the director's decision is
not based on his subjective belief that the company' interests is identical with the
117 ‘Dongshi Hui Shidian Zhongyang Qiye Zhigong Dongshi Lvxing Zhize de Guanli Banfa’
[Regulation on Employee Directors in Wholly State-Owned Enterprises] issued by State-owned Assets
Supervision &Administration Commission on 7thApril 2009
118 Davies (n 4) 528
119 P. Crutchfield (n 108) 139 and 141
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nominator's interests. This test is relatively difficult to satisfy. In addition to this
orthodox test, the second one inserts an objective standard of reasonableness into the
regime, which enables judges to play a more active role in judicial review by deciding
whether the decision is "reasonable" based on their understanding of societal
standards.
5.2.4.3 Conclusion
To conclude, this part first explained the importance of the duty of good faith in
controlling agency cost in a context where insiders are powerful. It then discussed
how to integrate the duty of good faith into China's legal regime. With appropriate
modifications, the standards relating to duties of good faith in UK case law can be
workable criteria, which fill a gap of China's company law. However, well-drafted
legal provisions, although important, are still not determinative. Duties of good faith
are not only about a set of perfectly designed legal rules, but are also achieved
through positive legal actions in the real world. As Jacobs J states,
The fiduciary duties of directors spring from the general principles, developed in
courts of equity, governing the duties of all fiduciaries -- agents, trustees,
directors, liquidators and others -- and it must be always borne in mind that in
such situations the extent and degree of the fiduciary duty depends not only on
the particular relationships, but also on the particular circumstances.120
Numerous UK legal sources addressed in this paper stem from judicial practice from
the last hundred years. This includes a bundle of general legal principles that have fit
into the model market economy. However, it is unwise to expect legal transplant to
achieve a one model fits all effect. Reforming the law on paper is only the beginning
for the development of duties of good faith in China's legal system. Its evolution in
the local context relies on profound judicial understandings of local commercial
120 Levin v. Clark, (1962) NSWR 686
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reality, skilful judicial analysis of factual evidence in each case and insightful legal
reasoning on a case by case basis.
5.2.5 Task II: Reforming the "No-Conflict Rule"
In China, the "no-conflict rule" is particularly important. As a result of the
multiple levels of agency relationship,121 insider-dealing and misappropriation of
corporate opportunities by directors and executives will cause loss to State-owned
assets. When these issues extend to State ownership, they are not merely legal issues,
but become closely related to political stability and the national economy. This part
will particularly focus on two doctrines of the "no-conflict rule": One is concerning
"self-dealing transactions" and the other is the "corporate opportunities doctrine".
5.2.5.1 Self-dealing Transactions
The law concerning self-dealing governs transfer of property by a company to its
director and vice versa.122 A self-dealing transaction is fundamentally different from
an arm's-length transaction. In the latter type of transaction, both parties generally
lack the information to assess their best interests and the overall transaction cost.123
However, in a self-dealing transaction, there is usually asymmetric information
between the two parties. The director as a party of the transaction is better informed.
In short, the significance of self-dealing is that a director's involvement or interest on
the other side of the contract represents a potential threat to the company.124
In order to ensure that both parties hold an equal amount of information, the law
requires the self-dealing director to disclose all material information to the company.
Generally, self-dealing is permitted in both of Chinese and UK law, but the duty of
121 On this point, see Chapter II, section 2.3.2.
122 A. Walters, 'Companies Act 1985, s.320' (1998) 19(8) Company Lawyer 229
123 A. Griffith, 'Section 317 and Efficient Self-dealing: What Should an Interested Director Be
Required to Disclose?' (1999) 20(6) Company Lawyer 184
124 A. Griffith, Contracting with Companies (Hart Publishing 2005) 265
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disclosure is imposed on the interested director as a penalty default rule in both
jurisdictions.125 Under the Company Law 2005, a set of provisions have been issued
to regulate self-dealing transactions. However, some considerable weaknesses of the
legal regime need to be fixed.
5.2.5.1.1 The Ambit of Self-dealing Transactions
The concept of a self-dealing transaction should essentially cover a wide range of
possibilities from a director's direct involvement as a third party to the situation where
a director has a remote or indirect interest in a third party as a shareholder or
creditor.126 According to UK legislation, conflicts of interest can be divided into
direct interests and indirect interests. Indirect interest means that the director needs
not necessarily be a party to the transaction or arrangement.127 Both direct and
indirect interests can take a variety of forms.128
Direct interests can take the following forms:
� Transactions between a director and the company that the director serves
(Type I)
� Transactions between director and the subsidiaries of a company the director
serves (Type II)
Indirect interests can take the following forms:
� Transactions between a person to whom a director is connected and the
company that the director serves (Type I)
125 CA 2006, s.175; Company Law art. 142 (2005)
126 A. Griffith (n 124) 265
127 CA 2006 s.175
128 Here self-dealing is defined in a broad sense. It takes both the self-dealing transaction and the
substantial property transaction into consideration.
187
� Transactions between a person to whom a director is connected and the
subsidiaries of the company that the director serves (Type II)
UK legislation in accordance with the above categorization provides a set of
systematic rules to regulate both direct and indirect interest conflicts between
directors and companies. According to the 2006 Act, in a normal proposed transaction
where a director has interests, he should disclose these to the board. In this sort of
transaction, the general principle is that a contract involves self-dealing where a
director has the beneficial interests of the third party. Thus even if the interest is only
a small shareholding, a director should disclose this to the company.129 Secondly, in
substantial property transactions,130 disclosure requirements are stricter. A director's
personal relationship will be deemed to be a cause of conflict of interest. It triggers
mandatory disclosure, no matter whether the director will actually obtain any interest
by taking advantage of this relationship. Additionally, the director is required to
disclose any conflict interest between himself or a person connected to him and the
subsidiaries of the company he serves. Under the substantial property transaction
doctrine, persons deemed connected to a director include:
(a) members of a director's family;
(b) a body corporate with which the director is connected;
(c) a person acting in his capacity as trustee of a trust (i) the beneficiary of which
is the director, or a person who is connected with the director by virtue of (a) and (b),
(ii) the terms of which confer a power on the trustee that may be exercised for the
benefit of the director or any such person;
129 A. Griffith (n 124) 275
130 Similar to the UK, in Chinese legal system, there is a concept of a substantial self-dealing
transaction. See Independent Director Guidelines (2001) Chapter 5, subsection 1. For the concept of
substantial property transaction in the UK legislation, see CA 2006, s.191
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(d) a person acting in his capacity as partner of the director or a person connected
with the director by virtue of (a), (b), (c).
(e) a legal person under the law by which it is governed and in which- (i) the
director is a partner (ii) his connected person by virtue of (a) (b) (c) is a partner (iii)
the partner is a firm in which the director or his connected person by virtue of (a) (b)
(c) is a partner.
A director's connected persons do not include a person who is himself a director
of the company.131
Similarly, Company Law 2005 includes a concept of a "connected relationship".
Art. 217 says that a "connected relationship" indicates the relationship between a
company's controlling shareholders, de facto controllers, directors, supervisors, senior
executives and the incorporated entity directly or indirectly controlled by the above
persons, and any other sort of relationship which may threaten the company's interests.
Additionally, Art.20 further states that the controlling shareholders, de facto
controllers, directors, supervisors, and senior executives of the company shall not
exploit the company's interests by taking advantage of their connected relationship.
However, in the section on director's duties, the law only requires disclosure by a
director under circumstances involving type I direct interests. It says that a director
must not enter into an agreement or transaction with the company by violating its
Articles of Association or without the approval of the general meeting. Again, one
might argue that the "catch-all" provision provided in Chinese Law can achieve a
functional equivalence to the UK legislation. The terminology of "any other sort
relationship" used in Chinese company law may well cover all types of connected
relationship specified by the UK's 2006 Act. Additionally, the recently issued
131 CA2006, s.252
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Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.36132 (Accounting Standards) lays down
some provisions regarding this issue. In accordance with the Accounting Standards,
listed companies must disclose related-party transactions through their financial
statements to the general public. It further confirms that a "related party transaction"
includes (i) transactions between executives or an executive's close family members
and the company, and (ii) transactions between executives of a holding company or
their close family members and the company.133
Even if the Chinese court could rightly define connected relationships based on
the catch-all provision on a case by case basis, the 2005 Law merely states that a
director must not use their connected relationship to undermine a company's interests.
It is logically inconsistent to conclude that this open-textual rule includes a
requirement under which a director is bound to disclose indirect interests in
substantial property transactions to members. Without a mandatory disclosure
requirement, directors could argue that unnecessary disclosure triggering the need for
shareholder approval will increase transaction costs for the company, especially where
they claim that they honestly believe that the transaction is in the best interests of the
company. Consequently, courts will struggle to decide whether a director has an
indirect conflict of interests in such a transaction. This will take up more judicial
resources and increase the difficulty of coming to a fair judgment. Under current
legislation, even for a substantial property transaction, a director need not disclose
direct or indirect interests, which conflict with the subsidiaries of the company he
serves. Moreover, the rules in the Accounting Standards are not reliable, since they
only require listed companies to disclose related party transactions. In other words,
they do not impose a duty of disclosure on individual directors in the event that a
director has an indirect conflict. Ironically, one might question how listed companies
can disclose related-party transactions if directors are under no obligation to inform
them those transactions are taking place. Clearly, the disclosure requirements for
132 Qiye Kuaiji Zhunze di 36 Hao [Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.36] issued by the Ministry
of Finance on 15th February 2006 (number 3)
133 ibid art.4 (9) and (10)
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self-dealing transactions require reform.
Many Chinese lawyers claim that the law should not keep silent on the issue of
whether a director needs to disclose a conflict interests between his family members
and the company he serves.134 This is particularly serious where the company is
controlled by a few insiders. In the case of New China Life Insurance, the chairman of
the board sold the company's projects at a considerably undervalued price to some
companies managed by his brothers. The chairman did not disclose the transaction to
the board or members. The result was that the boundary between the chairman's
personal assets and the corporate assets were completely blurred.135 However, a
director is free to argue that under the current legal regime he is under no obligation to
make such a disclosure. Chinese company law should clearly define the ambits of
conflict of interest by broadening the concept of connected relationship. Firstly, the
meaning of "family members" should be specified. In order to be consistent with the
Accounting Standards, all close family members should be deemed as "connected
persons". This concept refers to:
� a director's spouse
� a director's children and step children
� a director's parents and grandparents
� a director's brother and sister
� a director's aunt and uncle
134 Y. Li, 'Meigou Gongsifa Zhong Zhongshi Yiwu Yuanze de Qishi' [Duty of Loyalty in American
Corporate Law: What shall We Learn?] (2008) 30 (1) Dangdai Faxue [Modern Law Science] 121
135 N. Yu, D.D. Su & M.H. Ji, 'Neibu Ren Guan Guo Guang' [Guang Guoliang, an insider] (2005) 186
Caijing [Caijing Magazine], <http://www.caijing.com.cn/coverstory/2007-05-26/20527.shtml>
accessed 20th July 2011
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� a director's cousin
Secondly, the concept of "connected relationship" should cover both a director's
close relatives and companies in which a director has considerable direct or indirect
financial interest.136 Thus, the "connected relationship" should further extend to the
following entities:
(a) a director's family members;
(b) a firm or unincorporated business vehicle in which a director or his family
member is a partner or have substantial interests ( e.g. shares or debt);
(c) a person acting in his capacity as agent in an agent-principal relationship where
the principal is a director or a person who is connected with a director by virtue of
(a) and (b);
(d) a business partner of a director and a business partner of a person connected
with a director by virtue of (a) (b) and (c);
(e) a legal person or other unincorporated vehicle in which the partner is a firm in
which a director or his connected person by virtue of (a) (b) and (c), is a partner.
Finally, transactions between a director or his connected person and the
subsidiaries of the company he serves should also be subject to mandatory disclosure.
The concept of "family members" should be defined more broadly in China's
legislation than it is in the UK law. In the UK, excessive burdens would be exerted on
directors and their companies if the concept of family members were broadly defined.
This results in a wide array of transactions needing approval from the members,
136 B. Black and others (n 70), 68
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which would adversely affect the efficiency of business activities.137 Additionally,
over-strict liability may discourage high quality individuals from becoming corporate
directors.138 Therefore, this mandatory member approval is only applied to
particularly risky transactions.139 By contrast, it is worth pursuing the safety of
transactions at the expense of efficiency in China, as minority shareholders bear more
serious risks from powerful insiders within the business environment. Furthermore,
defining the ambit of family members and connected persons in a broad sense can
alleviate the pressure faced by judges. Judges can make fair judgments based simply
on whether a director has made a proper disclosure to the members rather than using a
bundle of objective tests to review complicated factual evidence. Thus, defining
"family members" in a broad sense as well as widening the ambit of director's duty of
disclosure can reduce the risks borne by companies and their minority shareholders.
In addition to the technical considerations, the Chinese cultural context should be
taken into consideration.140 One of the fundamental Confucian teachings is Li, which
is usually translated as being a "moral rule of correct conduct and good manners".141
Li consists of five fundamental relationships which a Chinese person should properly
engage in. These five relationships include: "ruler and subject, father and son,
husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friend and friend."142 From these
137 E.g. Chapter 2 of the Company Law Reform Bill - White Paper 2005 published on 17th March 2005
says: "A genuinely modern and effective framework can promote enterprise, enhance competitiveness
and stimulate investment." at page 8, Chapter 3 also says: "It is important however that the duties [of
non-conflict of interest] do not impose impractical and onerous requirements which stifle
entrepreneurial activities." at page 21 Following this ideology the UK government is unlikely to launch
corporate rules which offer excessive protection to shareholders and stakeholders at the expense of
business efficiency. However, this kind of all-round protection may meet the needs of the Chinese
context.
138 See ibid at Chapter 3, which says "The law on directors' liability needs to strike a care balance:…
on the other, Britain needs a diverse pool of high-quality individuals willing to assume the role of
company directors, and a willingness by directors to take informed and rational risks." at page 24
139 B. Black and others (n 70) 62
140 On how culture can affect the related party transaction in general, see M. Roe, 'Can Culture
Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law' (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1262
and A. Licht, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate
Governance System', (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147, 192-194
141 L.T. Lee & W.W. Lai, 'The Chinese Conception of Law: Confucian, Legalist and Buddhist' (1978)
29 Hastings Law Journal 1307, 1308
142 ibid 1308 and C. Rarick, 'Confucius on Management: Understanding Chinese Cultural Values and
Managerial Practices' (2007) 2 Journal of International Management Studies 22
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five relations, it is apparent that Confucianism is founded on a clan-based, blood
related society. Indeed, in Confucian society, a large family usually provides
educational, moral and material support to its members. In turn, family members are
obliged by a moral obligation to pursue the interests of their immediate family or
other family members, when they have power to do so.143 As Wang concludes,
"different from their counterparts in Western world, the rule of fair play is not the
tradition for Chinese businessmen. In the Chinese business world, plain fact is that
kinship determines property relationships."144 Compared to Western people, the
Chinese rely heavily on kinship in doing business. In such circumstances, they are
more likely to facilitate a family member's interests at the expense of their employer's
interests. The result of this cultural difference is that the risk of directors disclosing
insider information to family members is considerably more acute in China.
Furthermore, as a result of the one-child policy, many studies indicate that younger
Chinese generations have closer relationships between cousins than ever before.145
Accordingly, their relationships with uncles and aunts also need to be subjected to the
mandatory disclosure rule.
Furthermore, section 252(c) of the UK's 2006 Act regarding related persons,
would be inactive in the Chinese context because the concept of "trust" is unfamiliar
to most Chinese businessmen, lawyers and judges. By contrast, principal-agent
relationships are far more familiar for Chinese lawyers and judges.146 Therefore, the
"trust relationship" specified in UK legislation should be replaced by the
"principal-agent relationship" in the Chinese legal system.147
143 See above, Chapter IV, section 4.2.2. 1,112-114
144 D.D. Wang, Shichang Jijin de Daode Jichu [Market Economy and Its Morality] (Shanghai Renmin
Chubanshe 2007) [People' Publisher Shanghai 2007] 62-63
145 P. Wang, 'Dusheng Zinv Zhengze Shifou Gaibian le Zhongguo de Jiating Jiegou? Yige Shizheng
Yanjiu' [Did One-child Policy Change the Traditional Family-relationship in China? A Empirical
Research] (2004) 20 Nanjin She Hui Kexue [Studies of Social Science Nanjing University] 322
146 E.g. in CNKI (the largest Chinese on-line library covering most disciplines of social science),
searched search for "principal agent relationship" uncovers 783 results including journal articles,
conference papers and articles in newspapers. By contrast, only 76 results are retrieved under the term
"trust relationship".
147 For a more detailed introduction of the content of "principal-agent relationship" in the context of
company in China, see section 5.2.5.2.2.3.1 below.
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Finally, the form taken by the regulatory regime is also important. In term of
controlling self-dealing transaction, the CA 2006 enables companies to tailor their
regulatory strategy through article of association. For example, section 175
sub-section 5 says that, authorisation (to director’s conflict interests in proposed
transaction) may be given by the directors—
(a) where the company is a private company and nothing in the company’s
constitution invalidates such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to and
authorised by the directors; or
(b) where the company is a public company and its constitution includes
provision enabling the directors to authorise the matter, by the matter being proposed
to and authorised by them in accordance with the constitution.
As mentioned, the Chinese Company Law 2005 also provides considerable number of
enabling and default rules which make companies have flexibility in designing their
regulatory regime.148 However, it is still not clear whether or not this flexible
approach can be directly used in the context of controlling self-dealing transaction in
China. This dissertation will discuss this issue in later part.149
5.2.5.1.2. What Should a Director Disclose?
It is unclear what directors are bound to disclose to the board or general meeting
in order to satisfy the disclosure requirement. In Imperial Mercantile Credit
Association v Coleman,150 Lord Chelmsford held that the disclosure of interest
includes "not merely the declaration of the existence of the interest but the nature of
that interest" because this "may be a most important element" in the considerations of
148 See above at section 4.2.3 141
149 See below at section 5.2.5.2.2.3.2 at 218
150 (1873) LR 6 HL 189
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those who have to decide whether a company should enter into a contract or not.151 In
addition to that, Lord Radcliffe advised the Privy Council that:
There is no precise formula that will determine the extent of detail that is called
for when a director declares his interest or nature of his interest. The amount of
detail required must depend in each case upon the nature of the contract or
arrangement proposed and the context in which it arises. His declaration must
make his colleagues fully informed of the real state of the thing.152
According to these decisions, section 177 of the 2006 Act requires a director with an
interest in a self-dealing transaction to disclose the "nature and extent" of that interest.
Nonetheless, the nature and extent of an interest is still an opaque concept.
The Law Commission's Consultation Paper153 made some suggestions in respect
of this problem. Paragraph 4.96 states that a director should be required to disclose the
"material interests" of the proposed self-dealing transaction. The term "material" was
interpreted as follows:
� material in the sense that the board would normally consider a transaction of
this type to be material;
� material to the director; or
� material to the company.
Material interests could be defined as being "those whose disclosure might reasonably
151 ibid 201
152 Grey v Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1.
153 The Law Commission, 'Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating A
Statement of Duties', 1999 (Law Com no 261/ Scot Law Com no 173 A joint report with the Scottish
Law Commission, Reference number: LC261/SLC173)
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be expected to affect the decisions of the board".154 Finally, this approach is not
adopted by the 2006 Act, as courts are reluctant to upset Lord Radcliffe's "no precise
formula" approach and run the risk of being under-inclusive in using a narrowly
defined approach.155
The Chinese 2005 Company Law together with the CSRC's administrative
regulations do not include any provisions related to what directors should disclose to
the board or general meeting in self-dealing transactions. The only guidance given is
the requirement set out in the Accounting Standards (No.36), which state that a
company is obliged to disclose the following information on related-party transactions
to the general public:
1. the nature of the relationship between the related party and the company; and
2. the type of related party-transaction (e.g. purchase or sales of goods, leasing etc.)
If these accounting requirements are taken as a starting point, a director at least
needs to disclose the existence of interests and the amount of his interest in the
proposed self-dealing transaction. Consequently, standards and mandatory rules
should be designed as follows:
1. A director must disclose the "existence and the nature" of a conflict of
interests:
2. If the amount of the director's interest is able to be quantified, the director must
disclose the existence and the amount of the interest; or
154 ibid 93-94
155 The Consultation Paper clearly outlined concerns that "this approach is also likely to result in
situation arising in which a director should be taken to be interested but which fall outside the statutory
list", (n 153) 94.
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3. If the amount of the director's interest is not quantifiable, a director must
disclose the information that the board would normally consider in a transaction
of this type;
4. A director is only entitled to retain the interests from the self-dealing
transaction which is appropriately disclosed.
5.2.5.2 Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
5.2.5.2.1 General Introduction
During the planned economic period, business opportunity was not important to
Chinese enterprises which were required to carry out productivity in accordance with
government instructions. However, now that a quasi-market economy has been
implemented in China over 30 years (1978-2011), business opportunity has become
one of the main sources of profit for both individuals and companies. Under such
conditions, there is an emerging phenomenon that executives tend to exploit a
company's opportunities for their own benefit.156 The newly enacted company law is
an immediate response to this challenge. Article 149 of Company Law 2005 makes
directors and executives who make profits by exploiting corporate opportunities
without member' approval liable to disgorge profits to the company. This provision
attempts to establish a formal procedural rule, which imposes a duty of disclosure on
directors, while enabling members to authorise directors to exploit certain
opportunities. In addition, it confirms that directors who use their employers' business
opportunities without proper authorization are not only liable for the company's losses
but are bound to disgorge the profits they make. However, the current legislation still
leaves some important notions unclear. Firstly, the ambits of "corporate opportunity"
remain vague. Under the current legal regime, it is still unclear whether judges should
156 J.H. Liu, Xin Gongsi fa de Zhidu Chuangxin: Lifa Zhengdian yu Jieshi Nandian [Institutional
Innovation of New Corporate Law: Legislative and Judicial Controversies] Falv Chuban She 2006
[Law Press China 2006] 400
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rely on a series of tests to identify corporate opportunity or whether they should
employ a much stricter approach by regarding all conduct which uses business
opportunity on an unauthorised basis as breach of the duty of loyalty. Secondly, under
the current legislative framework, no provision clarifies whether a resigned director is
entitled to use a mature opportunity outside his former directorship. Later parts of this
section will provide some solutions to both these issues using a comparative analysis.
5.2.5.2.2 Drawing the Ambits of Corporate Opportunity
This part will not only discuss the UK's approach to corporate opportunity, but
also the Delaware approach. The reason for incorporating the Delaware approach into
this research is two-fold. Firstly, as stated earlier, the corporate opportunity doctrine is
merely at the nascent stage in Chinese company law. As a result, there is little reliable
judicial practice to investigate. This means that Western experiences are particular
important. The comparison of Delaware's approach and the UK's approach to
corporate opportunity can provide a theoretical framework for formulating the
corporate opportunity doctrine in the Chinese context. Secondly there are strong calls
for the flexible approach adopted in Delaware case law to be introduced into the
Chinese legislative framework, due to its considerable advantages in promoting
economic efficiency.157 For the same reason, some English lawyers have argued that
the UK approach should be replaced by Delaware's corporate opportunity doctrine.158
These arguments complicate this research. Before dealing with detailed technical
issues, it is essential to answer the important question of whether the UK's approach
to corporate opportunity is still a proper model for the Chinese company law to adopt
if Delaware's approach has some overwhelming advantages. At the beginning, this
part will therefore introduce the two leading common law approaches to corporate
opportunity, before explaining the implications behind these approaches. Finally, on
157 Y. Li, (n 134), 121-128; and L.Q. Li, 'Gongsi Jihui Lilun Ji Xin Gongsi Fa 149 Tiao Shiyong Yiyi'
(Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the Interpretation of art.149 of the Company Law 2005) (2008)
24 (1) Zhongguo Shiyou Daxue Xuebao [Journal of China University of Petroleum] 50
158 J. Lowry and R. Edmunds, 'The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting Boundaries of the
Duty and its Remedies' (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 515
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the basis of that analysis, it will make some further suggestions regarding the
development of the corporate opportunity doctrine in China.
5.2.5.2.2.1 Formulating an Analytical Framework for Developing
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
5.2.5.2.2.1.1 UK's Approach v. Delaware's Approach: A Legal Analysis
The resemblance between the exploration of corporate opportunity and
self-dealing transactions should be noted from the outset. A director is the arms, eyes
and brain of a company. This means that, compared to members, executives are in a
better position to access accurate information. Meanwhile the members rely heavily
on their expertise. As a result of this information asymmetry, it is necessary to enact a
strict rule by which the executives can be prevented from appropriating a company's
opportunity. However, it would be unfair to ignore the fact that from another
perspective directors are merely the normal employees of a company.159 From this
perspective, they should be entitled to exploit business opportunities, which are not
related to a company's interests. Given these subtleties, it is difficult to formulate a
series of concrete standards to distinguish between a company's interests and a
director's personal interests. In the UK, corporate opportunity cases are generally
reviewed under the overriding principle of the "no-conflict rule".160 Therefore, in
most cases courts will disregard questions about whether the opportunity belongs to
the company or whether the company has a beneficial interest in the opportunity.161
Arguably, Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver162 is the most influential corporate
opportunity case in the UK. Regal Ltd, which operated a cinema, obtained an
opportunity to lease two additional cinemas. It prepared to sell all three cinemas to an
159 See Canadian Aero Service v O' Malley [1973] 40 D. L. R. (3rd) at 382 per Lord Laskin J's
reasoning.
160 See, for example, P. Koh, 'Principle 6 of the Proposed Statement of Director's Duty' (2003) 66 The
Modern Law Review 898
161 D. Kershaw, 'Does It Matter How the Law Think about Corporate Opportunities' (2005) 25(4) Legal
Studies 543
162 [1942] 1 All E.R.
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outsider. For this purpose, a subsidiary was formed. However, Regal was financially
incapable of satisfying the landlord's conditions, which required it to pay the share
capital of £5,000. Additionally Regal's directors were reluctant to grant a personal
guarantee for the rent. Finally, two directors and Regal's solicitor decided to purchase
the shares which Regal was unable to pay using its own funds. Three weeks later,
following Regal's sale, both the directors and the solicitor made considerable profits.
The new controllers of Regal filed litigation against the former directors. The House
of Lords upheld the plaintiff's claim. Lord Russell held that,
The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make
a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or
absence of bona fide… The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having…
The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the risk of
being called upon to account.163
This decision introduced a strict "no-profit rule", first established in the landmark
trust law case of Keech v Stanford164, into the law of corporate opportunity.165 This
means that a company's opportunity does not cease to be so merely because the
company is financially unable to exploit it.166 Furthermore, a more recent case denies
the application of the "line of business test"167 in corporate opportunity cases. In
O'Donnell v Shanahan,168 the Court of Appeal reconfirms the strictness and
inflexibility of the "no conflict rule". It held that the "scope or line of business"169 is
not relevant in considering the extent and application of the no conflict and no profit
rules in so far as they applied to fiduciaries such as trustees and directors.170 In other
words, directors are not allowed to exploit opportunities without the members'
163 ibid 144-145
164 [1726] Sel Cas Ch61
165 J. Lowry and R. Edmunds (n 158) 517
166 P. Davies (n 4) 562
167 For the concept of "line of business test", see below at 202-203.
168 [2009] BBC 822 (CA)
169 ibid
170 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 354
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authorization, even if there is only "a real, sensible, possibility of conflict".171
This strict ethic seems to have been adopted in the 2006 Act. Indeed, whilst
corporate opportunity is subject to the no-conflict rule under s.175, the no-conflict
rule would heavily overlap with the no-profit rule, where it is defined in a broad
sense.172 Section 175(2) plays a considerable role in maintaining the strict approach
by emphasizing that "it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of
the property, information or opportunity". However, some commentators argue that
this orthodox approach is out of fashion. Bhullar v Bhullar173may be a good starting
point to understanding this argument. In this case, a family company was in deadlock.
Two of the company's directors had invested in real estate which was beside the
company's property. Before this investment was made, these two directors had learned
that the board had a clear intention to limit the company's business by restricting its
scope. Therefore, arguably the interested directors had reasonable grounds to assume
that the board did not want the company to purchase more properties. Accordingly, in
this particular situation, this business strategy would lead the company to deny the
business opportunity of purchasing an additional real property which was located in
the company's next door. On the basis of this assumption, although the interested
directors were aware of that the company's value would be promoted by acquiring its
next door property, they did not disclose this business opportunity to the company.
After purchasing this property, the company filed a petition against the directors based
on the unfair prejudice doctrine and a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeal
held that the interested directors were liable for a breach of fiduciary duty occasioned
by misappropriating the company's business opportunity. However, this decision is
widely criticised by lawyers on the basis that the facts of Bhullar indicated that,
unlike in Regal where the directors intend to act opportunistically, the company took
the initiative to restrict its future activities. Furthermore, there was no firm evidence
to indicate that the directors took advantage of their positions in order to bring the
171 D. Kershaw (n 161) 537
172 ibid
173 [2003] 2 B. C. L. C. 241, CA
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opportunity to maturity and then usurped it from the company. Therefore it could be
argued the court paid little attention to the differences between the facts of Bhullar
and Regal. Davies argues the court's decision in Bhullar results in a questionable
extension of the criteria for identifying a corporate opportunity.174 Following this line
of thought, some suggest that a more flexible approach to corporate opportunity
should be transplanted into the UK. US corporate law, especially the case law of
Delaware, is regarded to be the best model for this legislative reform.175
The flexible attitude adopted by the Delaware courts can be unpacked by looking
at the leading case of Guth v Loft.176 Mr Guth was a dominant director who
substantially controlled the management of Loft Inc (Loft). Loft's line of business
covered several different sectors. One of them was the manufacture of syrup for soft
drinks. Guth bought a secret syrup recipe from Pepsi and proposed to develop Pepsi
into a nationwide brand by taking advantage of Loft's financing, manufacturing and
retailing assistance. The court found Guth liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Judge D. J. Layton held that,
if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity
which the corporation if financially able to undertake, which is, from its nature, in
the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in
which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by
embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be
brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to
seize the opportunity for himself.177
Following the tests laid out in Guth, courts would generally examine whether the
opportunity was (1) within the "avowed business propose" of the business; (2)
174 P. Davies (n 4) 566
175 J. Lowry and R. Edmunds (n 158) 515
176 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)
177 Guth, 5 A.2d 503, 511
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reasonably incident to its present or prospective operation; or (3) so closely associated
with the existing and prospective activities of the corporation that the defendants
should fairly have acquired that business for or made it available to the corporation.178
These inquiries underlie the traditional tests for corporate opportunity in Delaware,
namely the "line of business test", "interest/expectancy test" and "fairness test".
So far, the technical differences between the Delaware approach and the UK
approach can be roughly drawn. According to Lowery and Edmonds, the strict
approach laid down in Keech v Sandford is fully applied to directors who enter into
trust relationships with the company. Therefore, the UK courts do not pay much
attention to investigating the circumstances surrounding a breach. Liability is
triggered simply on the basis of the capacity of a profiteer. By contrast, the Delaware
approach unties the determinate relationship between directorial fiduciary capacity
and the strict liability of using corporate opportunity. It places more emphasis on a
close analysis of the facts in each case, while reducing the strictness of pre-existing
principles in judicial practice.179 For example, in Broz v Cellular Information System
Inc180, the court held that,
It is important to note, however, that the test enunciated in Guth and subsequent
cases provide guidelines to be considered by a reviewing court in balancing the
equities of an individual case. No one factor is dispositive and all facts must be
taken into account insofar as they are applicable.181
Thus, compared with the orthodox approach underpinned by the strict "no-profit rule"
or "no-conflict rule", the Delaware approach seemingly has a better level of pragmatic
flexibility to hold the tension between capitalist principles which encourage
profit-making and equity's strict rule governing liability. As Lowery and Edmonds
178 M. Salzwedel, 'A Contractual Theory of Corporate Opportunity and A Proposed Statute' (2002-2003)
23:83 Pace Law Review 100
179 J. Lowry and R. Edmunds (n 158) 524
180 Del Supr, 637 A2d 148 (1996)
181 ibid 155
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conclude, "[the Delaware approach] facilitates directorial entrepreneurialism within a
matrix firmly rooted in the notion of prophylaxis."182
Nevertheless, if we look at the flexible approach closer, it is not difficult to find
that it complicates the process of identifying corporate opportunity. Firstly, in respect
of the "line of business test", as Davies argues, "[a] Company's business models
rapidly change from time to time. Therefore it is difficult for the director to properly
identify whether the opportunity is within the scope of the company's opportunity."183
Furthermore, some vivid examples which could manifest the limitations of this test
can be easily found. For instance, an opportunity to purchase adjacent land may not be
in the line of a company's business or have anything to do with operating a golf
course, but it may still be "detrimental to the best interests of the club' if the course
plans to expand in the future".184 As this example illustrates, although the "line of
business test" is arguably the broadest of the Guth tests,185 it would still suffer from
considerable under-inclusiveness. By contrast, the "interest/expectancy test" is
considerably narrower than the "line of business test". It only prevents directors from
misappropriating a project or opportunities to which the company has a present
contractual right.186 In addition, its different formulation from that of the "line of
business test" causes much uncertainty in judicial practice. Just as Koh explains, "it is
not clear what the boundaries of impermissible conduct are, the answer depending on
first, which test is adopted and, second, how the requirements of the particular test are
interpreted by the relevant court".187 Finally, the fairness test is also under threat of
problems of indeterminacy. In corporate opportunity cases, US courts, like their UK
counterparts, do not generally take concepts of good or bad faith into account.188 This
182 J. Lowry and R. Edmunds (n 158) 525
183 P. Davies (n 4) 566. For a similar point, see S. Scott, 'The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and
Impossibility Arguments' (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 858
184 M. Salzwedel (n 178) 101
185 P. Koh, 'Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary?' (2003) 62 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 403, 411-412
186 P. Koh (n 185) 411
187 ibid 414
188 According to M. Salzwedel, "Concepts of good or bad faith are usually not evaluated in making an
in making an initial determination whether an opportunity is corporate in nature" (see M. Salzwedel (n
174) at 101)
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means that whether it is "fair" for a director to use an opportunity relies entirely on the
courts' discretion. In sum, Delaware case law has established a group of standards for
identifying corporate opportunity. However, just as Judge D. J. Layton said in Guth,
"the standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale."189 These open-ended
standards trigger a high degree of uncertainty surrounding corporate opportunity
cases.190. Taking all these factors into consideration, concluding that "uncertainty and
ambiguity [in the context of corporate opportunity], resulting in guessing game as to
the corporate fiduciary's freedom of action"191 should not be a surprise.
To conclude, corporate opportunity cases are generally reviewed under a broadly
defined no-conflict rule in the UK. Compared to the open-ended standards employed
by Delaware's case law, the UK's approach seems to be "inflexible", "inveterate" and
"rigid".192 By contrast, Delaware's approach which has no structured principle has the
leeway of allowing a change in position on the basis of the facts of each case.
However, this attractive flexibility in the Delaware approach is at the expense of legal
certainty. Furthermore, in the UK, by implementing the strict approach, the integrity
of the duty of loyalty is well protected, whilst legal certainty regarding corporate
opportunity cases is promoted.193 Bearing all these differences in mind, it is necessary
to unpack the reasons behind these two different approaches, before examining which
approach is more likely to fit in with Chinese commercial reality.
5.2.5.2.2.1.2 Generalizing the Reasons behind the Different Approaches
Having examined the differences between the UK and Delaware approaches to
corporate opportunity, some light will be shed on the implications of these differences.
189 Guth, 5 A.2d 503, 510
190 D. Kershaw, 'Lost in Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative Perspective' (2005) 25(4)
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 603, 614
191 P. Koh (n 185) 415. On a similar point, see S.M Bainbridge, 'Rethinking Delaware's Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine' (November, 06 2008), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No.
08-17 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296962> accessed 20th July 2011
192 D. Kershaw (n 190) 622-623
193 D. Kershaw (n 190) 625-626
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In this part, the major reasons for the different approaches adopted by Delaware and
the UK will be highlighted.
Firstly, judicial differences can be explained from a philosophical perspective.
The UK's corporate opportunity approach, under which a fiduciary is obliged to
comply with the "no-conflict rule", has its own inner logic. In Bray v Ford194 Lord
Herschell noted that:
It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon
principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human
nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person
holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and
thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been
deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule. .195
Moreover, Kershaw in his article further elaborated on the philosophical
considerations behind of the strict approach. He wrote:
facts and evidence [of corporate opportunity cases] are deeply malleable and that
honest and trustworthy witnesses' perceptions and recollections of events and of
their own and other's actions may have been formed by the interrelationship of,
amongst others, non-aligned interests, friendship, professional trust and personal
pride… in many corporate opportunity situations "fairness" is not available for
determination as its factual foundation is inaccessible.196
Consequently, it is a matter of principle in the UK that a director should not be
allowed to make profit out of his office. This approach is underpinned by an
overriding philosophical dictum that decent commercial morality which is vitally
194 [1896] A.C. 44.
195 Bray v Ford , ibid 52-53
196 D. Kershaw (n 190) 621
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important to a sound economic environment would be effectively protected by
consistent and integrated duties of loyalty.197 Furthermore, the strict approach which
gets around investigations and observations about the detailed facts of each case, is
based upon a belief that the facts and evidence of the corporate opportunity cases are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fully ascertain.
By contrast, Delaware's approach to corporate opportunity is deeply influenced
by the "law and economics movement". In the context of company law, law and
economics theory is generally manifested in a hypothetical contractual model.
According to Cheffins, the hypothetical contract model is based on the idea that
"welfare-maximizing legal rules may be developed by ascertaining what transactors
would agree to under ideal contracting condition."198 Chew has applied this thought
to corporate opportunity cases. He argues that, "in the optimal situation the parties
will have an express agreement on how they expect to resolve the corporate
opportunity disputes. In the absence of this agreement, the courts should determine
what their reasonable expectation would have been."199 Therefore, under the
hypothetical contract mode, the reasoning behind Delaware's approach, which places
more weight on the idea of facilitation rather than prohibition, becomes
understandable.
To sum up, the prophylactic approach employed by the UK is underpinned by an
epistemology that dictates that consistency and stability of a legal regime should be
cautiously protected in order to retain the essence of commercial morality.
Consequently, moral philosophy plays an essential role in forming the approach to
corporate opportunity in the UK.200 By contrast, Delaware's approach which relies on
law and economics theories, would generally examine corporate opportunity in an
197 P. Koh (n 185) 403
198 B. Cheffins, Company Law Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997) 264
199 P. Chew, 'Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine' (1989) 67 North Carolina
Law Review 435
200 In many cases, there would be conflicts between "moral values" and "wealth maximization", e.g.
see R. Dworkin, 'Is Wealth a Value' (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191
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"efficiency-minded, gap-filling, or bargain-substitute" framework.201 This approach is
underpinned by a philosophical assumption that the main function of fiduciary duties
is to reduce transaction costs between parties.
Secondly, much evidence shows that different interests groups may present their
interests to legislators through lobbying. The influence of this should not be
underestimated.202 This factor may also explain the different corporate opportunity
approaches in these two jurisdictions. Kershaw has made an insightful analysis of the
dynamic powers involved in the evolution of Delaware's corporate opportunity
approach. He provided much evidence to show that Delaware's flexible approach
could be attributed to directors' lobbying efforts.203 Indeed, under the institutional
infrastructure in the US, persons and companies are free to incorporate or
re-incorporate in different states applying different policies that may be of benefit to
them. Therefore, all US states are under a competitive pressure to formulate attractive
policies, which would encourage persons to incorporate business vehicles in their
territories. It is widely recognised that Delaware wins this "charter competition" by
applying policies which favour managers who control incorporation and
re-incorporation decisions.204 Just as Kershaw concluded, "although the Delaware
legislature is subject to the demand of multiple-interest groups, including
management, shareholders and the bars, management interests are, on balance, likely
to have more weight as managers make the incorporation decision."205 Consequently
the flexible approach to corporate opportunity, to a large degree, could be regarded as
a result of the effects of "charter competition". By contrast, there is no equivalent
institutional pressure in the UK. Thus, it is understandable that UK legislation would
employ a stricter approach to retain its traditional shareholder-value dominated
201 M. Salzwedel (n 178) 90-91
202 M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 307
203 D. Kershaw (n 190) 610-612
204 ibid 611. See also L. Bebchuk, 'Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1443, 1462
205 D. Kershaw (n 190) 611
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ideology.206
Thirdly, issues regarding the general nature of the judiciary also have some
explanative power in relation to the differences between the UK and Delaware's
approaches. Cheffins argues that Delaware's judges might be more learned than their
UK counterparts in the field of company law. He notes that,
Delaware's court of chancery judges usually have prior background in the area
since most have practiced corporate law before coming to the bench and thus will
have had hands-on experience with the implementation of business
transactions. …[By contrast] since the typical English judge is a former barrister,
he will have had an almost entirely litigation-related practice and thus will not
have had the same experience with the mechanics of corporate deal-making.207
Additionally, Cheffins points out that UK company law is generally more
detailed than other jurisdictions, including the US, because it attempts to "provide
guidance to judges who are not well-suited to the task of applying rules which are
expressed in the form of broad, general principles" because "the judiciary, when
confronted with a situation where legislation fails to address directly a significant
issue, has customarily been reticent to fill in the gap."208 This argument sheds some
light on the different corporate opportunity approaches adopted by the UK and
Delaware. UK judges appear to rely on the strict rule set out in previous case law, as
they might not be well qualified to "pursue bold initiatives designed to reorganise
legal principle".209 By contrast, judges in Delaware may have the expertise to select
the applicable test or tests from a group of open-ended standards in accordance with
the facts of each case.
206 E.g. see B. Cheffins, 'Minority Shareholder and Corporate Governance' (2000) 21(2) Company
Lawyer 41, 42 and P. Davies, 'Shareholder Value: Company Law and Securities Markets Law - A UK
View' (October 2000) 3 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=250324> accessed 20th July 2011




This comparison between the UK's approach and Delaware's approach
generalises the major factors influencing the evolution of the corporate opportunity
doctrine; namely legal philosophy, institutional choice and judicial expertise. This has
provided an analytical framework with which to examine the development of the
corporate opportunity doctrine in the Chinese context.
5.2.5.2.2.2 Putting the Chinese Context into the Analytical Framework: A
General Picture
This part will address which of the two approaches to the corporate opportunity
doctrine (UK or Delaware) is more likely to fit in with the extant Chinese legal setting.
In fulfilling this task, this part will place the Chinese context within the analytical
framework formulated above. It will examine the Chinese context in relation to three
dimensions; namely legal philosophy, and institutional and legal technical
perspectives.
Chinese stock markets suffer from a shortage of sound extra-legal features,
especially decent commercial morality. As economist, Wang Dingding concludes
Lack of decent commercial morality is the major problem for the Chinese market
participants, including investors, managers and even labour forces. Some of them
are morally corrupted and lack of self-discipline. As a result, in the Chinese
market, "moral hazard" deters cooperation between parties.210
Another economist, Wu Xiaobo, concludes that
With the process of urbanization and the development of modern media, China is
witnessing exploitation, unfairness, ugliness and moral atrophy which are the
210 See D.D Wang, (n 144) 17
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by-products of brutal economic development. Powerful commercial empires
show their intelligence, endless energy and glorious to us, but also their greed and
selfishness…The Chinese should rebuild their commercial ethic urgently. 211
These arguments coupled with the corporate governance scandals mentioned in
former chapters,212 show that commercial morality has been undermined. However,
the lack of decent commercial morality in the market is not a result of the fact that the
ethical standards in society are ruined at large. As Lord Acton wrote, "absolute power
corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men".213 Therefore, weak law
or institutional devices which cannot promote sound commercial morality empower
people to be corrupt and greedy. In such an environment, regarding "efficiency" as an
overwhelming criterion above "commercial morality" and placing more emphasis on
the idea of "flexibility" in legislation, will keep the market under-regulated. A set of
flexible rules are not sufficient to foster the commercial morality of the market
participants. Consequently, this under-regulated market with a corrupt moral
environment would suffer from the "adverse selection effect"214 which vitally harms
the quality of the market.215 Therefore, from a philosophical perspective, protecting
commercial morality, rather than promoting economic efficiency, is a more important
goal for the current company law regime in China.
Indeed, Art.149 illustrates that some consideration of such matters has already
been made. For example, it establishes a mandatory requirement under which
authorization for a director's use of a corporate opportunity must be given by the
members, in both public and private companies. This rule which makes members'
211 X.B. Wu, 'Zhi Mei Laoban de Yifeng Xin' [A Letter to the Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mining
Industry] on Financial Time Chinese website; see also X. Liang, ‘Shichang Jiji Yaoqiu Daode Chongsu’
[Market Economy Calls Moral Reconstruction] (2002) 16 Zhongguo Jiji Liutong [China Business and
Market] 173
212 See chapter IV, section 4.2.2. 1,107-109.
213 'Letter to Mandell Creighton (5th April 1887), by John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton', in J. Figgis
and R. Laurence (eds.), Historical Essays and Studies (Macmillan and co., limited, 1907) 504
214 For the concept of "adverse selection" see Akerlof, George A., 'The Market for Lemons: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism' (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488
215 See B. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Security Markets' (2001) 48
University of California Los Angeles Law Review 781, 786-787
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approval compulsory would reduce the efficiency of company operations by
increasing costs associated with giving authorizations to directors.216 The reason for
this rule is that disinterested approval of a director's actions would pose a threat to the
substantive justice of such authorization. More specifically, disinterested directors
have no direct interest in a particular case. However, they may have an underlying
interest in culture of easy conflict approvals.217 Additionally, this risk would be
exacerbated by the clientelism-based cultural environment, which would promote
under-the-table transactions between disinterested directors and directors who attempt
to use opportunities for their own benefit.218 Moreover, Delaware's approach which is
based on the hypothetical contract model is unlikely to function in Chinese judicial
practice. Some observers have argued that, there is an obvious tension between the
moral stance which has long been adopted by the Chinese courts and the spirit of law
and economics.219 By interviewing Chinese judges, Cheng & Rosett found that "[in
China] the letter [in contract] must be softened by deference to the relationship of the
party and the moral demand of accommodation".220 Therefore, this approach which
does not entirely insist on precise terms of contract and parties' original intentions
might heavily reduce the functions of the hypothetical contract model in dealing with
corporate opportunity cases. To conclude, even disregarding the technical mismatch
between the hypothetical contract model and the approach for interpreting contracts
adopted by the Chinese courts, it is undeniable that philosophically the strict approach
which prioritises fostering a decent commercial morality would be more likely to
enable company law to solve problems in China.
216 In public companies, a general rule that requires approval from the general meeting would be less
costly than the requirement of members’ approval. E.g. S. Deakin & A. Hughe's empirical research
indicates that for public company with dispersed ownership structure, the transaction costs of obtaining
members' approval are high. See S. Deakin & A. Hughe, Director's Duties Empirical Findings (Report
to the Law Commission) reported in The Law Commission & The Scottish Law Commission,
'Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating A Statement of Duties' (August
1999) (n 149)
217 P. Davies (n 4) 568
218 For a detailed analysis, see J.Y. Wang 'The Strange Role of Independent Directors in a Two-tiers
Board Structure in Chinese Listed Companies' (2007) 3 Compliance & Regulatory Journal 47, 54
219 N. Zhu, 'A Case Study of Legal Transplant: The Possibility of Efficient Breach in China' (2005) 36
Georgetown Journal of International Law 1145, 1163
220 L. Cheng & A. Rosett, 'Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the
Transformation from Hierarch to Market, 1978-1989' (1991) 255 Journal of Chinese Law 143
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In addition to the philosophical considerations, institutional pressure would also
push Chinese company law to adopt a strict approach. Unlike Delaware's company
law, which places more weight on managers' interests in order to thrive in the charter
competition, the latest evolution of the Chinese company law is driven by a different
institutional force. As mentioned above, the most powerful force driving legal reform
in China seems to be political pressure from a combination of interrelated factors,
including growing individual shareholder activism and the government's concern for
social stability.221 Therefore, Delaware's approach, which is largely oriented around
executives' interests, does not meet the demands of the dominant institutional
pressures in China. By contrast, the UK approach which functionally limits a
manager's opportunistic behaviour to a narrower scope would meet the claims of the
increasingly motivated constituency by supplying them with better protections. In
addition, the high level of legal certainty provided by the strict approach will increase
investor confidence and foster cooperation between investors and directors. As a
result, potential causes of the social instability would be further reduced.
Finally, as noted in the former part, the effectiveness of the flexible approach
relies heavily on judicial expertise. Thus, a weak court system creates particular
difficulties in using Delaware's approach. In China, judicial expertise is often
questioned by observers.222 In addition, judges are not generally encouraged to
develop case-law based jurisprudence.223 Consequently, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for Chinese judges to adjudicate corporate opportunity cases by selecting
one or two applicable tests from a group of open-ended standards in accordance with
the factual evidence in each case. Furthermore, the reception of the US approach
221 J.Y. Wang, 'Rule of Law and Rule of Officials: Shareholder Litigation and Anti-dumping
Investment in China', The foundation for Law Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
<http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Jiangyu%231%23.pdf> accessed 20th July 2011. See Chapter
IV above at section 4.2.2. 2.1, 132-134
222 See Chapter II, section 2.4.2.2; and Chapter III, section 3.2.
223 D. Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China' GWU Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 433 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1245803> 44
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would cause additional problems. The flexibility of judicial practice is a double-edged
sword. On one hand, it would promote "efficiency" in certain cases by relaxing rigid
rules. On the other, it would trigger judicial misuse of wide discretionary powers and
may even lead judges to engage in rent-seeking activities. In China, the latter is more
likely to be the case. Consequently, Delaware's flexible approach would be too
sophisticated to be properly adopted in China. By comparison, the UK's approach
which provides greater legal certainty would be easier for Chinese courts to manage.
Consequently, the analysis coherently indicates that a "commercial morality
promoting", "shareholder friendly", and "bright-line rule based" approach would meet
the needs of corporate opportunities regulation in China. As highlighted above, the
strict approach adopted by the UK to some extent includes these characteristics. Thus,
following the rules provided by the UK case law, an attempt will now be made to
formulate an approach to drawing the ambits of corporate opportunity in Chinese
context.
5.2.5.2.2.3 Drawing the Ambits of Corporate Opportunity: Proposed
Statute for Company Law 2005
5.2.5.2.2.3.1 Capacity-based Test
It is widely recognised that the orthodox approach established in the Regal
(Hasting) case affirmed a capacity-based test in identifying corporate opportunity.
This test develops from the fiduciary relationship between a company and its directors.
As Lord Upjohn indicated in Boardman v Phipps,224 "the relevant rule for the
decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary
capacity must not make a profit out of his trust."225 As already highlighted, this
approach technically establishes a fixed relationship between directorial fiduciary
224 [1966] 3 All ER 721
225 ibid
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capacity and strict liability. It does so by disregarding issues about whether a company
is financially capable of pursuing this opportunity or whether a company has an
interest in or expectancy of the opportunity. Thus, it has a strong prophylactic function
which would ensure a high degree of protection and deterrence.226 Consequently, this
approach functionally meets the significant demands made of shareholder protection
in the Chinese context. However, there are nevertheless some technical obstacles
which would deter the reception of such a capacity-based approach.
Firstly, the nature of the relationship between a company and its directors is
undefined in Chinese law. Furthermore, although the Company Law 2005 has
introduced the duty of loyalty, the legislative framework contains no overriding
principle that requires directors not to put themselves in positions where their personal
interests conflict with the companies' interests. Therefore, it is questionable whether
there is any theoretical basis for the existence and development of capacity-based
liability. Yu's argument is a good foundation for beginning an analysis of this issue.
She notes that in general the relationship between a company and its directors in
China can be categorised as a principal-agent relationship.227 She further finds that
Agents have duties to exercise their powers in good faith and with a degree of
care. Here, the duty of good faith is based on the doctrine of good faith in
contract law, but goes beyond the scope of contract law by requiring directors to
actively discharge their duties of good faith and to place their company's interests
in front of their personal interests. 228
This view is further expanded by the other leading Chinese corporate lawyer, J.H Liu.
In Liu's recent book, he points out,
executives who work as agents of companies should be faithful to the companies'
226 P. Davies (n 4) 515
227 Y.W. Wei (n 1) 42
228 ibid
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interests all along … in accordance with their duties of loyalty, the executive
must not put their personal interests in front of the company's interests, [and]
must not appropriate company's tangible or intangible interests without proper
authorization…229
These arguments illustrate a relatively clear picture of the underlying theory for the
reception of the "capacity-based test" in China. According to Yu and Liu's arguments,
a director who works as an agent of the company is subject to a duty of self-denial. As
a result of his capacity, he is not allowed to make any secret profits without the
company's authorization. This principle although not expressed in legislation, can be
deducted using theoretical reasoning.
Whilst it has been possible to locate a theoretical basis for the application of this
approach, detailed technical problems may nevertheless also pose difficulties in
applying the approach in China. A threshold for accessing capacity-based liability
must be established. It should be clarified whether liability can be triggered by
proving the "existence or possibility of conflict between a director's interests and the
company's interest", or merely by establishing the "existence of profits". The former is
generally less strict than the latter. The application of the no-conflict criterion is
subject to significant judicial discretion in terms of the fact that in different cases, it
can be defined in different ways.230 By contrast, the no-profit rule is more concrete.
Where it is applied, plaintiffs only need to prove the fact that an executive has made
unauthorised profits out of their position. Its strictness can effectively prevent the
directors and executives from engaging in moral hazard. As a result, it provides a
sufficient level of protection to shareholders. Overall, the no-profit rule which meets
the demands of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the Chinese context is the best
choice for reform legislation.
229 J.H. Liu (n 156) 397
230 D. Kershaw (n 161) 537
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Nevertheless, the no profit rule has to some extent been rejected in the 2006 Act.
Some commentators argue that the main reason for nullifying the no-profits rule is the
fact that its inflexibility could stifle the modern economy and dampen entrepreneurial
activities.231 However, this would not be the case in China. If such an approach
generates unaffordable transaction cost by applying a strict liability rule that makes
directors give up business opportunities, and if employers are financially incapable of
exploiting such opportunities, the question is raised of whether this means that such
opportunities would be rendered unexploited and therefore wasted. Admittedly, one
must accept that in some cases the potential value of business opportunities might
only be realised by a particular director's professional knowledge, business judgment
and expertise. However, directors' personal efforts should not be over-stated. Firstly, a
business opportunity is only a belonging of the company' within the relationship
between a company and its executives.232 In other words, this opportunity is open for
use by any capable third party, to the exclusion of unauthorised directors only.
Therefore, in a highly competitive market consisting of a large number of business
players in a same sector, this opportunity will surely be exploited by another party
sooner or later. Secondly, recent research indicates that many business opportunities
rejected by directors by reason of high transaction costs, under the strict no-profit rule
are investment opportunities brought to directors by third parties. If a company is not
financially capable of taking up an opportunity and the director is also reluctant to do
so (because of the high transaction costs), third parties would expect the funding to be
made available elsewhere.233 Therefore, the strict approach towards corporate
opportunity cases would increase the transactions cost for certain parties (most likely
the executives), but it is highly unlikely to decrease the social welfare at large. In
addition, in the Chinese context, the foreseeable costs generated by a flexible rule are
even higher than that of a strict rule. Firstly, the agency cost between the shareholder
231 D. Kershaw (n 190) 617
232 On the question of ‘to what extent can the corporate opportunity be regarded as an property belongs
to the company’, see D. Kershaw (n 161) 547-548
233 D. Kershaw (n 190) 618
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(especially minorities) and executive is severe.234 A flexible approach which defines
corporate opportunity narrowly will promote an executives' opportunistic behaviour.
It would reduce the transnational cost for executives by enlarging vertical agency
cost,235 while further damaging commercial morality. On balance, therefore, it makes
conditions worse. Moreover, the flexible rule would also increase the judicial costs. In
order to properly apply the rule, the courts would have to take a long time to
investigate the factual evidence of a case. This time-consuming and uncertain process
leads both parties to invest a huge amount of time and effort into the litigation. Both
would lose the best timing of fully exploiting the business opportunity. Finally, both
parties would be worse off. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that economic efficiency
will be harmed by a strict liability rule in China. Consequently, in Chinese context,
the no profit rule would be a proper criterion for activating the "capacity-based
liability" in corporate opportunity cases.
In accordance with the forgoing analysis, there is a theoretical basis for the
implementation of the capacity-based test. Additionally, by employing the "no-profit
rule", this test is likely to be workable in practice and to properly regulate the agency
cost between executives and minorities - the central problem of Chinese corporate
governance.
5.2.5.2.2.3.2 Reformulating Procedural Rules
As mentioned above, a procedural rule is set out by Company Law 2005.
However, this rule must be integrated with more detailed guidance. In terms of
procedural issues, according to the 2006 Act, the non-interested director's approval of
another director's use of corporate opportunity is established as an enabling rule for
public company. In other words, if the Articles of Association does not authorise
234 See Chapter II, section 2.3.2 above.
235 According to S. Turnbull, 'this [a strict approach to corporate opportunity] would make economic
sense if the transaction cost of either the monitoring director's behavior or the ex post determination of
their action are prohibitively high.' S. Turnbull, 'The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity: An Economic
Analysis' (1988) 13 Canada-United States Law Journal 193
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directors to approve conflict-interests activities, the authorization should be granted
by the members. Statutes concerning procedural issues surrounding the 2006 Act
leave more room for private corporate players to decide which approach they want to
adopt. This flexible approach is based on a strong belief that private parties have
competent professional abilities to make proper judgments in accordance with their
own needs. However, as Chinese market participants are generally less sophisticated
than their UK counterparts, a mandatory rule seems to be more effective than an
enabling rule. Furthermore, highlighted earlier, the members' approval is necessary for
a directors' use of corporate opportunity. Consequently, a procedural rule based on the
flexible approach would provide limited guidance in Chinese company law.
By contrast, the mandatory disclosure rule as stipulated by the American Law
Institute (ALI) would be a sound model. This rule states that
a director or senior executive may not take advantage of a corporate opportunity,
unless (1) the … senior executive first offers that corporate opportunity to the
corporation and makes disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the
corporate opportunity; (2) the corporate opportunity is rejected by the
corporation"236
When compared to Art.149 this two-step approach makes clearer instructions for
executives to follow.
However, ALI's rule sets a pre-condition for this disclosure rule, which could be
inconsistent with the proposed no-profit rule. Under the rule set out by the ALI, a
director is bound to disclose an opportunity for the company where "the executive
becomes aware and knows it is closely related to a business in which the corporation
236 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (St Paul, Minn: American
Law Institution Publisher 1994) 5.05 a
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is engaged or expects to be engaged."237 Nonetheless, under the no-profit rule, it is
immaterial whether the company could benefit the opportunity. This means that even
if an executive subjectively believes that the opportunity is not related to the
company's interests, before pursuing it, he should place himself into a "safe-harbour"
by disclosing the opportunity to the company. The rationale for this strict disclosure
rule can be explained by arguments relating to human behaviour: "the conflict-parties,
even those who believe that they act honestly and in good faith, cannot trust
themselves to give impartial advice."238 This means that the self-interested executive
is considered unable to evaluate "whether this opportunity is related to the company'
interests", since his personal interests will ruin his "independence" which is essential
to be a competent decision-maker in this context.239 Consequently, a mandatory
disclosure rule is vital to preventing executives from misappropriating corporate
opportunity.
5.2.5.2.3 The Duties of a Resigned Director
Another important issue surrounding the corporate opportunity doctrine is the
duty of resigned directors. A strict adherence to a capacity-based principle could allow
directors to escape their duties simply by terminating their directorship. In such
circumstances, a managing director could exploit their former employers' interests by
taking advantage of commercial secrets from their former directorship. However, the
Company Law 2005 includes no provision under which ex-directors retain continuing
obligations in respect of their employers. To date there appear to have been no
reported cases concerning this duty passing through the courts. In one reported case, a
director disappeared from the company and engaged in competitive business with his
employer. However, in this case the court did not accept that the director's
237 ibid
238 See M. Bazerman, K. Morgan and G. Lowenstain 'The Impossibility of Auditor Independence'
(Summer 1997) Sloan Management Review 89, 91
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disappearance from his work could be regarded as resignation of his directorship.240
As a result, although the court held that the director's conduct breached his duty of
loyalty, this does not mean it accepted that ex-directors owe a continuing
responsibility to their employers. Consequently, the legislation leaves some gaps in
regulating ex-directors' duties towards their former employer. This part will formulate
some standards for resigned directors in the context of corporate opportunity by
studying the UK common law and relevant UK statutes.
In the UK, common law principles impose a continuing obligation on resigned
directors in the context of corporate opportunity. In Island Export Finance Ltd. v.
Umunna,241 Hutchinson J. held that,
It seems to me that counsel's bold submission [that English Law does not
recognise any fiduciary duty after termination] cannot be right, amounting as it
does to the contention that a director, provided he does nothing contrary to his
employers' interests while employed, may with impunity conceive the idea of
resigning so that he may exploit some opportunity of the employers and, having
resigned, proceed to exploit it for himself. Such a suggestion has only to be stated
to be seen to be unsustainable.242
Under the 2006 Act, s.170(2) (a) now states that s.175 can be applied to directors who
have already resigned their directorships. Nonetheless, imposing an over-strict
obligation on ex-directors may generate counter-productive effects. As Davies
concludes:
Indeed, in order to encourage the exploitation of directors' talents, the general
policy of the court is not to put executive directors of a company in any worse
position than employees in terms of restraints on their post-resignation activities.
240 See Beijing Hua'er case (Beijing Haidian District Court 2001) for details in N. Howson (n 33) 150
241 [1986] B.C.L.C. 460
242 ibid 480
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This means that, in the absence of explicit contractual restraints on the director,
he or she is free to exploit after resignation even confidential information carried
away in his or her head, unless this information amounts to knowledge of trade
secret 243
The common law strikes a balance between protecting employer's interests and
facilitating the exploitation of directors' talents by defining the scope of an
ex-directors' continuing liability. This can be illustrated in two leading cases; namely,
Canadian Aero Service Ltd v. O'Mally244 and Industrial Development Consultant Ltd
v. Cooley245. In both cases, the courts held that ex-directors had breached their
continuing liabilities to their former companies. In the Canadian Aero Service Ltd
case, the president and the vice president of the plaintiff company (Canaero)
negotiated a large aerial surveying and mapping contract with the government of
Guyana on behalf of Canaero. However, they failed to make sufficient efforts to
secure the contract for Canaero. Instead, they resigned their directorships and formed
their own company (Terra). They then signed a contract with the government of
Guyana in the name of Terra. In this case, Laskin J. held that,
In my opinion, this ethic [strict ethic] disqualifies a director or senior officer from
usurping for himself … a maturing business opportunity which his company is
actively pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting even after his resignation
where the resignation may fairly be said to be promoted or influenced by a wish
to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company…246
The Cooley case manifests a similar group of facts. Mr Cooley, who was a
managing director of the plaintiff company, participated in negotiating a building
contract with officers from the Eastern Gas Board (Gas Board). However, the
243 P. Davies (n 4) 565
244 (1971) 23 D.L.R. (3d) 371
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negotiation was not successfully concluded. Shortly afterwards, the Gas Board
formally approached Mr Cooley in his personal capacity for the building project. Mr
Cooley resigned his directorship by lying that he was in ill health. He later went on to
sign a valuable contract with the Gas Board. Roskill J. held that, the defendant was
accountable to the plaintiff, because
from the time he embarked up on his course of dealing with the Eastern Gas
Board …, he embarked upon a deliberate policy and course of conduct which put
his personal interest as a potential contracting party with the Eastern Gap Board
in direct conflict with his pre-existing and continuing duty as managing director
of the plaintiffs.247
Nonetheless, in Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna248, an ex-director was
allowed to keep the profits arising out of a contract which was essentially the same as
an earlier contract secured for the plaintiff when Umunna worked as the plaintiff's
managing director. In this case, the judge accepted that the ex-director's resignation
was unrelated to the exploitation of a maturing business opportunity. Moreover, there
was also no firm evidence to indicate that the plaintiff was actively pursuing the same
opportunity in endeavouring to secure the contract for his own benefit. At first glance,
the approach adopted in this case is more lenient than that of the Cooley case.
However, a closer inspection reveals some key differences in the facts between these
two cases. In both the Cooley and Canadian Aero Service ltd cases, there was a
material corporate opportunity prior to the directors' resignation. In Cooley, the
director tried to avoid their fiduciary duty in order to obtain a business opportunity in
their personal capacity by terminating their directorship. More importantly, the
companies in both cases were interested in an identifiable business opportunity,
although it was uncertain whether the companies could properly secure it.249
247 Industrial Development Consultant Ltd v. Cooley (n 245) 451-453
248 [1986] B.C.L.C. 460
249 In the Cooley case (n 245), the court found that the plaintiff had 10 per cent of opportunity to secure
the contract with the Gas Board.
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However, in the Umanna case, many of these key facts were absent. In these
circumstances, if the court upheld the plaintiff's claim of a breach of fiduciary duties,
the result would have been unjust for Mr Umanna. As Pettet argues, "if a director
[Umanna] has a lifetime of general entrepreneurial activity in various markets, it will
not be possible for a company which hires him for a few years of that lifetime to
argue that all future business in that area becomes the business of the company".250
Consequently, the comparison between the Colley and Umanna cases conveys some
important information. The UK courts tend to protect a director's business innovation
by limiting the scope of an ex-director's continuing liability within a certain ambit.
Continuing liability would only be enforced where an opportunity is not only
maturing, but also where it is pursued by the company.251 More specifically, a
director's intention to resign and the plaintiffs' potential business opportunities are key
determinants of a judicial decision. Firstly, if there is evidence to indicate that a
director's motivation for resigning is to exploit a maturing corporate opportunity, the
director can be found subjectively guilty of deliberately avoiding his fiduciary duties
through resignation. Secondly, if evidence also shows that a company is actively
pursuing an opportunity, the director will be objectively guilty if he puts himself in a
position which conflicts with the company's interests.
Finally as Sealy concludes the following key facts would give rise to a breach of
continuing liability in corporate opportunity cases:
(1) the defendants had diverted for their own benefit a "maturing business
opportunity" which their company was actively pursuing; (2) they were
participants in the negotiations on behalf of the company; (3) their resignation
had been "promoted or influenced" by a wish to acquire the opportunity for
themselves; and (4) it was their position with the company rather than a "fresh
250 B. Pettet (n 8) 169
251 See P. Koh (n 185) 421
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initiative" which led them to the opportunity which they later acquired.252
It seems that these fact-based standards are quite clear and would allow Chinese
company law to fill in the gaps relating to a director's continuing liability. However,
as Chinese company law is without the support of case law, these standards would
still be too abstract to solve problems in practice. For example, a director's motivation
for resigning would be difficult to prove. There may be several reasons prompting a
resignation, of which the "guilty" motive is but one. How would one assess this
motive to be primary?253 Therefore, in addition to this group of standards, further
guidance should be provided.
To start with, an objective standard is important. A court must be able to confirm
whether a conflict of interests exists in a particular case from the outset. This is
achieved by investigating whether the plaintiff actively sought this opportunity either
when the director resigned or later when he obtained the contract. The court can then
investigate the ex-director's subjective motive for his resignation. It is important in
this context to note that corporate opportunity cases generally result from asymmetric
access to information between a director and their company. A director, as the
gatekeeper of a company, can block information from flowing to his employer. Thus,
it would be useful for a court to consider whether the director, compared to the
company, had an informational upper-hand in obtaining the commercial secret in
question. For example, it would be useful to examine whether the defendant was a
controlling director in the company holding considerable power and he participated in
the negotiating process of this business opportunity. If the court finds that the director
has an informational upper-hand, an assumption of impropriety should arise where
such a director exploits any business opportunity, after his resignation and without
prior disclosure to the company.254 In such circumstances, the defendant should have
to provide evidence to rebut this assumption. Secondly, timing is also an important
252 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 365
253 On this point see P. Koh (n 185) 424
254 On a similar point, ibid 425
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factor. If a director's exploitation of a business opportunity occurs one or two years
after his resignation, it would be difficult to conclude that the ex-director should bear
continuing liability.255 This is not only because many facts in the case will become
ambiguous after such a long time, but also because the commercial secrets held by
ex-directors will also lose their value over such a time period. However, if the conflict
of interests between a company and its director happens shortly after the director's
resignation, the court may have grounds to suspect the motivation behind the
director's resignation.
To conclude, the first part of this section builds a workable legislative framework
for director's continuing liability in Chinese company law by introducing some legal
principles from UK case law. However, it is important to note that as the duties of
resigned directors are highly fact-based, such cases rely heavily on a court's judgment
of the facts in a given case. It is therefore difficult to formulate a fixed judicial
approach to this particular group of cases. Establishing more concrete objective
standards demand the support of empirical research. For example, empirical research
might be able to measure how long a commercial secret generally retains its value in
Chinese commercial practice. The answer to this question would be valuable in
achieving a sound judgment in judicial practice.
5.3 Controlling Shareholder's Duties
5.3.1 "Controlling Shareholder's Duties" under China's Legal Regime
Having discussed a controlling strategy for vertical agency cost, this part focuses
on mitigating horizontal agency cost. From a theoretical point of view, it seems that ex
post protection for minority shareholders against controlling shareholders in public
companies is not vitally important. This is because shareholders in public companies
can protect their interests by utilizing the "vote by foot" rule under which they can
255 ibid 427
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exist by selling their shares. Unlike shareholders in closely-held companies, public
company shareholders have a stock market on which to express dissent through share
trading. Nonetheless, in China, several factors make ex post protection essential for
protecting minority shareholder interests. Firstly, information asymmetry is a serious
problem on China's stock markets.256 Many cases show that the market price of
shares is distorted by insiders manipulating and misrepresenting information.257
Consequently, the market price sometimes does not accurately reflect the fair value of
a public company's shares. The "vote by foot" mechanism cannot therefore realise
sufficient impact to protect minority shareholders. Secondly, the Chinese company
law system does not provide effective alternative mechanisms to protect minority
shareholders against unfair treatment by controlling shareholders. The previous
chapter highlighted that minority shareholders are entitled to strong voting powers
through the class-voting system. However, it seems that this procedural protection
does not work well in China.258 Thirdly, the independent director regime has proved
to be inadequate in restraining controlling shareholder abuse.259 Recent shareholding
structure reform enables institutional shareholders to have a stronger voice in a public
company's corporate governance. However, it is undeniable that such shareholders
still play a limited role in balancing and checking the powers of controlling
shareholders.260 To conclude, non-legal constraints (efficient capital and product
market) are usually very weak in transition economies. They cannot properly control
controlling shareholders. These economies therefore should have stronger legal rules
256 See Chapter II, section 2.3.2, above.
257 See CSRC's Administrative Sanction against the "Hangxiao Ganggao" Company and its insiders:
full text available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2007-05/14/content_6097360.htm> accessed
20th July 2011. See also Q.Y. Jiang, 'Monitoring Problems versus Fiduciary Duties in Chinese Stock
Companies: an Economic and Comparative Analysis on Corporate Governance' in T. Eger, M. Faure &
N.G. Zhang (eds.), Economic Analysis of Law in China (Edward Elgar 2007), 200
258 See Chapter IV, section 4.1.2.3.2, above.
259 D. Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law 125, 127-224
260 See C. Xi, 'Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice' (2006) 9 International
Company and Commercial Law Review 251
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to protect minority interests.261 These conclusions are supported by research
conducted by lawyers into company law regimes in transition economies.262
In order to enhance the minority protection regime, China's company law system
imposes some duties on controlling shareholders. Article 21 of Company Law 2005
sets out a general principle that controlling shareholders and de facto controllers shall
not take advantage of their affiliations with others in an attempt to harm a company's
interests and, where any losses are incurred in violation hereof, shall be liable for
compensation. Article 217 defines a "controlling shareholder" as being a shareholder
with more than fifty per cent of the total amount of share capital of a joint stock
limited company or, a shareholder who, by virtue of their voting power, represented
by their capital contribution or shareholding, has a significant impact on the decisions
of the general meeting regardless of whether their holding is under fifty per cent. The
rules provided in the Guidelines for Articles of Association are more straightforward.
The Guidelines say that a company's controlling shareholder and de facto controller
owe a duty of bona fide (cheng xin yi wu) to the company and to individual
shareholders. The controlling shareholder must not harm the company or an
individual shareholder's legitimate rights by illegally distributing profits,
re-organizing assets, taking out corporate loans, sub-investment, appropriating the
company's assets, or using his controlling position to injure other shareholders'
interests.263
It seems that legal provisions about controlling shareholder duties are relatively
accurate and competent, especially, when compared to other vague provisions in
China's company law. The duties can be divided into two main parts. Firstly, they
prevent controlling shareholders from using their affiliations with the board, usually
261 G. Avilov, and others, 'General Principle of Company Law for Transition Economy' (1999) 24
Journal of Corporate Law 190, 204. See also G.M. Cheng, M. Firth, D.N. Gao & O.M. Rui, 'Ownership
Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from China' (2006) 12 Journal of Corporate
Finance 424
262 ibid
263 Guidelines for Articles of Association issued by the CSRC, article 39
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through nominee directors, to harm a company's or minority shareholders' interests.
Secondly, they attempt to keep controlling shareholders away from involvement in
conflict-interest transactions by enumerating a variety of prohibited conflict of interest
activities. Indeed, the legislative framework is an effective response to the problems
faced in securing sound corporate governance of public companies in China. Indeed,
controlling shareholder tunnelling activities have long been a serious issue.264
Consequently, the current legislative framework may play a positive role in mitigating
horizontal agency cost in China's public companies.
Nonetheless, even if these provisions are workable, they are still surrounded by
vagueness. Although the Guidelines for Articles of Association impose several
limitations on the actions of controlling shareholders, they fail to formulate a general
principle, which connects these limitations to controlling shareholder voting power.
The following parts will illustrate how UK and US company law regimes deal with
controlling controlling shareholder's voting power. It will then analyse how Chinese
company law selectively transplants Western experiences in formulating a more
complete legal framework for controlling shareholder duties.
5.3.2 Controlling Controlling Shareholder's Powers: The UK Approach
and the US Approach
5.3.2.1 The UK Approach
The UK's company law regime does not impose fiduciary duties on controlling
shareholders.265 In the Northern Counties Securities ltd266case, the judge held that, "a
member's vote is a property right which, prima facie, may be exercised in the
264 See Chapter II, section 2.3.2. 2, 37-38, above.
265 However, some corporate law scholars claim that fiduciary duties should be applicable to
institutional shareholders in the UK, in order to require institutional shareholders to integrate
environmental, social and governance issues ("ESG") into investment policy: see P.Q. Watchman, J.A.
Wedderburn & L. Shipway, 'Fiduciary Duties in the 21st Century: A UK Perspective' (2005) 19(3) Trust
Law International 127
266 See Northern Counties Sec. Ltd. v. Jackson & Steeple Ltd., [1974] 1 WLR 1133
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member's own interest and as he or she thinks fit. A member voting as such is under
no fiduciary duty to the company."267 However, UK company law does provide some
suggestions on how to prevent controlling shareholders from abusing their voting
powers. In order to achieve this, two important mechanisms have been established.
The first is the "shadow director regime" and the second the "the proper purpose test".
Instead of fiduciary duties, the law uses the concept of a "shadow director" to
achieve functional equivalence. In accordance with the 2006 Act, a shadow director is
"a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the
company is accustomed to act."268 Additionally, the Act further explains that, a
corporation is not regarded as a shadow director of any its subsidiary companies for
the purposes of (1) the general duties of a director; (2) transactions requiring member
approval; or (3) contracts with a sole member who is also a director, by reason only
that the directors of the subsidiary are accustomed to act in accordance with its
directions or instructions.269 It seems that the statute does not attempt to impose
general director's duties on controlling shareholders who control the boards of their
subsidiaries. Furthermore, even if a person can be regarded as a "shadow director", a
director's general duties may be still not applicable to them. Section 170(5) states that
"the director's general duties apply to shadow director where, and to the extent that,
the corresponding common law rules or Equitable principles so apply." In the
Ultraframe (UK) Ltd case270, the judge held that a director's fiduciary duties do not
apply to a shadow director, on the grounds that a shadow director, unlike a de facto
director does not undertake to act on behalf of the company and so does not put
him/herself in a fiduciary relationship with the company.271 Accordingly, under
statute and case law, except in some extraordinary circumstances, UK law does not
267 ibid 1144. See also Peters' American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath (1939) 61 C.L.R. 457 at 504, where
Justice Dixon explains that: "The power of alteration is not fiduciary. The shareholders are not trustees
for one another, and, unlike directors, they occupy no fiduciary position and are under no fiduciary
duties. They vote in respect of their shares, which are property, and the right to vote is attached to the
share itself as an incident of property to be enjoyed and exercised for the owner's personal advantage."
268 CA 2006, s.251
269 ibid
270 [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch D)
271 ibid
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impose general director's duties towards minority shareholders or the company upon
controlling shareholders. In essence, statute and common law show that there is little
point in requiring a controlling shareholder to make a decision in the best interests of
shareholders as a whole.
Furthermore, another important relief provided by the law to the minority
shareholders is the unfair prejudice doctrine. Section 994 of the 2005 Act says that,
“(a) the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which
is unfairly prejudicial to the interest of its members generally or some part of the
members (including at least himself) or (b) that any actual or proposed act or omission
of the company (including any act or omission on its behalf) is or would be
prejudicial”
However, if the company is a public company, the court in general denies that the
“unrecorded legitimate expectation” exists, for the reason that in public company, all
material information must be disclosed to potential investor. For example, in Re Blue
Arrow plc272, Lord Vinelott held that,
“No doubt there are cases where a legitimate expectation may be inferred from
arrangements outside the ambit of the formal constitution of the company, but it must
be borne in mind that this is a public company, a listed company, and a large one, and
that the constitution was adopted at the time when the company was first floated on
the Unlisted Securities Market. Outside investors were entitled to assume that the
whole of the constitution was contained in the articles, read, of course, together with
the Companies Acts. There is in these circumstances no room for any legitimate
expectation founded on some agreement or arrangement made between the directors
and kept up their sleeves and not disclosed to those placing the shares with the public
through the Unlisted Securities Market... I think that the petition, on its face, is so
272 [1987] BCLC
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hopeless that the only right course is to strike it out."273
In addition to that, for private company, the limitation on the shareholder’s
ratification of directors’ breach of duty is another important device to control
shareholder’s power. In this kind of company, shareholder and director is usually the
same person. If there is no limitation on shareholder’s power of making ratification of
directors’ breach of duties, majority shareholder, in such condition, can ratify his or
her breach of duty in the position of company’s director. In response to this issue,
section 239 of 2006 Act prevents the interested directors from voting on a
shareholder’s resolution to ratify the wrong doing. However, similar to the unfair
prejudice doctrine, it may only release very limited influence on public company. The
reason is that, in public company, there is generally a clear separation between
ownership and management. It means that rare director sits in the general meeting in
public company.
One of the major functions of "limited liability" is understandably to make
shareholders more remote from each other. In a partnership, business partners owe
each other mutual fiduciary duties, as no clear line can be drawn between their
personal assets and business assets. By contrast, in large-scale public companies,
shareholders can clearly distinguish their personal assets and their corporate
investment. As a shareholder's amount of investment is fixed, supervisory costs
among shareholders are reduced.274 Furthermore, a shareholder enters into the
company in the expectation that other shareholders will vote in their own self-interest.
He equally takes the risk that his interests could be adversely affected by other
shareholders voting in this way.275 Taking all these factors into consideration,
Flannigan points out the lack of "a foundation for the fiduciary regulation of
273 ibid 619





By contrast, Cohen highlights that there is a solid base for controlling
shareholder fiduciary duties. He argues,
Controlling shareholders have the power to control the property of others; they
may make decisions concerning the company's property and influence the right of
other shareholders...The majority shareholder can direct a company's actions and
may bind the minority by its decision...the law imposes a fiduciary duty on
anyone controlling another's property. As controlling shareholders effectively
control the company's and minority's property, such a general fiduciary duty
should apply to controlling shareholders.277
Additionally, I. Anabtawi explores the same question from a moral perspective. He
states,
Greed and selfishness are powerful forces, and they are no less powerful for
shareholders than for corporate officers and directors. Corporate law has
historically relied on the fiduciary duty of loyalty to constrain greed and
selfishness.278
Following these lines of thought, UK company law sets out some limitations on
controlling a shareholder's voting power, although these limitations seem to be more
lenient than director's fiduciary duties. Firstly, in respect of public companies,
transactions between a listed company and its controlling shareholders are governed
276 ibid
277 Z. Cohen, 'Fiduciary Duty of Controlling Shareholders: A Comparative View' (1991) 12 University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 325, 380
278 I. Anabtawi & L. Stout, 'Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders' (2008) 5 Stanford Law Review
1255, 1307
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by the Listing Rules in the Financial Services Authority's Handbook279. Chapter 11 of
these Rules requires shareholders to disclose any proposed related-party transaction to
other shareholders. This needs to be approved through the votes of non-interested
shareholders. More importantly, the concept of "related party" is widely defined so as
to include a person who can control ten per cent or more of a company's voting rights,
who has the most voting rights in the company or who can exercise substantial control
over the company.280
In addition to procedural rules, the case law also imposes some limitations on a
shareholder's voting power. One important case in this regard is Cook v. Deeks281. This
case is about directors (also members of the same company) who entered into a
contract in their own names on the condition that they should be able to enter into a
contact for the company. The Privy Council held that this action could not be ratified
by controlling shareholders on the grounds that, under the rules of equity, the profit
that derives from the contract belongs to the company. Lord Buckmaster held that,
men who assume the complete control of a company's business must remember
that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the interests which they are bound to
protect, and, while ostensibly acting for the company, divert in their own favour
business which should properly belong to the company they represent.282
The Court of Appeal in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd283 establishes a
principle that the power to alter Articles of Association must be exercised "bona fide
for the benefit of the company as a whole", because this power enables a majority to
bind a minority.284 In Brown v British Abrasive case,285 majority shareholders
279 See, Listing Rules in the Financial Services Authority's Handbook
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/hb-releases/rel100/rel100lr.pdf> accessed 20th July 2011
280 ibid. See Listing Rule chapter 11
281 [1916] 1 AC 554
282 ibid 564
283 [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA)
284 ibid; and see P. Davies (n 4) 654
285 [1919] 1 Ch. 290.
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holding 98 per cent of shares in the public company attempted to squeeze out the
minority shareholder by altering the Articles of Association. The judge held that, the
purpose of this alteration was to enable the majority shareholders to undermine the
minority shareholder's interests rather than for the benefit of the company as whole.
As a result, the resolution is dismissed by the court's injunction.286
Another similar case is Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd287. Here, a private
company was owned by the plaintiff and her aunt, Miss Clemens. The plaintiff's aunt
owned 55 per cent of the shares in the company, and the plaintiff held 45 per cent.
According to the articles of the company, existing shareholders had pre-emptive rights
when another member wished to trade her shares. On this basis, the plaintiff had
reasonably expected that the company would be wholly controlled by herself after her
aunt's death. Miss Clemens decided to increase the capital by issuing new shares to
non-shareholding company directors. Unsurprisingly, the proposal of a capital
increase was passed by Miss Clemens's vote at general meeting. Although it was
found that the resolution was in the best interests of the company, the court held that
the object of the resolution was to deprive the plaintiff of a level of control in the
company, and the resolution was therefore dismissed. Foster J held that,
I think one thing which emerges from the cases to which I have referred is that in
such a case as the present Miss Clemens is not entitled to exercise her majority
vote in whatever way she pleases…To use the phrase of Lord Wilberforce, the
right is "subject…to Equitable considerations…which may make it unjust…to
exercise in a particular way". 288
The above cases show that there is no universal principle for the limitation of
majority shareholder voting power. The court tends to accept that every case in this
category is varied. The court's review of majority shareholder voting is therefore
286 ibid
287 [1976] 2 ALL ER 268 (Ch D)
288 ibid 282
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usually a fact-specific assessment.289 Nevertheless, the court's principal consideration
in limiting majority shareholder voting power is not elusive. In the cases highlighted
above, the courts have been inclined to question whether a shareholder's voting power
is being used for a "proper corporate purpose". Sealy confirms the existence of
"proper corporate purpose doctrine" in controlling controlling shareholders voting
powers in the UK:
The Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd and Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd appear to
impose vaguer limitation on the member's voting powers: first, that votes must
not be used 'oppressively', and second, that they must be used for 'genuine'
purpose…it is true that shareholders are not constrained by fiduciary duties:
unlike directors, they do not have to deny their own interests and favour those of
the company or other shareholder. But it is not clear why they should not be
subject to the same limitations that routinely apply elsewhere to those given a
power to exercise--in those cases it is not controversial that, to be valid, the
power must be exercised bona fide and for proper purpose.290
5.3.2.2 The US Approach
Different from the UK's approach, the approach taken by US law recognises
fiduciary duties for majority shareholders. In Pepper v. Litton,291 a US court
confirmed that majority or controlling shareholders bear fiduciary duties to minorities.
In this case, the court held that,
A director is a fiduciary... So is dominant or controlling stockholder and a group
of stockholders...their dealings with the corporation are subject to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is
challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good
289 R. Flannigan (n 274) 286
290 L. Sealy & S. Worthington (n 4) 243
291 380 U.S 295 (1939)
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faith of a transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of
the corporation and those interested herein.292
The US courts generally allow minorities to show that it was possible to achieve
the same legitimate aim in a way which was less harmful to them, where a majority
can indicate a legitimate business aim for their activities.293 In Delaware, the
approach adopted by the court in judging shareholder fiduciary cases is similar to that
of corporate opportunity cases mentioned in the previous section. In Weinberger v.
UOP INC,294 the Delaware judiciary developed an "entire fairness standard" in cases
concerning controlling shareholder fiduciary duties. The standard includes two tests;
namely, fair dealing and fair price. In order to prove that an interested transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation and its minority shareholders, a controlling shareholder
must prove to the court's satisfaction that the transaction took place at a "fair price"
and that was accomplished through "fair dealing".295 With respect to fair dealing, the
court stressed both the obligation of candour on the part of the parent company, and
the importance of a process which reflects an arm's length transaction, where each
party has the right to say no. Regarding fair price, the court endorsed the liberalised
appraisal standard296 adopted by the Delaware legislature to determine this issue.297
Nevertheless, the decision of whether dealing or a price is fair in any given case is
largely dependent on the factual evidence and the judge's discretion in each case.298
As Gilson states, "unfortunately, the court provided no real guidance as to how the
two elements of fairness interacted."299 The Delaware approach to majority
shareholder duties is again more flexible and uncertain than the UK's approach.
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293 Stanley J. Wikkes vs. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. & others
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Furthermore, like a director's fiduciary duties, majority shareholder decisions are also
protected by the business judgment rule. Only if the minority can prove that the
majority's decision involves "self-dealing", does the burden of proving the fairness of
the transaction shift to the majority shareholder. 300
5.3.2.3 Concluding Remarks
So far, it is clear that, rather than addressing how shareholders treat each other,
the aim of imposing duties on controlling shareholders is to achieve a subtle balance
between controlling shareholder interests and minority shareholder interests. On one
side, fiduciary duties should not prevent a controlling shareholder from rationally
pursuing his own interests. On the other side, it is unwise to ignore the possibility that
a minority shareholder's legitimate rights could be aggrieved by controlling
shareholder abuse.
A short comparative observation between the UK and the US has led us to
understand the difficulties of imposing duties with proper intensity on controlling
shareholders in these subtle situations. On one hand, a loose duty may not effectively
constrain a controlling shareholder's opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand, an
over-strict duty may restrict their voting power unfairly. Thus, the following questions
arise:
1. In order to formulate a general principle geared towards controlling
shareholder duties, can China directly transplant US-style fiduciary duties into its
legal regime?
2. If US style fiduciary duties do not work in China, can China introduce the
concept of a shadow director from UK law in order to circumvent troublesome
controlling shareholder duties?
3. Finally, are the procedural rule and the proper purpose test outlined in UK
company law workable in the Chinese context?
300 Z. Cohen (n 272) 388
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5.3.3 Towards A General Principle for Controlling Shareholder Duties
5.3.3.1 Could US-style Shareholder Fiduciary Duties Work in China?
The US, especially the Delaware case law, has developed a set of duties of
loyalty for controlling shareholders. Therefore, it must be ascertained whether China
can directly import these US style shareholder fiduciary duties into its own company
law system. Firstly, some scholars argue that the US or Delaware approach to
controlling shareholder fiduciary duties is based on the unique legal education system
in the US, and highly reliant on the individual judicial discretion. Even, other
common law jurisdictions, such as the UK or Canada, may therefore have difficulties
applying US-style fiduciary duties in judicial practice.301 As highlighted, there is a
significant gap between the efficiency of court systems in China and the US. As a
result, Chinese judges may not be capable of correctly applying the complicated legal
rules developed by the US court system to deal with China's local cases.302 Secondly,
culturally speaking, US style fiduciary duties are based on a local inclination towards
"other-regarding behaviour". The breach of fiduciary duties is not only deterred by
legal sanction, but sometimes by market sanctions.303 Therefore, where a culture of
altruism is lacking among market participants, such a transplant is unlikely to be
workable. Similarly, another study by Xi indicates that China lacks a sound
institutional and cultural foundation for implementing US style shareholder fiduciary
duties.304
5.3.3.2 Would the Shadow Director Work in China?
301 J.G. MacIntosh, J. Holmes & S. Thompson, 'Puzzle of Shareholder Fiduciary Duties' (1991) 86
Canadian Business Law Journal 86
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304 C. Xi, 'Foreign Solution for Local Problem? The Use of US style of Fiduciary Duty to Regulate
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UK law's concept of a "shadow director" may not be effective in the face of
China's problems. Firstly, a clear boundary between the powers of shareholders and
directors is the pre-condition upon which judges can clarify the capacity of a
company's members in a specific case. The Company Law 2005 specifies that the
shareholders meetings shall exercise the following functions and powers:
(1) to decide on the business policy and investment plan of the company;
(2) to elect and recall directors and supervisors whose posts are not taken by the
representatives of the staff and workers, and to decide on matters concerning the
remuneration of directors and supervisors;
(3) to examine and approve reports of the board of directors;
(4) to examine and approve reports of the supervisory board or supervisors;
(5) to examine and approve the annual financial budget plan and final accounts
plan of the company;
(6) to examine and approve plans for profit distribution of the company and
plans for making up losses;
(7) to adopt resolutions on the increase or reduction of the registered capital of
the company;
(8) to adopt resolutions on the issuance of company bonds;
(9) to adopt resolutions on matters such as the merger, division, transformation,
dissolution and liquidation of the company;
(10) to amend the Articles of Association of the company;
(11) to exercise other functions and powers provided for in the Articles of
Association.305
The board of directors is accountable to the shareholders meeting and shall
exercise the following powers:
(1) being responsible for convening shareholder meetings and presenting reports
305 Company Law article 38 (2005)
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thereto
(2) implementing resolutions adopted by the shareholders meeting;
(3) determining the company's operational plans and investment programs;
(4) preparing annual financial budget plans and final accounting plans of the
company;
(5) preparing profit distribution plans and plans to cover company losses;
(6) preparing plans for increasing or reducing registered capital of the company
or issuing company bonds;
(7) drafting plans for merger, division, change of corporate form or dissolution of
the company;
(8) determining the structure of the company's internal management;
(9) appointing or removing the general manager of the company, appointing or
removing, upon the general manager's recommendation, deputy managers of the
company and the officer in charge of finance, and determining the remuneration for
those officers;
(10) formulating the basic management scheme of the company; and
(11) exercising other powers stipulated by the Articles of Association.306
Under China's company law, the general meeting takes charge of the essential
management of the company. By contrast, the board has the power to manage the
company's business objectives, and takes charge of personell resources. The law
requires a separation between management and ownership in companies. However, in
taking a companies' ownership structure into consideration, it is undeniable that it is a
widespread business custom in China that majority shareholders control the board of
directors.307 Accordingly, there is no clear boundary between director powers and
shareholder powers in many cases.
306 Company Law article 47 (2005)
307 K.P. Zhang, 'Jianlun Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili de Tezheng---Zhengfu Guquan,
Xingzhengquan Shuangchong Kongzhixia de Shangshi Gongsi Zhili' [The Major Characteristics of
Corporate Governance in China's Listed Companies---A Corporate Governance Regime Controlled by
State Shareholder and Administrative Power], In P.Z. Gan, J.B. Lou (eds.), Gongsi Zhili Zhuanlun
[Studies on Corporate Governance] (Beijing Daxue Chubanshe 2009) [Perking University Press 2009]
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Secondly, China's company law includes the concept of a "de facto controller",
which conflicts with the concept of a "shadow director" from an ideological
perspective. The regime of shadow director is built upon an institutional arrangement
that "the company's business is necessarily in the hands of the board".308 It radically
conflicts with the institutional arrangement adopted by Chinese company law, which
is based upon general meeting is the supreme organ in company.309 According to the
Company Law 2005, a de facto controller refers to a person who is not a shareholder
of the company, but has virtual control over corporate actions through investment in,
agreement with or other arrangements with the company.310 In order to reflect
socialist ideology, this legal provision implies the State shareholder is the ultimate
controller of large-scale company. As one Chinese lawyer describes, most of China's
large public companies are governed by a regime, namely "shareholder control under
administrative power".311 In Chinese company law, the shareholders' meeting is
usually considered to be the highest power organ in the enterprise.312 These kinds of
terminology manifest the untouchable position of "big-brother directorship"
underpinned by powerful State ownership. In these conditions, if the law categorises a
controlling shareholder as a "shadow director" in certain conditions, it implies that,
legally the controlling powers of large-companies' would be centralised in the hands
of boards of directors rather than State shareholders. This would clearly conflict with
the government's socialist ideology, which places emphasis on the overwhelmingly
dominant position of State ownership. Consequently, both ownership structure and
governmental ideology mean that the legislation needs to follow
"shareholder-centralism". Consequently, the concept of a "shadow director" is
unlikely to be applicable in China.
308 P. Davies (n 4) 410
309 See (n 17) above.
310 Company Law, article 217 (2005)
311 See K.P. Zhang, (n 307) 209
312 T.L. Hong, 'Corporate Governance Issues in PRC Companies' (2000) 11 International Company and
Commercial Law Review 87, 89
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5.3.3.3 A More Workable Procedural Rule and a General Principle of
Proper Purpose?
Compared to the procedural protection provided by the Listing Rules in the
Financial Services Authority's Handbook, China's company law stipulates a
mandatory limitation on controlling shareholder voting power, but fails to clarify by
what procedure this limitation should be imposed on controlling shareholders. The
only procedural protection, except the class-voting regime, that can be found in the
Chinese company law system is the requirement that all corporate loans or guarantees
provided to members or related parties should be approved by the general meeting.313
A non-interest shareholders' approval is not required. The reason for this loose
protection is partly because the "class voting regime" has already provided a strong
procedural protection for minority shareholders. However, as mentioned above, it is
expected that the split shareholding structure will be unified in the future.314
Therefore, a more detailed and effective procedural rule based on non-interested
shareholder approval should be introduced into China's legal system.
Furthermore, China's company law system has not introduced a "proper purpose
test" like that of UK law into its legislation. The law only approaching this issue states
that a block-holder shall not "use his controlling position to injure other shareholders'
interests".315 Nonetheless, this doctrine is too demanding to be obeyed by
block-holders. It is impossible for the interests of different groups of shareholders to
be 100 per cent homogeneous, especially in public-held companies consisting of a
State shareholder, institutional investors and portfolio shareholders. Block-holders
generally prefer to approve corporate activities, which generate long-term benefits. By
contrast, most portfolio shareholders prefer activities that boost share value
313 Guidelines for Articles of Association, article 41(5)
314 See Chapter IV, section 4.1.2.2.2, above.
315 Guidelines for Articles of Association, article 39
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immediately.316 Not surprisingly therefore, majority shareholder decisions are
sometimes likely to pursue long-term benefits at the expense of immediate benefits.
To some extent, portfolio shareholders' interests, especially those with a strong
intention to sell their shares in the short term, may be adversely affected by a
majority's controlling position. Here, the majority shareholders may breach their
duties in accordance with the principles in the CSRC's Guidelines for Articles of
Association. However, such a majority shareholder's decision could not attract legal
responsibility. Indeed such a shareholder naturally has the power to vote in favour of
their best interests for a proper corporate purpose (prompting company's long-term
growth), rather than the best interests of another particular group of shareholders. As
Davies states, "votes are proprietary rights, to the same extent as any other incidents
of the shares, which the holder may exercise in his own selfish interests even if these
are opposed to those of the company."317
In consequence, it is necessary to narrow this doctrine down into a more precise
and accurate form. This can be achieved by establishing a general principle under
which controlling shareholders, who can control the decisions of the general meeting
by their voting power, should use their votes for a "bona fide and proper purpose".
Under this principle, even if a minority shareholder is injured by the majority's
controlling power, the duties will be not breached, when their controlling power is
used for a "proper corporate purpose". Finally, the conflict of interests between
controlling shareholders and the company should be regulated by both substantive and
procedural rules. Substantively, in addition to various conflict of interest transactions
specified by the current legal system, the law should recognise that, a controlling
shareholder is legally bound to act for a proper corporate purpose. A "fraud" against
minority shareholders should be strictly prohibited. Moreover, China's corporate law
system should adopt more demanding procedural rules under which conflict of
316 For the reasons as to why majority shareholders prefer long-term investments and portfolio
investors prefer short term investments, see R. Gilson, 'Corporate Governance and Economic
Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?' (1996) 74 Washington University Law Quarterly 327
317 P. Davies (n 4) 653
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interest transactions between controlling shareholders and a company should be
subject to disinterested shareholder approval.
5.3.4 Concluding Remarks
This part attempts to build a theoretical underpinning for controlling
shareholders' duties in China's legal system by answering several questions. It points
out the difficulties of transplanting the concept of a "shadow director" and US-style
fiduciary duties into China's legal system. It builds a two-tier principle which guides
the application of controlling shareholder duties. One tier is the "proper purpose
principle". The other is "disinterested shareholder approval".
Beyond these technical issues, the study of controlling shareholder's duties
reveals a vital defect in China's company law system. Controlling shareholder duties
may appropriately govern issues in China's stock market, if we disregard some
enforcement problems. However, it fails to provide a structured legal regime with a
good level of theoretical consistency. It seems that the only purpose of the law is to
solve practical problems. However, the result of solving practical problems using a
piece-meal approach to adopting new legal rules is that the law suffers from the
serious problems of lacking of sustainability and consistency. Consequently, one of
the fundamental barriers in the way of achieving an efficient legal framework is how
to equip the law with a reasonable degree of theoretical depth. This raises the problem
of how to use a general principle to connect and manage detailed legal rules, which
are responses to specific problems in practice.
5.4 Summary of Principle Suggestions
Following the theoretical findings of Chapter IV, this chapter makes a series of
practical contributions to understanding China's legal reform of corporate governance.
The following will summarise the major practical suggestions that this chapter has
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made.
5.4.1 Director's Fiduciary Duties
5.4.1.1 Director's Duty of Good Faith
The current company law system does not lay down a clear rule for a director's
duty of good faith under the regime of directors’ fiduciary duties. The bright-line rules
provided by directors’ fiduciary duties are under inclusive. Therefore, the following
recommendations are made:
1. An overriding principle under which a director should act in the bona fide best
interests of the company should be established;
1.1 The interests of the company should be interpreted as the long-term interests
of the shareholders as a whole;
1.2 A director's decision should be presumed to be made in good faith unless one
of the following criteria has been met:
1.2.1 the existence of any undisclosed conflict of interest (direct or indirect) on
the part of the director; or
1.2.2 where there are any improper purposes of the director's decision, and two
basic tests for determining improper purposes should be established;
1.2.2.1 the director exercises his power unconstitutionally or for a purpose which
is inconsistent with the initial purpose for which the power is delegated to the
director by the Articles of Association;
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1.2.2.2 the business decision is a patently unreasonable or irrational, is not found
on the director's honest belief that he is acting in the best interests of the
company.
5.4.1.2 Nominee Director's Fiduciary Duties
Current fiduciary duties do not impose a series of duties on nominee directors.
The absence of such duties for nominee directors in Chinese public companies means
that the behaviour of nominee directors' is under-regulated. The following
recommendations are therefore made.
A nominee director is presumed not to be in breach their fiduciary duties by
taking their nominator's interests into consideration or acting in accordance with their
nominator's instruction, unless one of the following circumstances is present:
1. in so doing the director does not have a bona fide belief that he is also
promoting the interests of the company as a whole; or
2. no honest and reasonable director could have formed the view that in so doing
the director was also promoting the interests of the company as a whole.
5.4.1.3 No Conflict Rule
5.4.1.3.1 The Ambit of Self-dealing Transaction
Although current company law lays down several rules governing self-dealing
transactions, the ambits of a self-dealing transaction are still ill-defined. The
definitions of "family members" and "connected relationship" are too narrow to
regulate the problems that exist in the in Chinese context. The following suggestions
ate therefore made:
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1. The meaning of "family members" should therefore be specified. In order to
be consistent with the Accounting Standards, all close family members should be
deemed to be "connected persons". This concept should refer to:
a) a director's spouse
b) a director's children and step children
c) a director's parents and grandparents
d) a director's brother and sister
e) a director's aunt and uncle
f) a director's cousin.
2. The concept of "connected relationship" should cover both a director's close
relatives and the companies in which a director has considerable direct or indirect
financial interest. Thus, the "connected relationship" should further extend to the
following entities:
a) a director's family members;
b) a firm or unincorporated business vehicle in which a director or his family
member is a partner or has substantial interests in ( e.g. shares or debt);
c) a person acting in his capacity as agent in an agent-principal relationship where
the principal is a director or a person who is connected with a director by virtue
of (a) and (b);
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d) a business partner of a director or a business partner of a person connected
with a director by virtue of (a) (b) and (c);
e) a legal person or other unincorporated vehicle in which the partner is a firm in
which a director or his connected person by virtue of (a) (b) and (c), is a partner.
3. Transactions between a director or his connected person and the
subsidiaries of the company he serves should also be subject to mandatory
disclosure.
5.4.1.3.2 The Content of Director's Disclosure
Current company law does not clarify what a director should disclose to the
general meeting, when he or she has a conflict of interest with the company in a
proposed or existing transaction. This leads to the following recommendations.
1. A director must disclose the "existence and the nature" of a conflict of
interests.
2. If the amount of the director's interest is able to be quantified, the director must
disclose the existence and the amount of the interest.
3. If the amount of the director's interest is not quantifiable, a director must
disclose the information that the board would normally consider in a transaction
of this type.
4. A director should only be entitled to retain the interests from self-dealing
transactions which are appropriately disclosed.
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5.4.1.3.3 Corporate Opportunities Doctrine:
Under the current law, the ambit of "corporate opportunity" remains vague. It is
still unclear what standards judges should rely on in corporate opportunity cases. This
vagueness also applies to the disclosure rule regarding the corporate opportunity
doctrine. Furthermore, no provision clarifies whether a resigned director is entitled to
use a mature opportunity outside his former directorship.
1. Establishing a Capacity-based Test
1.1 A director who works as an agent of the company should be subject to a duty
of self-denial. As a result of his capacity, he should not be not allowed to make
any secret profits without the company's authorization.
1.2 Liability should be triggered by proving that a "profit" has been made from
holding a director's position.
2. Establishing a mandatory procedural rule
2.1 A director or senior executive should not be able to take advantage of a
corporate opportunity, unless
1. he or she first offers that corporate opportunity to the corporation and
makes disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the corporate
opportunity; and
2. the corporate opportunity is rejected by the corporation.
3. liability for resigned director
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3.1 In establishing an objective standard for the liability of resigned director, if a
director has an informational upper-hand in certain transaction, a presumption of
impropriety should arise where such a director exploits any business opportunity,
after his resignation and without prior to transaction disclosure of that
information (conflict of interests) to the company. In such circumstances, a
director should have to provide evidence to rebut this presumption of impropriety.
3.2 Establishing more concrete objective standards demand the support of
empirical research. Empirical research might be able to measure how long a
commercial secret generally retains its value in Chinese commercial practice.
5.4.2 Majority Shareholder Fiduciary Duties
Although the CSRC's Guidelines for Articles of Association and Company Law
2005 impose several limitations on the actions of controlling shareholders, they fail to
formulate a general principle, which connects these limitations to controlling
shareholder voting power. This leads to the following recommendations:
1 an overriding principle that a controlling shareholder is legally bound to act for a
proper corporate purpose should be established; and
2 more demanding procedural rules under which conflict of interest transactions
between controlling shareholders and a company should be subject to disinterested
shareholder approval should be developed.
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Chapter VI. Conclusion
This dissertation starts by examining the relationship between ownership
structure and corporate governance problems in China. It culminates in a set of
detailed proposals, as to how to improve agency-cost controlling strategies by
selectively transplanting rules or institutions from the UK to China. The central
chapters of this dissertation have advanced important theoretical arguments by
answering a series of research questions. They compare the practical effects of the
formal convergence model with those of the functional convergence model, using
case studies to generate a rationale behind the outcomes of these models. They have
gone on to illustrate the cultural, ideological and historical determinants of the current
reform approach of the Company Law adopted in China. In this final chapter, this
dissertation will summarise the theoretical implications of this research.
6.1 Developing the Scholarship on China's Legal Reform of Corporate
Governance
As highlighted in the first chapter, existing scholarship on China's legal reform of
corporate governance tends to argue that the intense conflict between China's
socio-cultural context and Western rules creates a reform path based on formal
convergence, which does not work in the Chinese context.1 However, in order to
draw this sort of conclusion, an accurate understanding of China's political and
cultural context, and how it influences the evolution of company law is necessary.
By taking a historical perspective, this dissertation accounts for a further
complication of the context in which Chinese company law is evolving. A culture
based on wide-spread clientelism and a political system based on corporatism stands
in the ways of the wholesale adoption of Western rules of company law. However,
1 See chapter I above, 1.2.2, 11-12
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from a historical point of view, the tangled web in which China's company law is
developing is more intricate than this argument suggests. A shortage of local
commercial culture and knowledge make it difficult for China’s company law system
to abandon the "legal transplant approach". A large number of Western rules and
institutions have been introduced into China's company law regime. These rules and
institutions constitute a complementary system. Abolishing the existing company law
regime triggers unaffordable sunk costs. Furthermore, China is no longer immune to
the pressure from modern-day globalization. It has been forced to promote the
competitiveness of its domestic corporate governance regime. Instead of maintaining
the blind cultural superiority2 of bygone times, today Chinese legislators and legal
end-users have a pragmatic and even humble attitude towards advanced Western legal
techniques and the legal cultures behind them. Indeed, the adoption of a Western legal
regime is believed to be a necessity for consistent economic development and strong
national welfare. Due to pressure from globalization, the Chinese context, especially
some economic elements still bearing planned economic characteristics, is subject to
reform. Consequently, some transplanted rules are not expected currently to fit in with
existing economic factors, although they may facilitate a change in those factors.
Sometimes, a conflict between a transplanted rule and its local context triggers a
radical change in elements of the economic infrastructure. Finally, domestic investors
and foreign investors, as powerful public interest groups, need the company law
system to achieve certain international standards in shareholder protection.
Consequently, Chinese policy-makers must face a range of complex technical,
political and cultural issues in the legal reform of corporate governance. The issues
include:
� overcoming the disadvantages resulting from limited local knowledge and
the weak culture of commercial law;
2 E.g. Emperor Qianlong dismissing the British ambassador with the comments "we have never valued
ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of your country's manufactures". see R.
Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest (Oxford University Press
2008) 282
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� considering the complementarity between a newly-implemented rule and the
existing legal system;
� facing the tough challenge from globalization;
� fulfilling the legal elites' demand for theoretical perfection;
� ensuring a newly-implemented rule has the potential to facilitate the
proposed economic reform; and
� balancing the interests between State ownership and individual investors.
In practice, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to design legal
rules, which can fulfil the multiple-legislative-objectives pursued in such a
complicated context. Indeed, designing perfect context-appropriate legal rules is not
the only aim of China's legal reform of corporate governance. The conflict between
law and context therefore is inevitable.
Secondly, the influence of local context on the development of company law in
China is also complex. China's political and cultural context not only hampers the
adoption of Western rules, but also the endogenous development of company law
through functional convergence. Nearly one hundred years ago, Yan Fu, a preeminent
Chinese scholar of the Qing Dynasty commented:
Anglo-American companies have well designed institutional structures, as they
come from constitutionally democratic countries. In contrast, the Chinese people
are living under a dictatorship. They have no idea of personal right and fairness.
Therefore, the Chinese cannot create any equivalence, which can compete with
the Western style company.3
This insightful comment provides an explanation for the development of China's
company law in 21st century. In modern China, some core features of the political and
cultural context have not significantly changed from how they were one hundred
3 F. Yan, Tian Yan Lun [Evolution and Ethics] (1897) 105
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years ago. Even today China has not established a political regime concretely based
on liberal democracy. However, healthy commercial law culture requires political soil
that does not restrict or disturb its development. In China, there is no civil society in
which NGOs or individuals are allowed to play an active role in supervising large
public companies. Additionally, the regulatory regime is over-reliant on
administration, which simplifies the direction of the growth of commercial law culture.
The current political regime makes China's commercial law culture too weak and
impoverished to support endogenous development of the company law system.
Consequently, although China has experienced rapid economic development in the
last three decades, leading to the Chinese economic system occasionally being
labelled a "Chinese model",4 this model is still not complete in modelling an effective
modern company law system without the support of Western experience. As discussed
in former chapters, the newly-revised Company Law 2005 rarely contributes any
institutional innovation through functional convergence.
To conclude, by summarizing the principal findings of previous chapters, this
dissertation tries to draw a clearer and more accurate picture of China's legal reform
of corporate governance. The multiple targets of this reform together with the
complex political background in which it takes place mean that the "formal
convergence model" is the only feasible and pragmatic approach available in the
Chinese context.
6.2 Some Theoretical Implications for Theories of Comparative Corporate
Governance
In addition to adding a new dimension to the scholarship of China's corporate
governance regime, this research generates some important insights for theories of
comparative corporate governance. China takes a formal convergence approach to its
legal reform of corporate governance. This supports legal scholars' explanations of the
4 See generally R. Peerenboom (n 2)
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formal convergence model, which focus on the congruence of underpinning economic
components5 and the force of global competition6. Firstly, China's case supports the
"convergence through congruence" argument. The Western style rules adopted by the
1993 Company Law are introduced to meet the demands of the newly-implemented
"socialist market economy." The transplanted rules of 2005’s company law are
responses to China's full engagement with globalization. The increasing number of
foreign listed companies, the invitation of foreign investors into the domestic market,
and the reform of the banking system and property law, all draw the economic context
surrounding company law in China closer to that of Western jurisdictions. As a result,
the law is becoming increasingly similar to that of the Western world.
Secondly, China’s case supports the "competition argument". Policy-makers take
an instrumental view of company law reform. They believe that the law does not only
react to, but forges context. Adopting technically advanced rules can facilitate
economic development and promote the competitiveness of China's domestic firms in
the global market.
Nonetheless, these two considerations do entirely account for China’s adoption
of the formal convergence model. There may be some other "convergence forces" in a
transition economy. Firstly, the legal end-user's attitude towards foreign law is
important for the reception of a transplanted rule. As Foster argues, commercial law is
not necessarily bound to, or dissociated from, culture or social processes: whether or
not it is "culture-specific" depends on the attitude towards it of those in a position to
influence its successful reception.7 Chinese lawyers generally have a critical attitude
towards the socialist legal tradition and regard path-dependent forces, such as
5 M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 250-290
6 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law
Journal 439 and Siems (n 5) 297
7 N. Foster, 'Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law in a Globalized World', In E.
Orucu &. A. Harding (eds.), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001)
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over-concentrated State ownership, as the origin of poor shareholder protection.8 By
contrast, lawyers have a more positive attitude towards rules or institutions
transplanted from Western jurisdictions, which are more likely to occasion a
fundamental structural change in the local context. Secondly, it is necessary to know
whether a jurisdiction has a well-established commercial law culture, before declaring
functional convergence as the more suitable model for the legal reform of corporate
governance in that jurisdiction. As highlighted above, in China, local knowledge and
traditional institutional structures are not rich and flexible enough to respond to the
changed economic context. China does not have a commercial culture or tradition that
is strong or flexible enough to deal with newly-emerged problems arising from the
intense pressure of globalization. Due to this lack of experience, the perfect functional
equivalence to fit China's context may be not available to legislators. Therefore, when
the government reforms China’s economic structure towards a "market economy"
model, transplanting legal rules or institutions from Western jurisdiction is inevitable.
Gilson’s explanation of the difference between formal convergence and functional
convergence highlights that the situation encountered in China reflects formal
convergence. He writes:
[F]unctional convergence, [is] when existing corporate governance institutions
are flexible enough to respond to the demands of changed circumstances without
altering the institutions' formal characteristics; formal convergence, when an
effective response requires legislative action to alter the basic structure of existing
governance institutions…9
Finally, the initial conditions in which the law develops significantly influences
the path along which the law further evolves. If the development of law is locked into a
model, it is economically inefficient to abolish this developing model, even if it
8 X. Tang, 'Konggu Gudong De Shouxin Yiwu Cong Meiguo Fa Shang Yizhi' [Block-holder's
Fiduciary Duties: Transplanting from the US] In B.S Wang (eds.), Zhuanxing Zhong Gongsifa De
Xiandaihua [Modernizing Company Law in Transition Context] 535
9 R. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function' (2001) 49
American Journal of Comparative Law 329, 356
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conflicts with some core components of its context. Consequently, the adoption of a
formal convergence model can result from "efficiency path-dependence". As such, a
formal convergence model may be triggered by the following combining forces in a
transitional economy:
� the congruence of some key elements of economic infrastructure with that of
Western jurisdictions;
� pressures from the competition of the global market;
� policy-makers and legal end-users tending to adopt a pragmatic attitude
towards Western legal culture, which is assumed to be superior or at least more
market-economy friendly;
� the notion that advanced Western law is an instrument for deepening the
reform of economic infrastructure and improving the competitiveness of domestic
firms;
� an absence of rich local knowledge and resources from which to develop an
effective company law regime through functional convergence, making formal
convergence the only available and practical method for legal reform; and
� legal reform starting from and therefore already being locked into the formal
convergence model, which it is too economically inefficient to change.
6.3 Practical Contributions
Beyond this series of theoretical arguments, this dissertation makes some
practical contributions to China's legal reform of corporate governance. It suggests a
bundle of proposals, which are aimed to improve agency-cost controlling strategies by
effectively adopting rules of UK company law. These reform proposals follow the
formal convergence model. By reviewing a wide-range of UK and occasionally US
case law and legislation, this paper highlights the legal rules, institutions or
interpretations that can improve the effectiveness of Chinese company law. It has
gone on to discuss how to integrate these elements into China's existing legal regime,
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and how to transform them into an effective model for controlling China’s corporate
governance problems. By proposing the reform of some important company law rules
for controlling agency cost, this paper has generated some findings which inform
China's company law reform using the formal convergence model:
� Accurately understanding the law in a parent jurisdiction is a precondition for
the formal convergence model. This understanding cannot be limited to the
positive law, but extends to the legal theory behind positive law.
� Extracting the "Chinese problem"10 from the universal corporate governance
problem is a key part of the formal convergence model. This process determines
which part of the transplant rule will be selectively adopted and which part will
be not. Alternatively it can determine how to modify a transplanted rule in order
to solve problems with Chinese characteristics.
� It is important always to take weak legal enforcement and weak institutional
support into consideration. In such cases law should contain more detailed and
manageable legal rules rather than vague standards or principles.
� In a transitional economy like China, the law should regard "commercial
morality" and the safety of transactions in the market as a superior value to
economic efficiency and effectiveness. A one-sided focus on the latter may cause
market disorder, especially in conditions where commercial morality is not well
established.
6.4 China's Legal Reform of Corporate Governance: History tells the
Future
As mentioned in the first chapter, China is an extraordinary interesting case for
testing the comparative corporate governance theories, not only because it is the
10 E.g. see chapter V 5.2.5.1, the discussion on the "clan-based commercial problem" in self-dealing
transactions. Self-dealing transaction is a universal corporate governance problem, which exists in most
jurisdictions. However, the "clan-based commercial problem" in self-dealing transaction is a "Chinese
problem", which is not the major concern for most Western jurisdictions.
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second largest economy in the world, but also it remains the socialist regime in a
political sense. In addition to that, as a transitional economy, many important factors
of China's political and cultural context are subject to reform. All these characteristics
make China's future development of corporate governance regime to be complicated
and difficult to predict. This research not only maps out an accurate picture of the
political-cultural context surrounding China's corporate governance, but also
formulates a solid correlation between China's political-cultural context and its legal
reform of corporate governance. The major findings of this research enable us to
make some valuable predictions of the future development of the corporate
governance regime in one of world's major economic entity.
It seems that China's legal reform of corporate governance is in a dilemma. On
one hand, powerful government control and consequent State ownership still appears
to be dominant. This supports consistent economic development in China and
occasionally creates some powerful competitors in the global market, at least in the
last three decades. Deeply-embedded political and cultural factors make it difficult to
rid China's legal system of the "rule of man". On the other side, economic
development that comes with wide-spread official corruption, extremely unfair
distribution between rich and poor, and "race to bottom" official policies is unlikely to
be sustainable. Therefore, the current regime could be forced to move towards a "rule
of law system".
One possible scenario is that China's large companies will finally be governed by
a "rule of law" system. China's current mode of economic development is ultimately
unsustainable11 and by further exposing its negative aspects to the general public, its
demise may loom closer. Both domestic and foreign investors may become impatient
with China's model of economic growth, which is based on corruption, government
11 For this point, see generally G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Rondam House
2001), and for more recent comments on the negative aspects of China's economic development, see J.
Anderlini, China's Growth Model 'Unsustainable', December 23rd, 2010, Financial Time and T.
Carpenter, 'Reassessing China's Rise: Knowns and Unknowns' on Cato institution's website at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12937 accessed 20th July 2011
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connections and unfair competition. This increasing public unease and apprehension
may force both the central government and local governments to redefine their roles
in supervising large public companies. Otherwise, the government and the Party's
legitimate position will be seriously threatened. Consequently, although corporatism
and clientelism may still play a role in China's public company corporate governance
regime, a fairer playing field will be provided by implementing a more substantial
"rule of law" system. Finally, the government might be able to achieve the Chinese
dream of harmonious society through the "rule of law" system. Under this system,
weakening the government's role in the regulatory regime will lead to a prosperous
commercial law culture. Accordingly, a more powerful cultural dynamic which
enables China's company law to achieve international standards by enacting
functionally equivalent rules may emerge.
The other possible scenario is that both domestic and foreign investors will
finally get used to China's development model based on corporatism and clientelism.
Fragmented economic reforms may be still capable of maintaining economic
development at a relatively high level whilst also maintaining social stability. As R.
Peerenboom argues, "Chinese citizens may be willing to accept shortcomings if they
feel steady progress is being made. They may feel the government is doing its best, or
at least reasonably well, given the circumstance."12 Foreign investors may remain
content with the existing system if the Chinese government provides a bundle of
attractive preferential policies. Legal reform would remain superficial, not
significantly affecting deeply-embedded political and cultural elements. Transplanted
rules would remain window-dressing. In some cases, Western legal rules would serve
some fragmented economic reforms proposed and oriented by the State, but would not
found any substantial political-economic reform. It is a little surprising to predict that
a system based on corporatism, clientilism and a weak legal system may capable of
maintaining sustainable economic development in the Chinese context. However, as
12 R. Peerenboom (n 2), 288
262
one Western Economist explains, China may be "the mother of all black-swans".13 A
company law regime, under such conditions, must still however, adhere to
transplanting Western rules into China's legal system to achieve some international
standards, as there is little room for developing a wholesome local commercial law
culture.
13 See V. Katsenelson, 'China: The Mother of All Black Swans', a presentation available at
<http://contrarianedge.com/2010/02/12/china-the-mother-of-all-black-swans/> accessed 20th July 2011
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